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Abstract 
 
So much has been written about Friedrich Nietzsche’s life and work that entire books 
have now been written about how extensively Nietzsche’s life and oeuvre have been 
written about. There is not simply a wide range of interpretations of Nietzsche, but an 
industry of interpretations. What is apparent in this industry is an interpretative 
maximalism that is part and parcel of the postmodern, post–nineteenth century 
approach to Nietzsche and his radical break from modernist thinking. Yet, despite the 
evident value of these herculean hermeneutic and biographical efforts of the past, 
perhaps the best impulse might lie in a counter-intuition: to re-construct Nietzsche’s 
work in the most minimal terms possible.  
 
Stemming from the French literary and cultural critic, René Girard, whose work on 
“mimetic desire” and the “scapegoat mechanism” were formative to his thinking, Eric 
Gans, Distinguished Professor of French and Francophone Studies at the University 
of California, Los Angeles, has pursued a line of non-metaphysical philosophical 
thought he calls “generative anthropology.” Contrary to much postmodern 
philosophical thinking—at least in the humanities—Gans has proposed a “minimal 
hypothesis” that attempts to answer fundamental questions about human 
consciousness and language by placing the ostensive sign at the very centre of human 
origins—of the origin of the human as human. Generative anthropology essentially 
attempts to figure Homo sapiens in the most elementary terms possible. Crucially, 
Gans claims that the work of Nietzsche represents a particular model of his originary 
analysis—although his analysis of how this is the case deserves to be elaborated on 
more. In this thesis, I situate Nietzsche’s work by articulating it in the most minimal 
terms possible—that is, to discern how Nietzsche’s work re-presents the scene of 
human origin; and equally, how this theoretical orientation offers a plausible, 
coherent, and novel way of approaching his work. And so, essentially, the goal of this 
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dissertation will be to expand and clarify how and why it is the case that one should 
utilise generative anthropology as a hermeneutic tool to study Nietzsche’s work.  
 
Despite the overwhelmingly postmodern philosophical reception of Nietzsche’s 
works (by Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault) in the twentieth century, this thesis 
aims to situate Nietzsche, not only as a precursor to postmodern suspicion, but as a 
theorist of the human, of human origins, and of the ethical. Of course, Nietzsche is 
particularly preoccupied with the origin of language, resentment, religion, morality, 
tragedy, culture, and music—all minimal categories of the human, according to 
generative anthropology. Yet, how is it possible to fly against a century of typically 
Nietzschean postmodern philosophical thinking characterised by the denial of the 
objectivity of linguistic reference, where determinate meaning is impossible? The 
answer to this question may lie in generative anthropology, which theorises that the 
emergence of language was a singular event and that all human culture is a 
development stemming from this event. Generative anthropology allows for a 
hermeneutic of Nietzsche’s oeuvre that at once positions him as an anthropologist, a 
theorist of human origins and of the ethical, and allows one to bypass the postmodern 
de-/re-constructions of his work by claiming that he offers a particular scene of 
human origins, that he explicitly discusses the origin of the human and language, and 
that he provides a particular insight to one of the most important philosophical 
questions: What is the human?  
 
This thesis positions Nietzsche as a theorist of the origins of the ethical. It does this by 
utilising generative anthropology, a field which deals specifically with the ethical in 
relation to the event of human language origins. By utilising generative anthropology 
as the hermeneutic lens to examine Nietzsche’s own insights about the human, we 
gain insights into both ways of thinking. Indeed, Nietzsche’s later thinking about the 
ethical is intimately connected to his earlier thinking about the emergence of language 
as an aesthetic phenomenon. Through an “originary analysis” of Nietzsche’s 
fundamental ideas about the human—the will to power, eternal recurrence, 
resentment, and language as “error”—Nietzsche’s particular vision of what the human 
is will be mapped out within a generative anthropological framework, which 
considers the advent of language itself to be coeval with the ethical and the “vertical” 
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separation of the human from the horizontal worldly appetite of the non-human 
animal. An originary analysis is essentially that which claims all human thought and 
activity stem from a single “scene” of human origin, where all aspects of the human 
can be traced back to this moment. In order to understand how and why one should 
read Nietzsche from a generative anthropological standpoint, it is essential to give a 
brief overview of generative anthropology and its understanding of the origin of the 
human, language, and the ethical. However, it is precisely because generative 
anthropology provides a fixed reference point that accounts for the fundamental 
elements of the human as human, we are able to assess Nietzsche’s own thinking 
about the human in a new way, without retreating into the postmodern suspicion of 
the truth value of language.
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Introduction to Generative Anthropology: 
The “Originary Hypothesis” and “Originary Analysis” 
 
Inspired by René Girard’s work on mimetic theory, Eric Gans has pursued a line of 
non-metaphysical philosophical thought he calls “generative anthropology.” One 
might equate Gans’s notion of the origin of language to the cosmological theory of 
the big bang, or to how Gans himself describes his hypothesis, that is, the “little 
bang.”1 For generative anthropology, all things human are accounted for with respect 
to the singular event of the emergence of human language. Gans argues that the origin 
of language is scenic—say, for instance, an early hominid group gathered around the 
fresh meat of a dead, non-human animal. For Gans, language is essentially scenic. In 
other words, language is characterised by a scene where a sacred centre and human 
periphery emerge. Accordingly, generative anthropology attempts to explain the 
emergence of meaning that is created from the scene of human representation. As a 
preliminary example—although it matters little to speculate on the exact details of 
how the first scene was generated, as long as it was a scene—several members of a 
hominid group are standing around an animal carcass, where all members of the 
group share the same triangulated mimetic desire for food. Since not all of the 
members of the group can acquire the same animal at the same time, an outbreak of 
violence threatens the group. At this instant, what Gans calls the “aborted gesture of 
appropriation” occurs. One member of the group has emitted a sign or signal that re-
presents the central object of desire symbolically that at once points to the object and 
at the same time renounces mimetic desire for the object. The aborted gesture of 
appropriation functions to both defer violence and form a referent in and of itself. The 
first sign is an imitation of an object (as per the classical theory of mimesis-as-
                                                             
1  Eric Gans, “The Little Bang: The Early Origin of Language,” Anthropoetics 5, no. 1 (1999): 1, accessed 
December 13, 2016, http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0501/gans.htm. 
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representation) but paradoxically it becomes its own “object” in the instance of its 
emergence: it traces its own closure through mimesis of the object. This, Gans claims, 
is coeval with—and in some senses is—the event of the emergence of human 
consciousness. Once symbolic representation of the central object has been occurred, 
Gans claims, no “alpha animal” can defer to the dominance hierarchy of violent 
control, nor does it have the ability to dominate the group’s mimetic desire for the 
central object. The aborted gesture of appropriation effectively defers the alpha’s 
ability to dominate the group through violence because the sign preserves the 
knowledge of the originary event. For Gans, the sign is an imitation and symbolic re-
presentation of the central object of desire. From “horizontal” mimetic appetite comes 
the “verticality” of the sign. Gans writes:  
 
The gesture of appropriation is an act that directly intends a worldly 
result; its temporality is that of the practical world. In contrast, the sign 
does not intend its referent directly, but through mimesis of its formal 
closure. The sign is an object, a product, a whole imitating another 
whole. The sign points to its referent, but in order to do so, it must be 
cut off from the possibility of attaining it, must mimic the objects 
closure in its own. What is new about the human sign as opposed to the 
most complex animal signals is that it is the product of a formal 
consciousness. The sign is a form in that it turns back on itself in order 
not to appear to be pursued as a gesture of appropriation.2 
 
Indeed, through the abortive gesture of appropriation, violence becomes temporarily 
deferred through signification. The sole cause and paradoxical function of the original 
gesture/sign is to defer violence through ever-new, reciprocal emissions of itself. 
Gans explains: “The gesture is aborted as appropriated but pursued as 
representation.”3 What we have here is a sign that becomes a quasi object of its own, 
existing in itself while pointing to its referent at the centre. Our protohuman ancestors, 
through the emission of a sign, have managed to temporarily defer violence, and in 
                                                             
2  Eric Gans, Signs of Paradox: Irony, Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 30. 
3  Ibid., 98. 
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the act separated themselves from their biological progenitors. The following points, I 
argue, are the most basic elements that constitute the originary hypothesis: (1) there 
was an original scenic event of some sort, comprising more than one protohuman; (2) 
this original scene was catalysed, or triggered, by a mimetic crisis at a critical 
moment/instant; (3) the outbreak of violence was deferred through an aborted gesture 
of appropriation; and (4) the first sign (the gesture) and the signs that followed were 
rapidly disseminated among the first language users.  
 
 
What Is the Methodology of Originary Analysis? 
 
The originary scene of human representation is the moment of transition between the 
animal and the human proper, where everything human emerges in its nascent state. If 
one is to accept the originary hypothesis, one can deduce that all human 
representation throughout history “reproduces the minimal conditions of its origin.”4 
In other words, every human representation, utterance, sign, or gesture recreates the 
original deferral of violence through an aborted gesture of appropriation. Thus, the 
methodology of originary analysis is to examine the most basic developments of 
human communication from the standpoint of their origin.5  
 
In Originary Thinking: Elements of Generative Anthropology, Gans declares that 
originary analysis begins with examining the origin of the fundamental categories of 
the human; for instance, desire, art, religion, morality, and resentment. In order to 
gain a greater understanding of any of these fundamental categories of the human, 
Gans declares, “we must construct a plausible model of the ‘moment’ within the event 
in which the particular category is constituted.”6 Therefore, a link can be drawn 
between a specific understanding of a fundamental human category and a broader 
theory of the human in general. One aim for originary analysis, then, is to locate how 
                                                             
4  Eric Gans, “Originary Analysis, Revisited,” Chronicles of Love and Resentment, no. 312 (2005): 2, accessed 
December 7, 2016, http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/views/vw312.htm. 
5  Gans declares that an originary analysis is not an all-inclusive analysis. In other words, only categories of 
human culture may be subjected to originary analysis; the means by which we seek to understand the natural 
universe is not within the scope of generative anthropology. See: Eric Gans, Originary Thinking: Elements of 
Generative Anthropology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1993), 10.  
6  Ibid. 
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and why a particular human category emerges from the originary event. Gans writes: 
“Originary analysis is essentially narrative; we understand a human phenomenon by 
attempting to tell the story of its emergence.”7 As an example, if one were to give an 
originary analysis of Nietzsche’s ideas on, say, resentment, one must first elaborate 
the emergence of resentment within the human scene of origin. By performing such 
an operation, we would be given a point of reference when examining Nietzsche’s 
position on central ideas: resentment, language, and the ethical. By utilising the 
“reference point” provided by generative anthropology and the originary hypothesis, I 
argue, I will account for—and redefine—many of Nietzsche’s central ideas, which are 
found on the original scene of human representation. 
 
 
1. Twentieth-Century Interpretations of Nietzsche: Beyond Postmodern 
Thinking 
 
The aim of chapter 1 is, first, to examine the major interpretations of Nietzsche’s 
thought found throughout the twentieth century, and, second, to position Nietzsche as 
a theorist of human origins in light of generative anthropology. The logic involved in 
surveying the most widely read and discussed interpretations of Nietzsche is twofold: 
(1) to understand the main trends of how Nietzsche has been interpreted thus far, and 
(2) to acknowledge how he has not been interpreted thus far—that is, as a theorist of 
human origins. Nietzsche is often categorised as one of the founding fathers of 
postmodern thinking, along with Freud and Marx, characterised by Paul Ricœur as the 
three masters of the “hermeneutics of suspicion.”8 Of course, the general tenets of 
postmodern thinking claim that “truth” and “knowledge” remain forever unreachable 
and unable to be verified because of the conditions that characterise language itself. If 
language is all that the human has as a tool to validate “truth,” it is impossible to 
prove the existence of an objective reality. Of course, the postmodern philosophers 
examined in chapter 1 all define, in one way or another, Nietzsche as a thinker who 
thinks beyond traditional Western notions of an objective reality. This skepticism 
                                                             
7  Ibid. 
8  Paul Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1970), 32. 
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pertaining to the lack of objectivity found in language is precisely why there exists a 
problem with Nietzsche interpretations. For example, Gans claims that it was solely 
twentieth-century, “Nietzschean” thinking that was responsible for the postmodern 
skepticism of philosophy, or of the sciences, for that matter, locating any sort of 
objectivity. The underlying reality of all human thinking is, indeed, language. Gans 
writes: “With the death of the ‘right Nietzschean’ illusion of fascist regeneration 
through an esthetic politics is born an era dominated by ‘left Nietzschean’ skepticism 
about any form of authentic human interaction, esthetics and politics included.”9 
Instead of the claims of the “right” fascists, or of “left” postmodern Nietzscheans, 
generative anthropology claims to be a non-metaphysical, philosophical line of 
thought that allows for a point of reference in order to examine Nietzsche’s work. 
Through the lens of generative anthropology, following Gans, I will clear a path 
where Nietzsche’s thought can be reconciled in objective terms, by tracing his 
thoughts on language, resentment, the ethical, the theory of the will to power, and the 
doctrine of eternal return back to the originary scene of human representation. 
 
First, I will examine Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche as the “last 
metaphysician,” found in “Nietzsche as Metaphysician.” Heidegger ultimately 
declares Nietzsche to be the last metaphysician and the first to characterise “beings as 
such.” Second, I will examine Karl Löwith’s interpretation of Nietzsche found in 
Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same as the systematic 
philosopher who was ultimately unable to reconcile the will to power with the eternal 
return. Third, Michel Foucault’s famous “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” interprets 
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, which stands as a postmodern interpretation 
of Nietzsche’s thinking par excellence.10 Foucault considers the genealogical 
interpretation of history to be a reflection on the emergence of cultural artifacts as the 
interrelation between power structures. Fourth, considered to be the most 
idiosyncratic reading of Nietzsche’s oeuvre, Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzsche and 
Philosophy presents a “left” creative-active Nietzsche—a Nietzsche for “radically 
                                                             
9  Eric Gans, Originary Thinking, 209. 
10 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 
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personal, artistic, poetic, and philosophical efforts.”11 Beyond Deleuze, I will assess 
Jacques Derrida’s Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles/Eperons; Les Styles de Nietzsche, where 
the father of “deconstruction” presents Nietzsche’s “styles” as the precursors to the 
decentring and deconstruction of the human as a consequence of Nietzsche’s 
proclamation of the death of God. The last work to be examined in relation to the 
major interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy will be Pierre Klossowski’s The 
Vicious Circle. Considered a masterpiece of Nietzschean scholarship, The Vicious 
Circle presents Nietzsche’s work as inextricably linked to his fluctuating health. 
 
Having provided an account of the major philosophical interpretations of Nietzsche’s 
thought, I will reflect on the problems contained in, or restrictions placed on, these 
very disparate interpretations—linked only by the qualifier “postmodern”—through 
examining what generative anthropology itself has to say about Nietzsche. Yet one of 
the key links, particularly between Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze, in their 
interpretation of Nietzsche, and in their own philosophical endeavours, is that they all 
agree on the notion that philosophical thinking must not engage with the search for 
human origins. 
 
In the chapter entitled “Scenes of Philosophy” in The Scenic Imagination, Gans 
positions Nietzsche as offering a particular model of the human, where a scene of 
human representation emerges from the synergies between Dionysian music and the 
Apollonian symbol, as mapped out in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy. An originary 
analysis of Nietzsche’s main ideas set out in The Birth of Tragedy will mark the 
beginning of the trajectory of this dissertation. I will conclude chapter 1 by giving an 
account of the feasibility of an in-depth generative anthropological originary analysis 
of Nietzsche—something that no-one has yet attempted.  
 
 
2. An Originary Analysis of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language 
 
                                                             
11  Gregory B. Smith, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 68. 
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Chapter 2 will begin by situating Nietzsche as a nineteenth-century theorist of origins 
by examining his very early works, “On the Origins of Language,” “On Music and 
Words,” On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, and later, The Gay Science, in 
order to emphasise just how explicitly Nietzsche attempts to account for the origin of 
the human and the fundamental generative anthropological categories of the human, 
such as resentment, morality, religion, logic, knowledge, and language. Not only is 
Nietzsche deeply entrenched within nineteenth-century thinking about origins—he 
reflects extensively on Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural descent, however 
misguided—but, he also deeply engages with the origin of language and of the 
ethical. Through a dialogue with generative anthropology, I will examine the 
fundamental theoretical synergies and differences between Nietzsche’s understanding 
of the human, and that of generative anthropology, in order to establish how each 
mode of thinking’s views on language and the ethical orients a particular model of the 
human. One of the aims of chapter 2 is to give an originary analysis of Nietzsche’s 
thinking about language and how it orients his thinking about the ethical in light of 
generative anthropology. Indeed, generative anthropology considers language and the 
ethical to be inseparable. Chapter 2 will contend that Nietzsche’s early views on 
language directly influence his later thinking about the ethical as a merely aesthetic 
phenomenon. I will also discuss the consequences of viewing language as an aesthetic 
phenomenon in light of generative anthropology. 
 
In On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense and The Gay Science, Nietzsche spends 
much of his time preoccupied with specific problems concerning language, such as its 
function, origin, and relationship to the ethical, and with other human “inventions.” 
Yet, his ideas about the function and origin of language are widely overlooked 
throughout academia. Nietzsche’s early fascination with philology led him to a keen 
interest in the problems of the origin of language. In these formative years he 
approached this problem by analysing the relation between verbal language and 
music. He considered music to be the “universal language” that “stands in symbolic 
relation to the primordial contradiction and primordial pain in the heart of the 
primordial Unity, and therefore symbolizes a sphere which is above all appearance 
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and beyond all phenomena.”12 For Nietzsche, music is the primary language, which 
precedes the linguistic. For him, linguistic symbolism is a secondary phenomenon, 
parasitic on music. In “Nietzsche’s Contribution to the Theory of Language,” Roger 
Hazelton writes that Nietzsche considers “the secondary symbolism that is language 
may thus be considered either as representational and imitative with respect to its 
objects, or as expressive and evocative with respect to its origin. This tension between 
metaphysical origin and phenomenal objects give rise in turn to the diversity of 
functioning within language itself.”13 In The Gay Science, we also see Nietzsche 
acknowledging the idea that language is not situated with the individual, but rather 
“only a connection, a connecting network between man and man” ultimately formed 
“under the pressure of the necessity for communication.”14 In these texts, Nietzsche 
anticipates many elements in Gans’s originary hypothesis on multiple levels, 
including the necessity of language being a communal phenomenon, rather than some 
instantaneous, subjective evolution. This figuring of consciousness as arising in social 
terms antedates Gans’s originary hypothesis. Hazelton claims “the important idea that 
communication by verbal exchange of signs precedes and even conditions the growth 
of consciousness in the individual,”15 or what Nietzsche calls “social utility.” To 
highlight the fundamental parallels between Nietzsche’s view of language (aesthetic) 
and Gans’s (ethical) view of it will clear a path to situate Nietzsche’s work within a 
generative anthropological framework, where we can begin an in-depth analysis of 
the notion of the difference between language as aesthetic or as ethical. 
 
 
3. Nietzsche, Girard, Gans: Master and Slave, Mimesis, and Originary 
Resentment 
 
Chapter 3 will examine the notion of resentment as a fundamental, minimal element 
of Nietzsche’s theory of the human. Nietzsche, Girard, and Gans each contribute 
                                                             
12 Roger Hazelton, “Nietzsche’s Contribution to the Theory of Language,” Philosophical Review 52, no. 1 (1943): 
47–60, accessed November 12, 2016, 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/stable/2180560?sid=primo&origin=crossref&seq=1#page_scan_tab_cont
ents. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 298. 
15  Hazelton, “Nietzsche’s Contribution,” 51. 
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toward the understanding of the importance and position of resentment. According to 
all three thinkers, resentment is an indispensable element of what constitutes the 
human. Interestingly, Gans claims that Nietzsche is indeed the discoverer of the 
rightful place of resentment. In Nietzsche’s first essay in On the Genealogy of 
Morals: A Polemic, he investigates the ostensible origins of Judaeo-Christian morality 
and the consequent emergence of what he calls ressentiment. This section of research 
will focus on the homologies that exist between Nietzsche’s critique of “our origin of 
moral prejudices,” Girard’s mimetic theory specifically in relation to Nietzsche, and 
Gans’s originary hypothesis. Chapter 3 will ask: In what ways does Nietzsche give a 
scenic representation of resentment, as pointed out in On the Genealogy of Morals? 
Further: How do we reconcile Nietzsche’s methodological preference of 
“genealogy”—that is, a slow, intertwining, and gradual evolution of humanity—and 
Gans’s punctual “origin” of consciousness?  
 
For Gans, resentment is not the overwhelming feeling of a slave morality towards a 
master; rather, he says that resentment is something experienced by all of humanity as 
a consequence of the inability to access the central object of desire, from the 
periphery, through the representation of the aborted gesture of appropriation. This is 
what Gans discerns as “originary resentment.” An originary reading of Nietzsche’s 
resentment may well be the formulation that the Jews—and, later, the Christians—
produced an entire mode of living based on resentment because of the impossibility of 
accessing the now designated but unreachable centre. In other words, Gans tells us, 
Judaeo-Christian morality has made being on the periphery something of a virtue.  
 
Girard’s work is also particularly important to chapter 3 for two reasons. First, his 
analysis in “Dionysus Versus the Crucified” gives insight into the religious elements 
of Nietzsche’s work, where one is able to get closer to sketching out an originary 
reading of resentment. “Dionysus Versus the Crucified” emphasises the notion that 
Nietzsche viewed the history of humanity as a violent struggle of impulses. Second, 
Girard’s work is a fundamental precursor to Gans’s work on the originary hypothesis. 
Without Girard’s work on mimetic theory and the scapegoat mechanism, Gans’s idea 
on the origin of the human would be inconceivable. Girard’s work will provide a 
balanced insight into what Nietzsche depicts as the “value” of morality and into 
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Gans’s hypothesis that language acts as the deferral of violence through continual 
representations of the sign. In chapter 3, I will reconfigure Nietzsche’s important 
discovery of resentment in light of generative anthropology. I will do so first by 
examining Gans’s notion of originary resentment. Then, I will provide a close reading 
of the central argument of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. Third, I will give 
a brief overview of Girard’s theory of mimesis, as it forms the foundation of his 
analysis of Nietzsche’s resentment. I will also consider some of the problems 
concerning Girard’s assessment of Nietzsche’s notion of resentment. From here, I will 
return to originary resentment in relation to Nietzsche’s idea that although the masters 
were the inheritors of language, the slaves were the ones who developed an internal 
scene of representation through resentment. Finally, I will consider Nietzsche’s 
assertion that the masters were the inventors of language, in relation to Gans’s 
proposition that there is indeed one who emits the first gesture on the scene of human 
origins, or what generative anthropology refers to as “firstness.” 
 
 
4. An Originary Analysis of the Will to Power and of Eternal Recurrence 
 
Through a close examination of Nietzsche’s unauthorised posthumously published 
notebooks (Nachlass), The Will to Power, chapter 4 will examine two of Nietzsche’s 
central philosophical ideas: the “will to power” and the “eternal recurrence of the 
same.” The Nachlass manuscript offers an extraordinary insight into what are 
considered to be the two pillars of Nietzsche’s thinking, the will to power, as the sum 
total of all reality, in an eternally recurring world of the same.  
 
In the Scenic Imagination, Gans declares that it is Nietzsche “whose every sentence 
puts author and reader en scene more compellingly than any thinker since Pascal.”16 
For Nietzsche, the scene, if you will, is the will to power in an eternally recurring 
world of sameness. He writes: “This world is a will to power, and nothing besides.”17 
In order to succeed with an originary analysis of the will to power, one must locate 
                                                             
16  Gans, Signs of Paradox, 139. 
17  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (London: Vintage Books, 
1982), 551. (WP 551; cf. 13:14[98]). 
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the minimal elements of these principles in order to reconstruct it on the original 
scene of human representation. This section will offer an originary analysis of what I 
consider to be the most relevant sections of Nietzsche’s The Will to Power 
(manuscript) in the attempt to situate Nietzsche’s formulations that constitute a theory 
of the “will to power” within an originary framework. This section will argue that 
Nietzsche’s will to power falters in light of generative anthropology because the 
subjectless will to power, as Nietzsche holds, is ultimately designated by a subject. 
Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power, however, may be tenable if we are to consider 
the cosmological doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same.  
 
The second aim of chapter 4 is to explore the eternal recurrence of the same in light of 
generative anthropology. There have been few responses from generative 
anthropology to Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. A notable exception is Adam Katz’s 
The Question of Originary Method: The Generative Thought Experiment. Considering 
there is no forthcoming “proof” of the eternal recurrence, nor any possibility of one 
forthcoming, Katz claims the eternal recurrence rests on the originary scene of human 
representation as a self-reflexive thought experiment. Another productive way to 
examine eternal recurrence in light of generative anthropology is to examine a 
ubiquitous mythological symbol that converges on Nietzsche’s and Gans’s thinking, 
the Ouroboros. The Ouroboros is found on the cover of Gans’s first book on 
generative anthropology, presumably because the Ouroboros represents the perpetual 
deferral of violence through symbolic representation. The Ouroboros, for Gans, is 
also a symbol of the formal closure of the sign, thus producing consciousness. 
Therefore, there is a convergence between Nietzsche’s and Gans’s thinking about 
eternal return in some very distinct ways. For Gans, the eternal return is characterised 
as being the perpetual representation of the scene of human origin. For Nietzsche, it is 
both an ethic to live by and a cosmology, which, I contend, is untenable.  
 
If Nietzsche is, indeed, a theorist of human origins—as this thesis has thus far 
posited—what are we to make of the eternal recurrence of the same, which is 
Nietzsche’s self-proclaimed “greatest teaching,” in relation to human origins and 
language? Once a general framework has been given for an understanding of the 
eternal recurrence as a kosmos anthropos (cosmic anthropology) that attempts to 
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overcome the human, I will consider where the eternal recurrence lies in relation to 
generative anthropology.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What is ultimately at stake in an originary analysis of Nietzsche’s thought are two 
things: (1) to consider Nietzsche a theorist of origins by aligning his thought with that 
of generative anthropology as a framework to guide us through Nietzsche’s central 
ideas; (2) Nietzsche’s views about the origin of the human and human language have 
greatly influenced his later thinking about the ethical—and even the human—as 
“error.” Generative anthropology not only sheds a great deal of light on Nietzsche’s 
thinking in relation to language, resentment, religion, and the ethical, but it also offers 
a solution to the post-Nietzschean thinking I will be exploring in chapter 1. For 
Nietzsche, the ethical is a mere artifact of the aesthetic emergence of the human—
again, as a part of the will to power, which is the eternally recurring world. As we 
have seen, the originary hypothesis accounts for the emergence of both language and 
the ethical, and provides a new way of thinking in terms of examining Nietzsche.
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Chapter 1: 
Twentieth-Century Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
Mankind loves to put the question of origin and beginnings out of minds: must 
one not be almost inhuman to feel in himself the opposite inclination?—
Friedrich Nietzsche1 
 
The aim of this chapter is to give a critical account of the major interpretations of 
Nietzsche’s thought found in the twentieth century. What are deemed here the 
“major” interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought are, quite simply, those works that 
have been at the centre of philosophical discussion and debate; put more baldly, I’ll 
concern myself with those thinkers and lines of thought most cited. This strategy 
clears the path of what would usually be a task that extends far beyond the reaches of 
a dissertation preoccupied with the fecundity of twentieth-century interpretations of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. The logic involved in surveying the most widely read and 
discussed interpretations of Nietzsche is twofold: (1) to understand the main trends 
of how Nietzsche has been interpreted thus far, and (2) to acknowledge how he has 
not been interpreted thus far—that is, as a theorist of origins. A crucial question we 
must ask in this chapter is: Why does academia resist the interpretation of Nietzsche 
as a theorist of origins? So far, the major philosophical accounts of Nietzsche’s work 
give no consideration to his early thinking, where he is indeed preoccupied with the 
origins of language and the human—precisely the theme that most concerns 
generative anthropology. In the last two sections of this chapter, through the lens of 
generative anthropology, following Eric Gans, I will clear a path where Nietzsche is 
situated as a theorist of human origins. 
                                                             
1  Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. (London: Penguin Classics, 
2001), 14. 
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The twentieth century is witness to a great eruption of interpretations of Nietzsche’s 
work. He has evoked more varied interpretations, in just a century, than almost any 
other thinker of his age. For example, renowned Nietzsche translator, Walter 
Kaufmann, asserts that Nietzsche’s books are “easier to read but harder to understand 
than those of almost any other thinker.”2 One of the reasons it is so difficult to 
“interpret” Nietzsche is because Nietzsche himself questions the essence of 
interpretation itself. His legacy is so deeply ingrained within twentieth-century 
intellectual history that much of Nietzsche scholarship has gone so far as to claim 
him to be the father of modern philosophical thinking, founder of postmodernism,3 
and creator of radical individualism.4 All of the above claims are correct. However, 
the sheer variety of –isms that find their ostensible source in Nietzsche’s thinking is 
hard to summarise. One can scarcely account the number of intellectuals who are 
primarily indebted to his thinking. What is this thinking, however? Why is it so 
difficult to agree which tenets of Nietzsche’s thought are central to it? One strategy is 
to account for those who have attempted to interpret Nietzsche’s thought thus far. 
 
This chapter will focus on the philosophical interpretations of Nietzsche that are the 
most cited: those of Martin Heidegger, Karl Löwith, Jacques Derrida, Michel 
Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Pierre Klossowski (in that order). Ultimately, there 
exist major strains of thought that are to be examined in order to uncover how and 
why Nietzsche has not been interpreted as a theorist of origins. The first major 
interpretation of Nietzsche is found in the work of Martin Heidegger. I will examine 
Heidegger’s notion of Dasein in relation to his interpretation of Nietzsche as found 
in “Nietzsche as Metaphysician.” As with every interpretation of Nietzsche discussed 
in this chapter, it is essential to briefly examine the central ideas espoused in 
Heidegger’s philosophy if we are to make sense of the conclusions he has drawn 
from Nietzsche’s own work. I will discuss also what Heidegger means when he 
                                                             
2  Walter Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 72. 
3  See: Dave Robinson, Nietzsche and Postmodernism: Postmodern Encounters (London: Icon Books, 1995).  
4  See: L.  Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism (Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).  
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declares Nietzsche to be the “last metaphysician.” Second, I will examine the 
interpretation presented in Karl Löwith’s—a student of Heidegger’s—Nietzsche’s 
Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, where he claims that Nietzsche’s 
work is a system of aphorisms that are ultimately linked by Nietzsche’s “central 
notion of the eternal recurrence of the same.” From here, I will examine Michel 
Foucault’s essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” which is indicative of his other 
works that deal with Nietzsche’s philosophy. Foucault’s views of Nietzschean 
“power” and “genealogy” are based on Nietzsche’s use of these terms as found in 
The Genealogy of Morals and the posthumous notes compiled in The Will to Power. 
Foucault is a thinker who, rather than presenting a commentary on Nietzsche, prefers 
to “utilise” Nietzsche’s ideas in order to invent new ways of thinking. I will examine 
precisely what these “new” ways of thinking are, which I suggest are fundamentally 
flawed. From here, I will examine Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy, where 
Deleuze presents a “left” creative-active Nietzsche—a Nietzsche for “radically 
personal, artistic, poetic, and philosophical efforts.”5 Deleuze’s interpretation of 
Nietzsche is considered to be the most idiosyncratic of all Nietzsche readings, both in 
this thesis and by most Nietzsche commentators.  
 
Beyond Deleuze, I will assess Jacques Derrida’s Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles/Eperons; 
Les Styles de Nietzsche, where the “father of deconstruction” presents Nietzsche’s 
“styles” as the precursors to the ubiquity of challenges faced by the West in the 
twentieth century, such as those related to sexuality, death, and politics, at least as far 
as these can be read through the analysis of “the question of style.” The last work to 
be examined in relation to the major interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy will be 
Pierre Klossowski’s The Vicious Circle. Considered a masterpiece of Nietzschean 
scholarship, The Vicious Circle presents Nietzsche’s work as inextricably linked to 
his life. In other words, Klossowski opts for a curious approach in claiming that 
Nietzsche’s ideas on truth and power resonate with his various physiological 
ailments. After giving an account of the major twentieth-century interpretations of 
Nietzsche, I will take into consideration how and why these thinkers have not taken 
seriously Nietzsche’s ideas about human origins. I will conclude the chapter by 
                                                             
5  Gregory B. Smith, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 68. 
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providing an alternative view of Nietzsche; that is, I will argue that Nietzsche is a 
theorist of human origins. Through an examination of Eric Gans’s The Scenic 
Imagination: Originary Thinking from Hobbes to the Present Day, I will justify and 
spell out the significance of generative anthropology in relation to Nietzsche’s 
thinking about the human.  
 
 
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Nietzsche as the Completion of Metaphysics 
 
This section will focus on one work in relation to the twentieth-century German 
philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who ultimately declares Nietzsche to be the last 
metaphysician and the first to characterise “beings as such.” Through an examination 
of Heidegger’s essay “Nietzsche as Metaphysician,” I will show that Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche is as a philosopher who declared that all beings are 
manifestations of the “will to power.” Heidegger criticises Nietzsche for never 
examining Being itself, which according to Heidegger is the greatest task of 
philosophy. Heidegger ultimately suggests Nietzsche ends the long chain of Western 
metaphysical thinking—beginning with Plato—by being the first thinker to 
characterise beings, yet he does not extend his philosophical inquiry in Being. 
Nietzsche’s work, for Heidegger, marks the end of metaphysics. Yet Heidegger, like 
many others, utilises Nietzsche’s philosophy in the service of his own philosophical 
project. Heidegger’s project in the essay “Nietzsche as Metaphysician” is to advance 
his notion of Dasein (Being) through a dialogue between Nietzsche and himself, 
rather than to attempt to directly explicate Nietzsche’s work.  
 
 
 
From the outset of “Nietzsche as Metaphysician,” Heidegger’s intentions are clearly 
to interpret Nietzsche as the philosopher of the will to power—that is to advance his 
uncovering of “being.” Heidegger’s aim here is to examine Nietzsche’s philosophy 
in light of a reflection on the being of beings; that is, Heidegger considers the 
ontological primacy of that which comes before all else, Being. Most of the 
discussion in the essay relates to Nietzsche’s position within the history of 
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metaphysics. Being, according to Heidegger, is in the concrete domain of reality and 
is not a metaphysical term. Nietzsche’s entire philosophy, according to Heidegger, is 
a series of ontological statements. If we could summarise Heidegger’s view of 
Nietzsche in one simple sentence, it would be: Nietzsche is the end of philosophy. I 
will show that this is evident in “Nietzsche as Metaphysician.” In other words, what 
Heidegger had in mind is surely that Nietzsche had exhausted the possibilities of 
metaphysics that had begun with Plato. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s critique of 
Nietzsche was his refusal to talk about “Being” as he furnished his entire philosophy 
around “becoming.” What is distinctive about Heidegger’s analysis of Nietzsche is 
that he never attempts to consider Nietzsche outside the light of a metaphysical 
debate. For Heidegger, the question of Being is always in the background. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger refuses to discuss what Nietzsche himself discusses about 
being. Nietzsche ultimately declares being to be an arbitrary metaphor for lazy 
thought, much like his understanding of the word “God.” 
 
In “Nietzsche as Metaphysician,” Heidegger, as previously mentioned, sets out to 
frame a central concept of Nietzsche’s—the “will to power”—as an answer to “the 
question what beings are.”6 Heidegger claims that the will to power “names that 
which constitutes the fundamental character of all beings.”7 Indeed, for Heidegger, 
Nietzsche’s concept of “will to power” is that which claims to answer the 
fundamental question of what beings are—precisely what Heidegger declares has 
been the task of all philosophy since Plato. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s view on the 
real task of philosophy is to uncover the essence of Being, not what beings are. He 
writes: “[t]he fundamental question, i.e., the question that became the foundation 
stone for philosophy, is the question about the essence of Being; it has never been 
developed in the history of philosophy as such, Nietzsche, too, remains within the 
preliminary domain of that question.”8 For Heidegger, Nietzsche is part of an ancient 
Western philosophical tradition preoccupied with the very same question of what 
beings are.  
 
                                                             
6  Martin Heidegger, “Nietzsche as Metaphysician,” in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert C. 
Solomon (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 106. 
7  Ibid., 105. 
8  Ibid., 106. 
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Therefore, Heidegger sets out to position Nietzsche as preoccupied with a single 
question throughout all his work. Heidegger positions Nietzsche as the culmination, 
the end, of metaphysics. He claims that Nietzsche had uncovered what beings are, 
that is, the will to power. Nevertheless, Heidegger asserts that Nietzsche had still not 
uncovered what the Being of beings is, or what Heidegger declares to be the non-
metaphysical question of beings (us) par excellence. According to Heidegger, we 
cannot find the meaning or value in Nietzsche’s thought if we look into the life of 
Nietzsche or the works themselves, strictly presented by their own content. He 
writes: “For even the work as work remains closed to us as long as we furtively 
search in some way for the ‘life’ of the man who created the work instead of asking 
about Being and the world upon which alone the work is based.”9 Rather, Heidegger 
insists we are to look at Nietzsche’s “work” as a single thought “about beings as a 
whole” and a philosophy about the “end of Western culture.”10  
 
Indeed, if we are to take Nietzsche seriously, according to Heidegger, we must place 
a heavy emphasis on the single thought (which every great thinker only has) about 
“beings as a whole.”11 Heidegger contends Nietzsche is one of those essential 
thinkers. He writes: “the essential thinkers are those whose sole thought tends in the 
direction of a single and highest decision, either preparing for this decision or 
accomplishing it definitively.”12 Characteristic of Heidegger, he sets out to define the 
real meaning of a “decision.” Heidegger claims that the real decision to be made 
(leaving aside the superficiality and coarseness of day-to-day, mundane “decisions”) 
is between “the primacy of beings and the dominance of Being.”13 According to 
Heidegger, Nietzsche is a thinker who stands at the apex of all great Western 
thinkers that came before him. It is here where Heidegger’s criticism of Nietzsche 
begins. Heidegger claims that Nietzsche appears to “affirm the primacy of beings 
over Being without knowing what is at stake in such an affirmation.”14 The “primacy 
of beings,” for Heidegger, is that which is the culmination of the Western tradition’s 
metaphysics.  
                                                             
9  Ibid., 109. 
10  Ibid., 106. 
11  Ibid., 109. 
12  Ibid., 110. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
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Yet Nietzsche’s affirmation of the primacy of beings, according to Heidegger, is 
what positions him as the thinker of the culmination of the modern age with his 
single thought of the will to power.15 Nietzsche, for Heidegger, is the “transition” 
from the modern age to the “beginning of its completion.”16 We catch a glimpse of 
why Heidegger considers Nietzsche a metaphysician, for he writes: “Metaphysically 
thought, Being is that which is thought in terms of beings as their most universal 
determination and in the direction of beings as their ground and cause.”17 In other 
words, if beings are the actualisation of Being, in any particular mode of thinking, 
including Nietzsche’s, the form of thinking is then metaphysical. Heidegger writes: 
“From the Greeks to Nietzsche all Western thinking has been metaphysical 
thinking.”18 And so, for Nietzsche to assert the true meaning of beings as will to 
power, Heidegger claims Nietzsche ends the modern age of metaphysical thinking by 
characterising beings—as a whole—as a will to power. Heidegger’s justification for 
this is that Nietzsche “thought ahead” by thinking of the will to power as thinking of 
“beings as a whole in such a way that the metaphysical ground of history of the 
present and future age becomes visible and at the same time decisive.”19 Ultimately, 
Heidegger’s legacy of Nietzsche interpretations is that Nietzsche is the thinker of the 
will to power, who is also the thinker of beings. For Heidegger, since Nietzsche has 
unraveled what beings actually are, he has also paved the way for an examination of 
Being itself—Heidegger’s idiosyncratic preoccupation as a thinker, not ours.  
 
 
Karl Löwith’s Interpretation of Nietzsche as the Philosopher of the Eternal 
Recurrence of the Same 
 
Unlike Heidegger’s accounts of Nietzsche, Karl Löwith’s Nietzsche’s Philosophy of 
the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, is of central importance to the enquiry to this 
thesis. This work is an important milestone because it turns our attention to 
                                                             
15  Heidegger claims the modern age spans roughly from 1600 to 1900. Ibid. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid., 111, Emphasis in original. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid., 112. 
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Nietzsche’s self-proclaimed greatest teaching, “eternal recurrence.” Löwith’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche is in stark contrast to the other major interpretations of his 
time: he is the only thinker to examine Nietzsche’s oeuvre without importing his own 
philosophical categories. Löwith is also a rare thinker in that he takes into 
consideration Nietzsche’s perpetual battle with the Christian belief in eschatology, 
and he uses Heraclitus’s idea of a cyclical model of the cosmos as his weapon. Is it 
an interpretation of Nietzsche, however? Löwith goes so far as to declare his reading 
of Nietzsche to be not an interpretation as such; rather, he declares, “this book does 
not impose an interpretation from without but rather extracts it from the Nietzschean 
texts.”20 As a student of Heidegger, it is surprising that his “extraction” of Nietzsche 
is so utterly divergent from Heidegger’s interpretation from “without.”21 Of course, 
Heidegger claims that the thinker of the will to power is indeed the thinker of the end 
of Western metaphysics. On the other hand, Löwith declares Nietzsche’s work to be 
a system of aphorisms that only become coherent in light of the central idea of the 
eternal recurrence of the same. More strikingly, he explicitly rejects Heidegger’s 
emphasis on the will to power as a characterisation of beings; and ultimately claims 
the core of Nietzsche’s philosophy—eternal recurrence—is incompatible with the 
will to power. Instead, Löwith declares that the only way to read Nietzsche is in a 
systematic, methodical way, always bearing in mind eternal recurrence of the same 
as the attempt to overcome nihilism. The aims now are as follows: (1) to give a 
necessarily brief overview of Löwith’s reading of Nietzsche’s oeuvre as a system in 
aphorisms, (2) to outline the unifying fundamental idea found in his philosophy of 
eternal recurrence, and (3) to examine Löwith’s critique of the idea of the eternal 
recurrence of the same.  
 
 
The Experiment: A System in Aphorisms 
 
One of Löwith’s intentions is to provide a “methodical summary” and not a vast 
“total presentation of Nietzsche.” He considers Nietzsche’s work to be a system of 
                                                             
20  Karl Löwith, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, trans. J. Harvey Lomax 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 9. 
21  Ibid. 
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interlocking aphorisms whose paradoxical relationship is only reconciled under the 
concept of the eternal recurrence. Löwith equates Nietzsche’s philosophy to a 
“system in aphorisms” bound together by the “single meaning” of the “eternal 
recurrence of the same.” Nietzsche himself declares the eternal recurrence to be his 
greatest teaching. Although Löwith admits that many aphorisms read side by side 
can at times be wholly contradictory, he nevertheless urges the reader to read 
Nietzsche’s corpus in its entirety. He writes: “For it is unmistakable that his writings 
consist of more- or less-developed aphorisms, and that he sketched out plans 
concerning the whole by means of which all fragments cohere. And they cohere 
exactly in what both the systematic interpretation and the renunciation thereof leave 
out of consideration, namely, the teaching of the eternal recurrence. Only in that 
teaching (as his last experiment) does the sequence of Nietzsche’s attempts dovetail, 
with systematic consistency, into a ‘teaching.’”22 Löwith also urges readers to 
consider Nietzsche’s work—as a whole—to be experimental in nature. Nietzsche’s 
critique of “closed systems of philosophical thought” is replaced by “experimenting” 
with the “aphoristic seed corns” of “hard little truths.”23 In this way, Löwith 
considers Nietzsche to revive not only the eternal recurrence but also, in his use of 
the aphorism, to renew “the old wisdom of the philosophic proverb.”24  
 
Löwith claims that Nietzsche’s philosophy is experimental because he explores “the 
anti-Christian repetition of antiquity on the peak of modernity.”25 For Löwith, a 
certain amount of courage is required to experiment with life. Löwith writes: “A lack 
of courage for the problem leads the systematic philosopher to close the open 
horizon of ‘at-tempting’ examination and questioning.”26 In a reflection on 
modernity, Nietzsche would experiment with ancient cosmological beliefs. Nietzsche 
declares: “He who would be wise about old origins … will finally search for sources 
of the future and for new origins.”27 Again, Löwith’s argument rests on the basis that 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of the eternal recurrence of the same is inherently built on a 
                                                             
22  Ibid., 11. 
23  Ibid., 13. 
24  Ibid., 17. 
25  Ibid., 108. 
26  Ibid., 10. Thus in the original. 
27  Ibid., 108. 
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“system of aphorisms.”28 In other words, in order to understand eternal return, one 
needs to recognise Nietzsche’s conscious effort to experiment with the first premise 
in mind that existence is “one essentially and comprehensive contradiction, which 
arises from a fundamental conflict in the relationship of man and world—where there 
is no God and no common order of creation.”29 Nietzsche’s philosophical 
“experiments” are what Löwith claims to be at-tempts towards new values. Of 
course, these experiments of Nietzsche’s are “nevertheless systematically guided” 
according to Löwith. 
 
 
The Unifying Fundamental Idea in Nietzsche’s Philosophy 
 
The chapter entitled “The Unifying Fundamental Idea in Nietzsche’s Philosophy” in 
Löwith’s book contains the most critical elements of his reading of Nietzsche, both 
in themselves and for this thesis. Through a detailed analysis of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Löwith sets out to emphasise the eternal recurrence of the same to be 
the core theme of Nietzsche’s philosophy in its entirety, without which all the 
seemingly unrelated aphorisms would fall apart in meaninglessness. In his chapter, 
Löwith claims there to be two fundamental interpretations of the eternal recurrence 
of the same that cannot be reconciled; that is, the anthropological and the 
cosmological readings of eternal recurrence. Löwith ultimately declares that 
Nietzsche’s philosophy is shattered into pieces because of this irreconcilable 
difference between interpretations. 
 
The anthropological component of eternal recurrence is based on an ethical 
imperative: if modern man has murdered God and has no direction or goal, then the 
teaching of the eternal recurrence establishes a new goal. Löwith writes: “the eternal 
return is to give humanity a goal that goes beyond the present state of man, yet not 
into an otherworldly ‘backworld,’ but instead into humanity’s own continuation.”30 
The explicit goal, ethical imperative, or philosophy of life given by Nietzsche is to 
                                                             
28  Ibid., 3. 
29  Ibid., 11, emphasis in original. 
30  Ibid., 84. 
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live “every moment so that you could will that moment back again over and over.”31 
To embrace eternal recurrence, for Nietzsche, means to be the “lord of the earth,” 
which is “the refrain” of Nietzsche’s “practical philosophy.”32 Anthropologically 
read, the eternal recurrence, for Nietzsche, has the highest “ethical gravity” because 
the willing is now a “responsibility for the future” and “a positively turned 
irresponsibility towards the innocence of existence.”33 The teaching of eternal 
recurrence is delivered by none other than Zarathustra, who according to Nietzsche is 
the highest type of man in total lordship over himself. The eternal recurrence, 
according to Löwith, is a historically conceived idea (Heraclitus), acting as a 
counterweight to the decay and decadence of Christianity. Löwith writes: “As a 
counterweight to the ‘modernity’ of decayed Christianity, the idea of the return is 
thus a historically conceived idea, and in accordance with its purpose it is directed to 
the future of European man … The teaching of the return sets free the hidden 
nihilism that results from the death of God.”34 After the death of God, the ethical 
imperative of eternal recurrence gives humanity a new goal for the future.  
 
For Löwith, eternal recurrence is the absolute overcoming of nihilism through the 
experimental character that begs us to explore new horizons for eternity. Löwith 
writes: “the teaching aims at the externalization of this existence as opposed to its 
vaporization in the technical bustle of existence. The teaching reflects Nietzsche’s 
desire to raise this finite existence to an eternal significance.”35 Ultimately, the 
eternal recurrence, for Löwith, is Nietzsche’s attempt to replace a dead God with an 
externalisation of this world, an affirmation of this world, not its denial, not a desire 
to live in another world, a “backworld.” Nietzsche would declare that if we “could 
bear our immortality—that would be the highest thing.”36 The eternal recurrence, 
then, is a “willed” replacement for the worldly (otherworldly) religions—particularly 
Christianity. If one wills the eternal recurrence, the nihilistic skepticism of the belief 
that “nothing is true; everything is permitted” is obliterated. However, Löwith does 
not read the eternal recurrence of the same in its literal sense. Instead, he argues 
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“eternity, then, does not have the meaning of an eternal recurrence of the same, but it 
is the willed goal of a will to eternal-ization.”37 Read in this light, the eternal 
recurrence is a self-willed goal without the need of a God. The self-willing goal of 
eternalisation, according to Löwith’s reading of Nietzsche, is the superhuman ethical 
teaching that obviates the Christian belief in the afterlife and God. 
 
Löwith argues that the cosmological component of eternal recurrence, if taken 
seriously, forces one to witness Nature as entirely indifferent to our ethical projects if 
we are to believe in the eternal recurrence as a cosmological principle and scientific 
proof. It is Nietzsche’s belief that the eternal recurrence is the “most scientific of all 
possible hypotheses, and a “new conception of the world.”38 Here, Nietzsche is 
referring to the scientific principle of the conservation of energy, which demands an 
eternal recurrence. Löwith observes that Nietzsche is convinced that the universe is 
infinite in time, but finite in matter. Therefore, all possible combinations of atoms 
would repeat ad infinitum. Yet, Nietzsche claims that because there is no origin of 
the universe (nor a goal), it begins and ends at the same time, in every moment as a 
“constant alteration of the same.”39 Nietzsche writes:  
 
In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or 
another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of 
times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all 
other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these 
combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same 
series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series would thus be 
demonstrated: the world as a cycle that has already repeated itself 
infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum.40  
 
Indeed, how can one ascertain a goal, or self-will the eternal recurrence if nature is 
indifferent to this? Perhaps this is Nietzsche’s point, as Löwith points out. 
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Nevertheless, the fundamental distinction to be made when contrasting the 
anthropological and cosmological readings of eternal recurrence has to do with will. 
How is it possible to will at all in an eternally recurring universe when at the same 
time the same willing for the eternal recurrence has already happened an infinite 
number of times? Would one not live one’s life an infinite number of times in the 
same way only to rediscover the eternal recurrence in an identical way? These 
questions are explored in greater detail in Löwith’s chapter entitled “The Critical 
Yardstick of Nietzsche’s Experiment.” 
 
 
The Critical Yardstick for Nietzsche’s Experiment 
 
As we have seen, Löwith points out that the two predominant interpretations of the 
eternal recurrence are irreconcilable: the anthropological and the cosmological. Let 
us now briefly reflect on Nietzsche’s idea of eternal recurrence by recourse to his 
own words. First appearing in The Gay Science, the eternal return of the same is 
described by Nietzsche as follows: 
 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your 
loneliest loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have 
lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more” ... 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the 
demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous 
moment when you would have answered him: “You are a god and never 
have I heard anything more divine.”41 
 
In the end, Löwith claims Nietzsche’s descent into insanity was caused by the 
attempt to embody the contradiction inherent within the eternal recurrence: the 
anthropological doctrine and the cosmological principle of eternal recurrence. 
Löwith writes: “Nietzsche’s philosophy, being a twofold ‘prophesy’ of nihilism and 
of the eternal recurrence of the same, is as ambiguous as Nietzsche himself. This 
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teaching was consciously his ‘destiny,’ because his will to the nothing (being a 
‘double will’) wanted to get back to the Being of eternity.”42 Löwith considers 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence to be, on the one hand, an ethical imperative and, as 
such, a philosophy of life: live your life as if every moment were to return 
innumerable times. On the other hand, Löwith claims that Nietzsche set out to prove 
the eternal recurrence as a physical reality: if time is infinite and matter finite then all 
possible combinations will recur infinitely. Indeed, this is why Löwith claims 
Nietzsche’s philosophy to be a particular cosmos anthropos (cosmic anthropology); 
it is at once a claim to a cosmological principle and an anthropological doctrine of 
sorts. Nevertheless, Löwith claims that Nietzsche’s attempt to avert—conquer, 
even—nihilism is ultimately shattered by the inherent contradiction between cosmic 
determinism and an ethical imperative. If the cosmos does indeed repeat endlessly, 
where is there room for human freedom? Löwith argues there is none.  
 
Despite Löwith’s criticisms of Nietzsche’s central teaching of eternal recurrence, his 
reading of Nietzsche signals the first attempt to situate the philosopher as an original, 
systematic thinker offering a cosmological anthropology. Löwith’s final conclusions 
about Nietzsche’s conception of eternal return are inherently contradictory; that is, 
the cosmological principle of eternal return cannot be reconciled with the 
anthropological. Löwith writes: Nietzsche’s thought is “one essentially and 
comprehensive contradiction, which arises from a fundamental conflict in the 
relationship of man and world—where there is no God and no common order of 
creation.”43 Like Heidegger, however, Löwith situates Nietzsche’s thought as a set of 
variations on a single thought, the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same, from 
which all other aphorisms get their ultimate sense.  
 
Löwith continually interprets Nietzsche’s philosophy as a single, unwavering 
thought. In the preface to Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the 
Same, Löwith writes: “He who has learned to read Nietzsche systematically will thus 
be astonished not at the motley riches of his alternating perspectives but at the 
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continuity and even the monotony of his philosophic problem.”44 Löwith’s rigorous 
analysis of Nietzsche’s oeuvre considers the “eternal return of the same” as a 
coherent, intelligible system of thought. Giving structure to Nietzsche’s fragmentary 
and aphoristic thought has always been a challenging endeavour. And so, Löwith is 
the first to present Nietzsche’s philosophy as forming a coherent structure out of one 
paradoxical aphorism. Ultimately, Löwith’s place in the history of Nietzsche 
interpretation is important to the extent that he was the first reader of Nietzsche to 
consider his work as a coherent system of the eternal recurrence in aphorisms – and 
this will be explored further in chapter 4.  
 
Nevertheless, Löwith declares that Nietzsche’s project was doomed from the 
beginning. For according to Löwith, in order to self-legislate an ethical imperative 
under the banner of eternal recurrence is to mistake oneself for God. Löwith has the 
final say when he sees Nietzsche’s “attempt to find his way out of the finite nothing 
of the self-willing ego back into the eternal whole of Being finally ends in his 
mistaking himself for God, around whom everything becomes world.”45 Löwith 
figures Nietzsche as an important philosopher of the nineteenth century, but 
ultimately declares him to have descended into a fatal madness, from which there 
was no return. 
 
 
Jacques Derrida: The Playfulness of Nietzsche’s “Styles” 
 
Literary theorist and philosopher, Jacques Derrida, is one of the most widely 
celebrated thinkers of the twentieth century. His impact on philosophy, 
anthropology, and social theory remains difficult to gauge. He is a difficult thinker to 
engage with as he implements no “methodology” as such. Rather, each “text” under 
Derrida’s analysis is examined in order to uncover precisely what is not in the text 
itself. Derrida examines texts themselves without incorporating external references 
or other methods of literary analysis. Chris Fleming, in his entry in Theory in Social 
and Cultural Anthropology: An Encyclopedia, aptly summarises Derrida’s form of 
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textual analysis. He writes: “analyses are invariably predicated on meticulous 
readings of the texts under consideration rather than examining them by reference to 
external criteria; he proceeds via a strict, albeit provisional, adherence to the 
concepts and logic of a host text to evacuate what the text excludes (historically and 
conceptually) in order to constitute itself. That, in a nutshell, is what is called 
‘deconstruction.’”46 In order to understand Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, we must first identify the fundamental ways in which Derrida interprets 
all texts.  
 
Simply put, Derrida contends that there is no single way of interpreting a text. 
Indeed, he suggests that it is an impossible task to etch out a single reading of any 
text due to the very nature of the ambiguity of texts themselves. This is also the case 
with Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche. Derrida takes this very same approach when he 
examines Nietzsche’s philosophy in Eperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche (Spurs: 
Nietzsche’s Styles). Originally planned to have the title (in translation) “On the 
Question of Style,” Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles sets out to “deconstruct” Nietzsche’s 
work by assessing whether the “style” of the text can be separated from its content. It 
is important to note that Derrida does not attempt to offer a precise account of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy; nor does he engage with the idiosyncratic readings of him 
regarding the will to power or the eternal return—Derrida claims that this is an 
impossible task. Instead, Derrida’s preoccupation with Nietzsche is to provide an 
alternative, transformative interpretation of Nietzsche in light if Nietzsche’s own 
notion of affirming the creation of new values. In Spurs, Derrida is more concerned 
with the question of “style” more generally, where he claims that it is indeed 
questionable that the style of a text can be separated from its content.  
 
In order to assess Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche, we have to understand the 
three main elements found in Derrida’s textual analysis of Nietzsche (and others) that 
invariably form the “structure” of his interpretation of Nietzsche’s text(s). They are 
as follows: (1) Derrida’s connection between his “metaphysics of presence” and 
Nietzsche’s discussion of “antithetical values.” In order to understand Derrida’s 
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interpretation of Nietzsche’s texts, we need to examine what Derrida means by a 
metaphysics of presence. I will also examine how and why this is the case. (2) 
Derrida’s implementation of Nietzsche’s “styles” in order to discuss the subject of 
“Woman” in relation to “Truth.” I will explain how and why Derrida claims that 
woman is the “untruth of Truth” in relation to his interpretation of Nietzsche. (3) 
Derrida’s analysis of the famous line in Nietzsche’s unpublished notes, “I forgot my 
umbrella.” Derrida makes this analysis in order to highlight the impossibility of 
rendering a singular interpretation of this quote—that the interpretation of the text is 
always to be renegotiated. 
 
 
The Metaphysics of Presence and Antithetical Values 
 
The first concept to consider is what Derrida calls the “metaphysics of presence.” 
Beginning with Aristotle, metaphysics can be characterised as being concerned with 
the search for the essential qualities in a thing, which exist in a world of perpetual 
change. Metaphysics deals with the first principles of things, which form the 
structure for experience and thought to take place. For example, if we look at a chair, 
there exists an ideal, perfect metaphysical chair that characterises our understanding 
of “chair.” Derrida claims that all Western thinking is structured by this inheritance 
of metaphysical thinking, and he claims that all metaphysical thinking also 
presupposes the notion of “presence.” For Derrida, presence serves to underline the 
prioritisation and presupposition Western thinking has for the “here” and “now.” He 
claims, however, that we cannot make such a presupposition. In other words, for 
Derrida, the belief in presence allows one to fall into the illusion that we can 
determine the essence of something if it is in the spatial-temporal dimension of here 
and now; he declares that we cannot determine that there “is” an essence of 
something at all. Thus, Derrida claims there is an inherent paradox involved in the 
use of the language of a “metaphysics of presence,” while at the same time exposing 
its impossibility by questioning the presumption that something is here and now. 
Nietzsche, too, claims the West must escape what he considers to be the 
metaphysical “faith in antithetical values.” On the one hand, Derrida contends in 
Difference (1982) that there is no single point (Reason, God) or presence that can 
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determine the immediate truth of something. On the other hand, Nietzsche claims 
that there is no world outside of the human where we could grasp absolute truth or 
meaning. For example, in The Will to Power, he claims that to seek for the “highest” 
value of something from the standpoint of the human is a false faith in antithetical 
values. Of metaphysicians, Nietzsche writes: 
 
This mode of judgement constitutes the typical prejudice by which 
metaphysicians of all ages can be recognised; this mode of evaluation 
stands in the background of all logical procedures; it is on account of 
their ‘faith’ that they concern themselves with their ‘knowledge,’ with 
something that is at last solemnly baptized ‘the truth.’ The fundamental 
faith of metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical values.47  
 
Here is where the notion of style comes into play. Derrida claims that where 
Nietzsche is criticising “antithetical values,” he does so with a style that summons a 
play of oppositional forces. Derrida calls this play of forces the will to power. If we 
take into consideration that Nietzsche himself understood the will to power as a 
perpetual play of forces, it sheds light on Derrida’s belief that Nietzsche’s texts 
themselves are never at rest, and so can never reveal a singular interpretation. It is 
the play of the forces of oppositions as Nietzsche “style” that inhibits any one 
reading of Nietzsche’s texts, according to Derrida. In other words, for Derrida, there 
is no unity that emerges from Nietzsche’s thinking, but only a style that reveals the 
play of forces of the will to power, which in turn cannot by its very nature be 
interpreted. Yet there is an inherent paradox involved in this “reading” of Nietzsche.  
 
 
Woman as the Untruth of Truth 
 
In Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, Derrida considers the notion of “Woman.” Simply put, 
Derrida equates the subject and object of Woman to the opposition between truth and 
untruth in Nietzsche’s texts. Derrida claims that Nietzsche’s texts contain the idea of 
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Woman as the elimination of truth and non-truth. Derrida claims that Woman 
“suspends the decidable opposition of the true and non-true.”48 Presumably, Derrida 
gets hold of the idea of Woman from the preface to Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and 
Evil. In the opening lines to the book, Nietzsche famously writes: “Supposing Truth 
to be a Woman—What?”49 Nietzsche continues with “playfulness” in his opening 
remarks and claims that if all dogmatists and metaphysicians approach Woman in the 
same way they approach the “Truth,” they stand little chance in winning her over. 
Interestingly, before Derrida, no interpretation of Nietzsche had taken the subject of 
woman into account as a way of observing Nietzsche’s metaphor for truth and 
untruth as Woman. Indeed, there are three ways Derrida positions the subject/object 
of Woman as a way of examining Nietzsche’s texts: (1) Derrida claims that 
Nietzsche considers Woman to be similar to man, who believes undoubtedly in 
Truth. For Nietzsche and Derrida, if “Woman” believes in objective truth, then she 
also believes that she can present herself as “Woman,” as a thing-in-itself. Nietzsche 
and Derrida criticise this evaluation as there can be no validity to the claim of either 
truth or woman. (2) The second shape woman takes on is simulation. For Derrida’s 
Nietzsche, a woman pretends the truth in order to get what she wants. Woman may 
not believe in the truth, but nevertheless acts out the truth in order to acquire 
something. The Derridian Nietzsche’s response to this is that the woman simulates 
the truth to such an extent that she eliminates the possibility of acquiring the 
multiplicity of figures a Woman can take on. (3) The final assumption made about 
Woman is the elimination of the possibility of Truth, where Woman becomes the 
untruth of truth. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche famously writes: “Women are 
considered deep—why? Because one can never discover the depths of them. They 
are not even shallow.”50 In Spurs, Derrida echoes Nietzsche’s notion of woman in 
the following statement. He writes: 
 
There is no such thing as the essence of woman because woman averts, 
she is averted to herself. Out of these depth, endless and unfathomable, 
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she engulfs and distorts all vestige of essentiality, of identity, of property. 
And the philosophical discourse, blinded, founders on the shoals and is 
hurled down these depths to its ruin. There is no such thing as the truth of 
woman, but it is because of that abyssal divergence of the truth, because 
that untruth is “truth.” Woman is but one name for the untruth of truth.51  
 
Here, the notion of Woman as the untruth of truth is a fundamental way in which 
Derrida interprets Nietzsche’s texts as either uninterpretable, or interpreted in an 
infinite number of ways. It is only through the examination of the “style” and 
“playfulness” of the text that we might uncover a new way(s) of reading Nietzsche’s 
texts.  
 
 
“I Forgot My Umbrella” 
 
For Derrida, there is no separation between Nietzsche’s (or any author’s) work from 
his or her life, no way of differentiating between the text and the outside of the text. 
Conspicuously wedged between two lengthy aphorisms in his unpublished 
notebooks, Nietzsche writes the words “I forgot my umbrella” with the quotation 
marks surrounding it. Derrida sets out to assess whether or not we can ever find a 
way to understand what Nietzsche means by this statement. Derrida claims that the 
decision to leave the quotation marks around the statement makes it impossible for a 
reader to determine any meaning in it. For Derrida, “I forgot my umbrella” is a 
phrase that cannot be interpreted. However, what remains important for Derrida is 
not that the phrase cannot be deciphered and given validity, but rather that Derrida 
always returns to playfulness in the undecidability about the meaning of any text. By 
analysing “I forgot my umbrella,” Derrida exposes the myth that there is a particular, 
a right, way to read and interpret a text. In short, Derrida is the first of Nietzsche’s 
major interpreters to claim that it is impossible to fathom a right way to examine an 
author, precisely because, following Nietzsche, Derrida claims that there is no 
metaphysical ground on which one has the ability to assess a text that can be 
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separated from the life of the author, the inside and outside worlds, or the “style” of a 
text.  
 
In conclusion, Derrida’s reading both relies heavily on Nietzsche’s ideas and is an 
adaptation and transformation of his ideas; precisely because Derrida claims the text 
is always undecided. Although Derrida examines different “styles” as a way of 
examining the “untruth of truth,” his notion of a metaphysics of presence separates 
him from Nietzsche’s thought. Nevertheless, what Derrida takes most from the spirit 
of Nietzsche’s writing is the idea of the creation of new values. Derrida takes 
Nietzsche’s work and does indeed transform and reinterpret it. This now brings us to 
another esteemed French interpreter of Nietzsche’s work, Michel Foucault. 
 
 
Foucault: Nietzsche as Genealogist 
 
Michel Foucault is greatly indebted to Nietzsche’s genealogical interpretation of the 
history of morals. Indeed, Foucault’s analysis of truth, power, and subjectivity is 
greatly influenced by Nietzsche’s thinking, particularly the book The Genealogy of 
Morals. In direct opposition to most interpretations of Nietzsche, Foucault’s interest 
in Nietzsche is directed at neither the will to power nor the eternal recurrence. 
Rather, Foucault concentrates his efforts on Nietzsche’s genealogical account of the 
history of morals. What interests Foucault about a genealogical analysis of history is 
the rejection of “origins” in favour of a genealogical account of history, which 
appears to deny singular origins. In other words, Foucault etches out from 
Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals a way of interpreting the history of “things” so 
as to account for the multiplicity and duplicity of the emergence of phenomena rather 
than their metaphysical origin. In this section I will briefly examine Foucault’s essay 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” where he interprets Nietzsche as the thinker of the 
genealogical method; that is, Nietzsche, as a genealogist, provides an alternative way 
of examining history by assessing the relationship between truth, power, and 
subjectivity, instead of seeking what Foucault thinks to be false origins. 
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Genealogy 
 
What is genealogy? Why does Foucault, contrary to all obvious evidence, insist 
Nietzsche is not only a genealogist, but one opposed to origins? In the opening lines 
of “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault claims that genealogy is “gray, 
meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and 
confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied 
many times.”52 Foucault claims that interpreting history from a Nietzschean, 
genealogical perspective has an advantage over what he calls a “historian’s history,” 
which is too reliant on a “suprahistorical perspective.” In other words, Foucault 
charges the historian’s history with attempting to interpret history within a linear 
historical narrative. Instead of seeking metaphysical origins, Foucault suggests we 
implement Nietzsche’s understanding of history—that there exist no singular origins, 
but many tributaries, to account for the developments throughout history. Foucault 
writes: “genealogy retrieves an indispensible restraint: it must record the singularity 
of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most 
unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history.”53 For Foucault, 
Nietzsche is a philosopher who denies the singular origin of things, but who is in 
favour of examining the multiplicity of forces that account for the “emergence” of 
things in history. 
 
In the opening lines to “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault claims the history 
of morality, which Nietzsche is preoccupied with in The Genealogy of Morals, 
cannot be traced in terms of a linear development, from origin to finality. He declares 
that by searching for a linear development of the history of morality merely 
masquerades in the service of utility. Foucault points out the German scholar, Paul 
Rée, a friend of Nietzsche’s, who Nietzsche attacks in the preface to The Genealogy 
of Morals, had made this fatal error. Foucault writes: “He [Rée] assumed that words 
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had kept their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas 
retained their logic; and he ignored the fact that the world of speech and desires has 
known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, and ploys.”54 In contradistinction 
to Rée’s understanding that morality has an origin, Foucault prefers Nietzsche’s 
genealogical interpretation of history. He writes: 
 
[G]enealogy retrieves an indispensible restraint: it must record the 
singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek 
them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without 
history—in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to 
their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, 
but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. 
Finally, genealogy must define even those instances when they are 
absent, the moment when they remained unrealized.55 
 
What is Foucault’s justification for implementing what he considers to be an analysis 
of history without origins, however? Foucault claims that Nietzsche’s genealogy is 
not in opposition to history as such. Rather, Nietzsche’s genealogy is in direct 
opposition to the “mole-like perspective of the scholar.” In other words, Nietzsche’s 
genealogy “rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and 
indefinite teleologies. It opposes the search for ‘origins.’”56 Foucault insists that a 
Nietzschean genealogy of history searches for the microcosmic elements that 
contribute to the “descent” and “emergence” of things in relation to each other. What 
is the difference between Nietzsche’s use of the words “descent,” “emergence,” and 
“origin,” however?  
 
Foucault claims that Nietzsche’s resistance to the origins of “things” rests on the 
separation between the words Herkunft (descent) and Ursprung.57 According to 
Foucault, the genealogist must refuse to “extend his faith in metaphysics” of the 
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“timeless and essential secret,” “the essence” of human origins.58 Rather, Foucault 
insists that things have “no essence,” that “their essence was fabricated in a 
piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”59 Essentially, Foucault deploys Nietzsche’s 
genealogical interpretation of history as a reaction to teleological readings of history. 
Finally, Foucault suggests that “what is found at the historical beginning of things is 
not the inviolable identity of their origins; it is the dissension of other things. It is 
disparity.”60 Indeed, Foucault’s interpretation of Nietzsche as opposing “the search 
for origins” directly relates to the way in which he considers Nietzsche’s different 
uses of the word Ursprung (origin). We will examine this in detail at present. 
Foucault writes: 
 
In Nietzsche, we find two uses of the word Ursprung. The first is 
unstressed, and it is found alternately with other terns such as Entsthung, 
Herkunft, Abkunft, Geburt. In The Genealogy of Morals, for example, 
Entstehung or Ursprung serves equally well to denote the origin of duty 
or guilty conscience; and in the discussion of logic and knowledge in The 
Gay Science, their origin is indiscriminately referred to as Ursprung, 
Entstehung, or Herkunft. 
 
Foucault insists that Nietzsche uses the word Ursprung mostly in an ironic fashion, 
connoting his suspicion of the search for the “miraculous” metaphysical origin of 
morality, religion, or the human. Nevertheless, Foucault points out that Nietzsche 
uses the word Ursprung from Human, All too Human onwards until he abruptly 
shifts his emphasis of the impossibility of origins by instead interchanging Ursprung 
with Herkunft (descent) or Entstehung (emergence) in order to “challenge the pursuit 
of the origin.”61 Why is this the case? Foucault insists that Nietzsche considers the 
attempt to grasp “origins” is destined to failure. He writes: 
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First, because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their 
purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; because this 
search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external 
world of accident and succession. This search is directed to “that which 
was already there,” the image of a primordial truth fully adequate to its 
nature, and it necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately 
disclose an original identity. However, if the genealogist refuses to 
extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there 
is “something altogether different” behind things: not a timeless and 
essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their 
essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.62 
 
According to Foucault, instead of seeking the “inviolable identity” of an origin, we 
must accept that where we seek origins, there is only “disparity.” Instead of seeking 
fabricated original identities, Foucault asks us to accept that the non-origins of 
history are a “profusion of entangled events.” The false belief in origins, according to 
Foucault, is a result of “a metaphysical extension, which arises from the belief that 
things are most precious and essential at the moment of birth.”63 Foucault’s 
justification in favouring a genealogical analysis of history, as opposed to seeking 
origins, lies precisely in the thinking that a genealogical analysis of “values, 
morality, asceticism, and knowledge” will never confuse itself with the false premise 
that they have an inviolable origin.  
 
In the third section of Foucault’s essay, he devotes his attention to Nietzsche’s use of 
the words Entstehung and Herkunft, which he claims are more exact terms than 
Ursprung for the objective of genealogy. The German word Herkunft equates to the 
English “descent,” which is to do with being affiliated to a group bound by blood, 
culture, ritual, and class. For Foucault, an analysis of descent requires us to seek the 
subtlest, “subindividual marks” that “form a network that is difficult to unravel.”64 In 
this form of analysis, as opposed to seeking origins, Foucault claims history opens up 
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to “numberless beginnings.” In analysing descent, one can dispense with the concrete 
“self” and recognise a “profusion of lost events.”65 Most importantly, descent is 
inextricably linked to the body. By looking at the body through descent, it allows for 
the analysis of errors of the body—pertaining to digestion, temperament, and 
respiratory failures—or of accomplishments of ancestral groups. These “errors” 
continue on into the future, in which further errors are manifested.  
 
The German word Entstehung equates to the English word “emergence”; this is not 
to be confused with emergence as in a singular origin. Rather, an analysis of 
emergence pertains to the reestablishment of “the hazardous play of dominations.”66 
Foucault claims that Entstehung deals with interactions and struggles of forces that 
are constantly attempting domination over each other. Ultimately, emergence is “the 
entry of forces” that designates “a place of confrontation.”67 For Foucault, no single 
origin is responsible for the emergence of historical phenomena. Rather, it is the 
interplay of an infinite number of forces and power relations.  
 
Foucault’s main preoccupation with an interpretation of Nietzsche clearly deals with 
ways of interpretation. He declares that there is no origin or “suprahistorical” 
perspective to view historical phenomena. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s genealogical 
analysis, for Foucault, opens up the horizons of the perpetual interplay of dominant 
and reactive forces. Furthermore, if there is no metaphysical, singular origin to be 
found in history, there can be no singular, historical “meaning” to be found. Rather, 
Foucault suggests that the “origin” of things is the perpetual play of forces where 
there is no distinct unity to be found.  
 
Finally, Foucault claims that Nietzsche’s “historical sense” is in direct opposition to 
the “Platonic,” metaphysical search for origins in three distinct ways: (1) in 
Nietzsche’s use of parody, which opposes history as being something to be 
recognised or real; (2) in Nietzsche’s attempt to dissociate himself, where he is 
opposed to identity, continuity, or representation; and (3) in Nietzsche’s emphasis on 
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sacrifice, where he is opposed to any recognition of “truth” or knowledge to be found 
in history. Foucault writes: “the veneration of monuments becomes parody; the 
respect for ancient continuities becomes systematic dissociation; the critique of the 
injustices of the past by a truth held by men in the present becomes the destruction of 
the man who maintains knowledge by the injustice proper to the will to 
knowledge.”68  
 
As we have seen, Foucault’s interpretation of Nietzsche in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History” is one that clearly focuses on exposing the false premise of metaphysical 
origins, in favour of a “gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary” analysis of 
history. This is what he calls a genealogical interpretation of history. Foucault’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche as genealogist allows Foucault the insight to expand the 
concept of “genealogy” as a way of tracing power relations (forces) that have existed 
in history. Instead of searching for the linear history of human characteristics, 
Foucault claims we must follow Nietzsche’s and look for that which is precisely not 
there. 
 
 
Deleuze’s Interpretation of Nietzsche: The Triumph of Reactive Forces over the 
Active, and the Overcoming of Nihilism 
 
This section’s aim is elucidate the work of Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzsche and 
Philosophy. Deleuze’s book is a work many commentators have considered to be the 
most idiosyncratic interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy: Deleuze takes into 
account what he considers to be Nietzsche’s main themes of the “will to power” and 
the “eternal recurrence,” and he positions them as part of a coherent philosophical 
system. In the opening pages of Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze tells us how we 
should not interpret Nietzsche. He writes: 
 
As long as the reader persists in: (1) seeing the Nietzschean “slave” as 
someone who finds himself dominated by a master, and deserves to be;  
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(2) understanding the will to power as a will which wants and seeks 
power; (3) conceiving the eternal return as the tedious return of the same;  
(4) imagining the Overman as a given master race—no positive 
relationship between Nietzsche and his reader will be possible. Nietzsche 
will appear a nihilist, or worse, a fascist and at best as an obscure and 
terrifying prophet.69 
 
The above passage illustrates Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche in a number of 
ways, precisely because he explicates how we should decidedly not read Nietzsche. 
Deleuze points out that it is a mistake to reduce Nietzsche’s thought to the level of a 
single reading. How does Deleuze interpret Nietzsche, then? In the opening lines to 
Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze tells us precisely the goal of his book. He writes: 
“This book sets out, primarily, to analyse what Nietzsche calls becoming.”70 
 
Much akin to Heidegger and Löwith, Deleuze figures Nietzsche as a seminal, 
indispensable thinker in Western thought, alongside Plato, Kant, and Aristotle. In 
many respects, Deleuze follows Löwith in emphasising Nietzsche’s key concepts of 
will to power and eternal return. For Deleuze, these key ideas are indispensable in his 
reading of Nietzsche. For Deleuze, too, Nietzsche was the first to define nihilism as 
the triumph of the reactive forces of resentment and bad conscience as a negative 
will to power, over the active forces inherent in becoming. Through the Overman as 
a positive force, argues Deleuze, ressentiment and bad conscience—nihilism—is 
overcome through total affirmation of the transience of life. In this section I will 
examine several key themes in Nietzsche and Philosophy that comprise the main 
thrust of Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche. They are as follows: (1) the notion 
that Deleuze considers Nietzsche’s philosophy as a critical metaphysics in 
opposition to Kant’s critique of metaphysics, (2) Deleuze’s notion of the genetic 
conditions of reality, (3) the idea of active and reactive forces in relation to the will 
to power, and (4) Deleuze’s notion of the eternal return of difference. 
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Nietzsche as the Inversion of Kant and of the Genetic Conditions of Reality 
 
Here, I will examine what Deleuze means when he considers Nietzsche’s philosophy 
to be a critical metaphysics as opposed to a critique of metaphysics. To begin, 
Deleuze places Nietzsche’s philosophy within the tradition beginning with Kant. 
Instead of Deleuze replacing Kant with Nietzsche, he considers Nietzsche’s 
philosophy to be the completion of the Kantian tradition. Deleuze writes: “Nietzsche 
thinks that the idea of critique is identical to that of philosophy but that this is 
precisely the idea that Kant had missed, that he has compromised and spoilt, not only 
in application but in principle.”71 How does Nietzsche complete Kant’s project, 
however?  
 
Deleuze tells us Nietzsche completes the Kantian project—whose goal is to uncover 
the nature and role of reasons—in a number of ways. The first is that Nietzsche 
questions values themselves. Deleuze writes: “One of the principal motifs of 
Nietzsche’s work is that Kant had not carried out a true critique because he was not 
able to pose the problem of a critique in terms of values.”72 In other words, Deleuze 
claims that Kant makes the mistake of thinking that all subjects are identical in their 
social and historical spheres. Kant might ask: How can we know that we know 
something? Nietzsche, on the other hand, would ask not only what the value of truth 
is, but also, why would anyone want the truth at all. Deleuze claims Nietzsche’s 
critical metaphysics of the question of the value of truth is not the Kantian debate 
about truth and falsity. Rather, Deleuze claims Nietzsche’s questioning of the value 
of truth reveals the “genetic” conditions of all reality. These genetic conditions of 
reality are simply the multitude of forces that constitute the will to power. On the one 
hand, Deleuze considers Nietzsche’s will to power to be a critical metaphysics of 
positivity and creativity. On the other, Deleuze considers Kant’s critique of 
metaphysics to be negative. Deleuze thinks this for two reasons.  
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The first is that Deleuze believes Kant’s critique of metaphysics relies on the thought 
that knowledge itself is valuable and is the true aim of thinking. Deleuze, on the 
other hand, claims that—following Foucault—Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis 
reveals that knowledge is only valuable according to social and historical contexts. 
The second reason, according to Deleuze, relates to Kant’s considering individual 
experiences and conditions to be universal, which Deleuze claims Nietzsche rejects. 
Ultimately, Deleuze asserts that Nietzsche’s philosophy is the inversion of Kant’s 
critique of metaphysical thought and the implementation of the will to power as a 
way of revealing the historically and culturally specific “genetic” conditions that 
allow for the construction of human reality.  
 
 
Active, Reactive, and the Will to Power 
 
What is the will to power for Deleuze? According to Deleuze, the will to power is 
both a transcendental and an ontological concept; it is that which constitutes the 
actual conditions of reality. In other words, the will to power is not something that 
resides in the human mind; rather, it is something that can be used to understand the 
origin of historical and cultural phenomena. The chapter entitled “Active and 
Reactive” in Nietzsche and Philosophy engages with what Deleuze considers to be 
Nietzsche’s understanding of the will to power as an explanation of all reality (or of 
nature). Deleuze decribes what Nietzsche writes in The Will to Power, in the 
following way: “all reality is already quantity of force. What exists is nothing but 
quantities of force in mutual relations of tension.”73 Yet, the perpetual engagement of 
forces, Deleuze asserts, is an engagement of unequal forces. He writes: “to dream of 
two equal forces, even if they are said to be of opposite senses is a coarse and 
approximate dream, a statistical dream.”74 Consequently, these unequal forces, which 
constitute the will to power, are either active or reactive forces. For Deleuze, the 
active forces are the dominant forces, while the reactive forces are those that are 
dominated. Idiosyncratically, Deleuze declares that Nietzsche considers the reactive 
forces of life to have dominated the active forces. He claims this by asserting that 
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active forces have no immunity to the disease of reactive forces, which is a state of 
affairs that is the precursor to ressentiment, the revenge against life.75 For example, 
Deleuze writes: “inferior forces can prevail without ceasing to be inferior in quantity 
and reactive in quality, without ceasing to be slaves in this sense. One of the finest 
remarks in The Will to Power is: ‘The strong must be protected from the weak.’”76  
 
To complicate matters, Deleuze considers the fundamental characteristic of all forces 
to be essentially active. This brings us to Deleuze’s account of the notion of the will 
to power. Deleuze writes: “the will to power is a good principle … because it is an 
essentially plastic principle that is no wider than what it conditions, that changes 
itself with the conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it 
determines.”77 In other words, the will to power, for Deleuze, is active or reactive, 
affirmative or negative, but, in the final analysis, the will to power is affirmative. 
Why is this the case? Deleuze would suggest that the only way that the will to power 
can manifest itself negatively is through a misrepresentation of it. This is what 
Nietzsche refers to as nihilism. Deleuze writes: “Nihil in ‘nihilism’ means negation 
as a quality of the will to power. Thus, in its primary and basic sense, nihilism 
signifies the value of nil taken on by life, the fiction of higher values which gives this 
value and the will to nothingness which is expressed in these higher values.”78 The 
nihilistic interpretation of the will to power, Deleuze claims, stems from reactive, 
slave morals that wish to transform the will to power into a nothingness. Instead of 
wishing for a nothing, Deleuze claims, one must accept the will to power as a game 
of chance. In other words, the multiplicity of active and reactive forces that 
constitute the will to power are to encounter each other purely by chance. In order to 
understand what Deleuze means by chance as the affirmation of the will to power, I 
will now discuss his reading of the eternal return of the same (difference).  
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Eternal Return of Difference 
 
I will now discuss the last major theme found in Deleuze’s interpretation of 
Nietzsche; that is, an interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return as an eternal return 
of difference. What does Deleuze mean by this? At first, Deleuze equates the eternal 
recurrence of the same with the affirmation of chance. If the active and reactive, 
dominant and dominated forces encounter each other only by chance, then the eternal 
return is the affirmation of these chance encounters, according to Deleuze. Beyond 
his claim about chance, Deleuze considers the eternal return to be an affirmation of 
difference and change. According to Deleuze, each active and reactive force that 
meet by chance manifest change. Yet the changes only ever occur through chance. 
This is why Deleuze considers the eternal return to be one of difference. To put 
things more simply, Deleuze considers the nature of all reality to be the chance 
encounters of forces that create change, and these changes are themselves pure 
chance. In other words, for Deleuze, nothing in nature can stay the same. Everything 
is subject to change through chance encounters, which in turn create more change. 
For Deleuze’s Nietzsche, everything is in a perpetual state of becoming another 
thing, something else, something different. Deleuze’s equation of the eternal return 
of difference relies on the basis that there is no underlying, fundamental reality 
beyond the chance of forces encountering each other. 
 
In Nietzsche and Philosophy, it is frequently difficult to ascertain whether Deleuze is 
attempting to present Nietzsche’s own views, a thoroughly Deleuzian Nietzsche, or 
some combination of both. In the preface to the English translation of Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, Deleuze claims that his interpretation of Nietzsche deals with the 
Nietzschean use of the concepts (forces), “active” and “reactive.” Deleuze writes: 
“Nietzsche was responsible for creating a whole typology to distinguish active, acted 
and reactive forces and to analyse their varying combinations … this book attempts 
to define and analyse their varying combinations.”79 The book does exactly what 
Deleuze describes in the above quote. Ultimately, Deleuze contends that the reactive 
force, ressentiment, has “triumphed” over humanity; this is also representative of 
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present-day “slave-morality.”80 Conversely, the active forces of the will to power 
come to light only when we view reality as a becoming through the affirmation of 
“eternal return.” To affirm becoming is to affirm the active, creative forces in 
opposition to the well-established reactive forces that have gradually held over 
humanity. Finally, the most important aspect to take from Deleuze’s Nietzsche is 
“to think, to cast the dice …: this was already the sense of the eternal return.”81   
 
 
Klossowski’s Nietzsche: Valetudinary States and the Vicious Circle 
 
Pierre Klossowski’s Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, in terms of its reception, is 
comparable to Heidegger’s two-volume Nietzsche, or Deleuze’s Nietzsche and 
Philosophy; it is one of the most widely cited interpretations of Nietzsche. Indeed, 
many have claimed Klossowski’s text to be the most extraordinary interpretation 
ever of Nietzsche.82 In the book, Klossowski offers a highly curious approach in 
finding an intimate connection between Nietzsche’s work, his fluctuating health, and 
the centrality of his experience of the eternal recurrence of the same. Indeed, the 
innovation of this study of Nietzsche lies in an examination of Nietzsche’s 
experience at Sils-Maria, where Klossowski provides a new interpretation of the 
event. Klossowski’s strategy for interpreting Nietzsche and others, he would later 
write, is “devoted not to ideologies but to the physiognomies[83 ] of problematic 
thinkers who differ greatly from one another.”84 How does Klossowski interpret 
Nietzsche as the thinker who lived the thought of the eternal recurrence? What does a 
live experience of eternal return entail, however? Klossowski introduces Nietzsche 
and the Vicious Circle by questioning the possibility of understanding Nietzsche’s 
thought without taking into consideration the many interpretations that had come 
after Nietzsche’s death. Klossowski writes: “How can we speak solely of 
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‘Nietzsche’s thought’ without taking into account everything that has subsequently 
been said about it?”85 Klossowski’s remark is true of Nietzsche and the Vicious 
Circle. There is no doubt that his interpretation of Nietzsche is the most 
unidiosyncratic reading of Nietzsche, precisely because Klossowski deals with not 
only the central concepts to be found in Nietzsche’s work, but the character of 
Nietzsche, the personality of Nietzsche—in short, Nietzsche’s physiognomy.  
 
In order to situate Klossowski in the history of Nietzsche interpretation, I will 
examine key themes of the seminal work Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle. They are 
as follows: (1) Klossowski’s idea that Nietzsche’s philosophy is intrinsically related 
to bodily impulses; (2) the eternal return as a vicious circle; (3) Nietzsche’s combat 
against culture. These three key themes will provide a general overview of 
Klossowski’s interpretation of Nietzsche. 
 
 
Valetudinary States and Semiotics 
 
The second chapter in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, entitled “The Valetudinary 
States at the Origin of a Semiotic of Impulses,” provides the most concise overview 
of Klossowski’s main themes in his interpretation of Nietzsche. In order to 
understand Klossowski’s interpretation of Nietzsche, however, it is important to 
break down the title itself. This, in turn, will enable us to understand why 
Klossowski considers Nietzsche entire philosophy to be thoughts arising out of the 
impulses of the body. A “valetudinary state,” according to Klossowski, is simply the 
states of sickness or health in the human body. What Klossowski means by a 
“semiotic of impulses” is the way in which he considers Nietzsche’s thoughts to have 
their origin in the body, but are ultimately distortions once they reach consciousness. 
Of course, the way we can understand these impulses requires a “semiotic” in order 
to correctly interpret the signs, allowing us to trace the thoughts back to bodily 
impulses. Klossowski argues that Nietzsche implemented this semiotic of the body as 
a kind of experiment. Indeed, Klossowski argues that Nietzsche was the first to 
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introduce the importance of the body into philosophy—as opposed to Plato or 
Descartes, who according to Klossowski and Nietzsche, attempted to subjugate the 
body. Nietzsche asks: “Can one go more dangerously wrong than by despising the 
body?”86  
 
It is well documented by Nietzsche and his commentators that he was a very ill man. 
Klossowski is the first interpreter of Nietzsche who considers Nietzsche’s sickness to 
be the hermeneutic key towards understanding his philosophy. Klossowski argues 
that Nietzsche’s illness provided him with access to what Klossowski calls a lucid 
delirium. A lucid delirium, according to Klossowski, is an acute awareness of the 
impulses of the body, manufactured when the mind is overwhelmed. Indeed, 
Klossowski claims Nietzsche integrated his lucid delirium into his philosophy, using 
it to explore the dimensions of the body. 
 
Nietzsche’s use of the terms “drives,” “affect,” and “instincts” is ubiquitous in his 
oeuvre. Klossowski examines these terms and provides his own term, “impulses,” as 
an umbrella term for each of Nietzsche’s. In doing so, Klossowski claims that one of 
Nietzsche’s main themes, the will to power, is made up of the ebb and flow of the 
impulses of the body in constant relation to each other.87 Beyond Klossowski’s 
claiming Nietzsche integrated his lucid delirium into a philosophy by monitoring the 
impulses of his body, Klossowski further asserts that Nietzsche attempts to revalue 
the body by raising the status of the body above consciousness. Klossowski claims 
Nietzsche does this by considering consciousness as a natural element or instinct 
found within the body. Furthermore, Nietzsche claims consciousness is the latest and, 
therefore, most underdeveloped, part of the human animal that is subject to error.88 
Here is where Klossowski’s main idea arises. Not only does conscious thought 
originate in isolated bodily impulses at war with each other, but conscious thought 
also makes false these undifferentiated impulses through a misinterpretation. Yet 
why are the conscious interpretations of the body false? Klossowski claims that each 
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individual impulse, in isolation, is entirely meaningless. Meaning can be found only 
in the relation of two or more impulses, perpetually exerting domination or 
acquiescing to dominance without end. Ultimately, Klossowski positions Nietzsche 
as the philosopher who tried to develop a philosophy that was good for the body. 
Although there is no adequate interpretation of the impulses of the body, there is a 
way of finding authenticity of these impulses in a collective by adhering to their 
becoming, as opposed to their being. This now brings us to Klossowski’s notion of 
the eternal return as a vicious circle. 
 
 
Eternal Return as a Vicious Circle 
 
According to Klossowski, who considers the eternal recurrence of the same to be the 
fundamental element in Nietzsche’s work, the eternal recurrence of the same cannot 
be “understood”; rather, the eternal return is only ever to be experienced by 
Nietzsche alone. It is the bodily experience of eternal return, according to 
Klossowski, that allows Nietzsche to consider the body a unity. Why does 
Klossowski consider the eternal return to be a vicious circle, however? He claims the 
eternal return is a vicious circle precisely because it is a profound paradox and 
radically destructive. Klossowski claims this is so for three reasons: (1) eternal return 
interprets reality in a way that disrupts the continuity of reality itself, (2) eternal 
return is a doctrine that questions its own status as something intelligible, and (3) 
eternal return is an experience to be experienced only by Nietzsche and that at the 
same time questions the reality of an experiencer and experience itself. 
 
According to Klossowski, eternal return can be defined as a willing of every instant 
and an affirming of each instant as necessary to existence. In this way, Klossowski 
claims Nietzsche’s eternal return is a response to ressentiment. Simply put, 
ressentiment is what Nietzsche considers to be the negation of life itself by willing 
for the otherworldly and not for this world. The willing of every instant of life, to 
affirm it, is what Nietzsche refers to as the goalless goal of humanity. With the 
removal of linear time and meaning—the precursors to a goal for humanity—there is 
no longer a goal besides the eternal return of life itself. Yet, the paradox of eternal 
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return is that there exists an experience without an experiencer. So, how can eternal 
return be experienced? Klossowski never appears to resolve this paradox. 
 
 
The Combat against Culture: Conspiracy 
 
The last way in which Klossowski interprets Nietzsche is by looking at the political 
implications of Nietzsche’s thought. At the outset, Klossowski writes: “there can be 
no question, in Nietzsche’s thinking … of instituting a political regime in any 
traditional sense.”89 Rather, Klossowski turns to Nietzsche’s critique of culture and 
the notion of “conspiracy” (Ger.: complot). In Klossowski’s chapter “The Combat 
against Culture,” He claims Nietzsche considers two types of culture: a lived culture 
and a gregarious culture. Indeed, Klossowski asserts that Nietzsche considers 
Western morality to be based on a particular “gregariousness” that is to be critiqued 
through the lens of the ideas of the ancient, pre-Socratic world. The term 
“gregariousness” can be equated to Nietzsche’s notion of slave morality. Klossowski 
writes: “A lived culture, according to Nietzsche, can never have a gregarious 
foundation.”90 According to Nietzsche, this “gregarious” characteristic of morality is 
“the principle ‘metaphysical virus’ of thought and science.”91 In opposition to the 
gregariousness of culture, Klossowski argues that Nietzsche favours a particular 
political model based on a lived culture, which is characterised by a master morality, 
inequality, and one of exceptional individuals in order to experiment with the human 
body ultimately in the service of producing the Ubermensch (Overman). Not only 
does Nietzsche criticise contemporary culture for its gregariousness, he also criticises 
both the capitalist system and science as being in service to the slave morality of a 
gregarious culture, infected with Judaeo-Christian values. Indeed, Klossowski claims 
Nietzsche’s understanding of science and industrial capitalism to be a kind of “super 
gregariousness” that will ultimately level out humanity to averageness, eliminating 
exceptional individuals.92 Klossowski writes: 
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mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the service 
of this economy—as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever smaller, 
ever more subtly “adapter” gears; as an ever growing superfluity of all 
dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, 
whose individual factors represent minimal forces, minimal values.93 
 
Clearly, then, Nietzsche vehemently attacks contemporary economic and political 
structures that impose this levelling out of the human animal. What is Nietzsche’s 
solution to science and capitalism? How does he combat the gregariousness of 
contemporary culture? Where does the notion of conspiracy come into play in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, however? Klossowski claims that the levelling effect of a 
Christian-based science and capitalist system is a kind of “external conspiracy.” In 
order to combat a conspiracy, Klossowski asserts, Nietzsche implements his own 
counter-conspiracy of the vicious circle. Klossowski claims that Nietzsche proposes 
the eternal return is in direct opposition to gregariousness. Indeed, to implement the 
principle of eternal return would bring about Ubermenschen, as opposed to the 
levelling out of humanity. According to Klossowski, the affirmation of eternal return 
leads to a kind of experimentation with the human. The political dimension of eternal 
return, according to Klossowski, is the separation between those who understand the 
implications of eternal return and those who aim for the averaging out of societies. In 
other words, the eternal return is for the strong; the “supergregariousness” of science 
and capitalism is for the weak. Nevertheless, Klossowski thinks Nietzsche considers 
the eternal return to be a transitional stage in the development of societies, one that 
will be fully understood only when the Ubermenschen emerge.94 Needless to say, 
this thinking had hitherto unimaginable consequences in the twentieth century.  
 
 
Klossowski’s Nietzsche: “Destined” for Madness 
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What is one to make of Klossowski’s Nietzsche, then? In Klossowski’s final chapter, 
“The Euphoria of Turin,” he sums up his position on Nietzsche by inferring that 
Nietzsche’s descent into madness was the ultimate conclusion to and consequence of 
his “extreme lucidity.” Klossowski claims that the only way Nietzsche could 
complete the circle of eternal return was to destroy “the organ which had disclosed it: 
namely—Nietzsche’s brain.”95 According to Klossowski, if the eternal return is 
incommunicable and unthinkable by its very nature, then the only way to think the 
eternal return is to un-think it. The only way to un-think the eternal return, according 
to Klossowski, was for Nietzsche to willingly, consciously go mad. This very 
unthinking of the eternal return, argues Klossowski, was Nietzsche’s “destiny” to 
land into mad muteness. Klossowski’s reading of Nietzsche ultimately emphasises 
the “experience of eternal return” as a process of self-dissolution, disregarding 
entirely Löwith’s argument of the cosmological element of eternal return. For 
Klossowski, every part of Nietzsche’s thinking revolves around the experience of 
eternal return at Sils-Maria. Whereas Löwith declares that Nietzsche could no longer 
bear the weight of the supposed contradiction between the cosmological and 
anthropological interpretations of the eternal return, Klossowski claims that the mad 
“muteness” brought on at Turin was the necessary, final conclusion to Nietzsche’s 
life and thought as the only way of un-thinking the eternal return.  
 
 
Against Origins: Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze 
 
Even a brief survey of the major interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought highlights the 
considerable variation that exists between them. Such a paradoxical and divergent 
historical reception of Nietzsche is indicative of his wide-ranging thoughts. As we 
will see, the philosopher, René Girard, whose I will consider in a subsequent chapter, 
claims Nietzsche’s legacy remains tied to his twentieth-century interpreters: 
Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze.96 Of course, the twentieth century has 
witnessed Nietzsche as: the Heideggerian Nietzsche, who characterises beings as the 
will to power; the Deleuzian Nietzsche, the creator of new values through the 
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affirmation of eternal return; the Foucauldian Nietzsche, who is the father of 
genealogical analyses, interpretation, and power relations; the Derridian Nietzsche, 
who claims that truth, language, as well as Nietzsche’s texts, are as elusive as 
“woman,” from which it is an ultimately pointless exercise to attempt to extract a 
final meaning; the Löwithian Nietzsche, who is the coherent systematic philosopher 
of the single idea of eternal return; and the Klossowskian Nietzsche, whose thought 
is irrevocably linked to his fluctuating valetudinary states. Yet what does this tell us 
about the main preoccupations of the interpretations of Nietzsche? Perhaps Nietzsche 
himself is to blame for such widely diverging readings. Of course, Nietzsche 
famously demands in Ecce Homo, “Have you understood me?”97  
 
In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche writes “Mankind loves to put the question of 
origin and beginnings out of minds: must one not be almost inhuman to feel in 
himself the opposite inclination?”98 Surely, then, Nietzsche is not aiming at 
disregarding human origins altogether, like his postmodern inheritors. Indeed, it is 
difficult not to observe that one of the shared characteristics concerning the theorists 
examined, what is consistent among all of the above Nietzsche interpretations, is the 
absolute dismissal of the question of human origins. It also remains difficult to 
examine what these thinkers have to say about human origins themselves. For some 
of these post-Nietzschean thinkers, such as Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault, even 
their own work eschews the impossibility of origins, quite explicitly. Indeed, their 
thinking is a product of postmodern thinking, whose founder they claim to be 
Nietzsche himself. Lyotard characterises postmodern thinking as incredulous 
towards metanarratives. In other words, the wide consensus among twentieth-century 
philosophical thought is that language itself cannot convey meaning or objective 
truth outside of itself; therefore, its origin cannot be reached. Yet, even when 
twentieth-century thinkers postulate a theory of non-origins by rejecting 
metaphysical narratives, their very ideas of non-origins must, and do, require an 
origin. Nietzsche, I argue, understands this better than most of his interpreters, who 
claim that he is among them as the first postmodern thinker or the postmodern 
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thinker par excellence. All of the thinkers examined in this chapter concede, in one 
way or another, that they owe a tremendous intellectual debt to Nietzsche. All of 
their projects, however, are either decidedly unsure, or explicitly work towards a 
denial of origins, whether they be those of language or of the ethical.  
 
As has been previously discussed, Foucault is explicit in his denial of origins. In 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault’s genealogical reading of Nietzsche, for 
instance, entertains an originless emergence of “things” through a process of nigh-
infinite bifurcations. Foucault claims that Nietzsche’s supposed intended meanings 
for the German words Herkunft and Entstehung emphasise a newfound suspicion of 
an Ursprung. Foucault emphasises that Nietzsche, in his later writings, replaces 
Ursprung with Herkunft (descent) and Entstehung (development) in order to 
emphasise the notion that there are “numberless beginnings” instead of a singular 
metaphysical origin.  
 
Even if there are numberless beginnings, they must in fact begin, no matter how 
bereft of an original “essence,” as Foucault gestures. Yet despite being claimed as 
“Nietzsche’s closest successor,”99 Foucault fails to take into account Nietzsche’s 
explicit thinking about the origin of the human and of language, regardless of the 
semantic variations available for the German words related to origin, descent, and 
development. Conversely, Nietzsche consistently uses Ursprung in its semantic 
context regularly in the original German Zur Genealogie der Moral. Foucault’s focus 
is on clearly mapping out the impossibility of a metaphysical origin, precisely 
because metaphysical thinking relies on origins. Nietzsche, on the other hand, is 
explicitly attempting to situate the origin of language in non-metaphysical terms.  
 
By the measure of the admission or denial of origins, the two modes of theoretical 
discourse can scarcely be reconciled. For Nietzsche, the metaphysical, the 
transcendent, have their origins in the origins of the human and of human language. 
For Foucault, a genealogical analysis aims to trace the non-origins, or the traceless 
bifurcations of events, that emerge into a history that form the subject. In typically 
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postmodern thinking, flying against the notion of origins, Foucault writes in 
“Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”: “There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret because, 
when all is said and done, underneath it all everything is already interpretation.”100 
Yet, just because Nietzsche famously declares that there are no facts, only 
interpretations, does not equate to an outright dismissal of “originary” thinking on 
Nietzsche’s part. Foucault may be right in suggesting that a genealogical analysis of 
history “opposes itself to the search for origins,”101 but Nietzsche does indeed 
account for human origins quite specifically, maintaining his account of human 
origins throughout his intellectual life. This cannot be ignored. Although Foucault’s 
focus is primarily on the Genealogy of Morals, where Nietzsche develops a radically 
new form of historical analysis, nowhere in the text does Nietzsche discredit the idea 
that we cannot seek out human origins. For example, Nietzsche portends it is 
precisely the Foucauldian position of steering away from origins, not examining 
them, that is a mistake. Rather, Nietzsche declares that it is a fundamental 
anthropological insight when we think about human origins. In On the Genealogy of 
Morals, published nine years after Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche writes: “With 
regard to a moral genealogy this seems to me a fundamental insight; that it has been 
arrived at so late is the result of the retarding influence exercised by the democratic 
prejudice in the modern world towards all question of origin.” 102 For Nietzsche, to 
peer into human origins, in his words, is a “fundamental insight” towards 
understanding the human.103  
 
Derrida, too, goes to great lengths to denounce the very idea of an origin. For 
example, the second half of Derrida’s Of Grammatology is primarily based on a 
reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s essay on the origin of language. Through a 
literal reading of Rousseau’s essay, Derrida argues the nature of language is 
originless, by situating language in the metaphysical. What is of interest in Derrida’s 
thinking, in terms of his ideas about origins, is that he appears to conflate an origin 
with metaphysics, much like Foucault. Naturally, this is where his deconstruction 
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begins, with a critique of metaphysical origins and not of material origins. He claims 
that the history of Western metaphysics has always attempted to uncover a 
foundation, a beginning, or what he coins a “presence.” For Derrida, the thought of 
origins represents the centre of the hierarchical structure of Western metaphysical 
thinking as a kind of Archimedean point. Of course, Derrida brings this assumption 
of an origin into question.  
 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida claims that the problem of the origin of language, like 
Foucault, resides in the metaphysical. He claims that he has escaped the old 
arguments rooted in metaphysical error by a “hair’s breadth.” By examining 
Rousseau’s own metaphors and arguments in his “Essay on the Origin of 
Languages,” Derrida’s aim is to turn Rousseau’s own arguments against him. Yet, 
instead of following the traditional hierarchy of metaphysical opposites, Derrida’s 
aim is to remove the very system of oppositions that make such a metaphysical 
argument possible. Rousseau claims that language originates from primitive speech 
and song as a primitive cry. From this articulate, primitive cry emerges speech, 
where need ultimately transcends into desire. According to Rousseau, writing is a 
step removed from language. Here, Derrida begins his critique of Rousseau. He 
writes: “what emerges is the fact that language, once it passes beyond the stage of 
primitive cry, is ‘always already’ inhabited by writing, or by all those signs of an 
‘articulate’ structure which Rousseau considers decadent.” What Derrida means by 
“writing” is the separation of the articulate cry into its various parts. For him, the 
origin of language is nothing but the variations of articulation that characterise 
language as it is performed or experienced. Derrida rejects Rousseau’s original self-
present articulate cry as the point of origin. Instead of an original articulate 
“presence,” Derrida contends that there is an originless “difference,” of all forms of 
human communication, whether it is speech, writing, or thinking. For Derrida, 
instead of an originary event, or gradual emergence, there is a continuity of the 
perpetual construction of language. Moreover, we are unable to even speak of the 
origin. Rather, because we are not present for the origin, we can only ever know it 
through its traces; the origin can never be reached because we are too late. In 
Originary Thinking, Eric Gans too echoes this point. He writes: “If lateness is 
fundamental to the human condition, then no one can be present at the origin, and 
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lacking such presence, we cannot speak of an originary event at all. Hence Jacques 
Derrida argues that the origin at which we are not present can be known only through 
its traces; its status itself need not even be discussed.”104 
 
Conversely, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze’s primary study of Nietzsche, 
there is no mention of Nietzsche’s ideas about human origins at all. Yet, in A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze (and Guattari) attempt 
to negate the notion of origins by invoking the concept of the “rhizome.” For 
Deleuze and Guattari, the rhizome is the philosophical concept that “rather than [to] 
narrativiz[ing] history and culture, the rhizome presents history and culture as a map 
or wide array of attractions and influences with no specific origin or genesis, for a 
rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo. The planar movement of the rhizome resists chronology and 
organization, instead favouring a nomadic system of growth and propagation.”105 
Again, we have a philosophical system that refuses to engage even with the notion of 
an origin. 
 
Yet an exposure of the “errors” of a metaphysical origin of language propagated by 
these thinkers is not necessarily an exposure of the material, actual origins, as 
Nietzsche and Gans have attempted to account for, however varied in their theories 
and conclusions. Nietzsche’s most influential interpreters, particularly from the 
French post-structuralist wave, all claim that Nietzsche somehow liberates modern 
philosophy by rejecting the possibility of origins through a radical break with 
metaphysics. Where is this evident? And, if it is evident, why are there no 
counterclaims? Such a blatant oversight, and reinterpretation of his work must be 
reconciled, however. These interpretations of Nietzsche might be charged with being 
more “Nietzschean” than Nietzsche by turning a blind eye to both the era and climate 
in which he was situated—nineteenth-century Europe—and to his frequent writings 
explicitly dealing with human origins. To claim that origins have their origins in non-
origins, as these self-professed Nietzscheans have done, is not only a reductio ad 
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absurdum, but a great misfortune and misunderstanding in Nietzsche scholarship. 
Whether it be Derrida’s negation of the metaphysics of presence, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s rhizomatous map of reality, or Foucault’s infinite genealogical burrowing, 
these postmodern philosophical concepts strive to reduce the importance of human 
origins by deconstructing it to a non-originary event. Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze 
all claim they owe some debt to Nietzsche for this strand of thinking. Yet perhaps 
there is a new way we can examine Nietzsche in light of the work he has produced 
on human origins. 
 
 
A New Way to Read Nietzsche: the Work of Eric Gans 
 
There is another way Nietzsche may be examined. Aside from Löwith, who 
methodically examines Nietzsche’s corpus from Thus Spoke Zarathustra onwards, 
the thinkers that have been examined in this chapter are charged with only 
peripherally engaging with Nietzsche’s oeuvre, ultimately in the service of their own, 
individual “postmodern” philosophical persuasions. These thinkers never seriously 
take into consideration Nietzsche’s writings on the origin of language and of the 
human. Yet Nietzsche deals specifically with matters concerning the origin of 
language (and of the human proper). In some instances, it is explicit; for example, we 
see it right from the outset, in Nietzsche’s early notes “On the Origin of Language,” 
“On Music and Words,” and in a work that concerns itself largely with the formation 
of metaphors, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense. These works are arguably 
the foundation of what I deem to be Nietzsche’s anthropology of the instinct of 
language, of language as resentment. Indeed, Nietzsche’s notion of the instinct of 
language appears all the way up to his later works. Nietzsche’s idea of the instinct of 
language, I argue, directs much of his later work. His early work contains much 
speculation about origins, particularly the origin of language. In the history of 
criticism, however, we now know that this is rarely noted. Foucault, for instance, 
even criticises Nietzsche’s assumptions about origins. I argue that Foucault’s 
rejection of origins through his reading of Nietzsche is at least willful, and in many 
respects, inherently incorrect. The concerns at large in Nietzsche’s early works 
permeate the later works, even direct or orient the later works. Indeed, Nietzsche’s 
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early conclusions about human origins are the core of what Karl Löwith describes as 
Nietzsche’s central teaching: the “cosmology and anthropology of the eternal 
recurrence of the same.”106 Therefore, we have a principle for reading Nietzsche, a 
potential way of seeing his oeuvre as a whole. My reading of Nietzsche’s work will 
demonstrate that his very early ideas on “the instinct of language” and “metaphor” 
are the preliminary themes for his philosophy as a whole. 
 
Given that Nietzsche has written explicitly on the origin, development, and function 
of language, it is essential that we look at his work at the very least as a contribution 
to a theory of human language. One way of situating Nietzsche as a theorist of 
origins is to reflect on generative anthropology. Eric Gans, who proposes a theory of 
the origin of language, claims Nietzsche to be “the first genuine theoretician of the 
scene of representation.”107 Gans writes: “Nietzsche’s particular modernity reflects 
the fact that, in contrast with his predecessors who took the human scene of 
representation as an a priori ethical model, Nietzsche situates the emergence of 
scenic self-consciousness, in its ethical as well as its esthetic mode, in human 
history.”108 Utilising Gans’s notion of the origin of language as a way of viewing the 
human, I will argue that Nietzsche is a theorist of origins—even more so than 
generative anthropology would anticipate. The conclusions drawn about language, 
by both Gans and Nietzsche, expose fundamental differences in matters concerning 
the ethical. They also shed light on the nature of language and of the human itself. 
Nietzsche’s conclusions about the origin and function of language lead him to 
suspect that language itself cannot verify the truthfulness of any given phenomena. 
Gans, on the other hand, claims language is coeval with the ethical itself. For Gans, 
language is fundamentally ethical. For example, in Gans’s chronicle, “Originary 
Ethics,” he writes:  
 
Language is ethical in the most fundamental sense of being indispensible 
to the establishment of the originary human ethnos or communal group. 
The reciprocal emission and reception of a sign representing a common 
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sacred object provides a model of equal status with respect to a 
“transcendent” object that can be intended but not (immediately) 
possessed. This model establishes the scene, with a human periphery and 
a sacred centre, as the model of all human interactions.109 
 
The gambit of this thesis is to consider reinterpreting Nietzsche as a theorist of 
origins through the lens of generative anthropology, in the hope that each theory of 
the origin of language will illuminate the other—that utilising generative 
anthropology as a way of reading Nietzsche will help us look at both generative 
anthropology and Nietzsche anew. Gans’s minimal theory of the origin of the human 
will be used as a yardstick to assess Nietzsche’s theory of the origin of language 
throughout this thesis.  
 
What is at stake between Nietzsche’s and Gans’s divergent theories is the question of 
the ethical in relation to language and resentment. Gans considers language to be the 
foundation of the ethical, where resentment remains on the periphery. Nietzsche, on 
the other hand, calls for the suspension of the ethical in order to “produce new 
metaphors,” so as to annihilate resentment. For Nietzsche, humans are language-
using animals because language “is the fundamental human drive to produce 
representations.” Yet, despite the difference in conclusions about language, the 
theory on the origin of language as proposed by Gans shares many synergies with 
Nietzsche’s idea that the best way of apprehending the human is by looking at its 
origins, from first premises. Gans claims that the best way to understand the human 
is in its most minimal terms. For Gans, the origin of language signals the origin of 
the human.  
 
 
The Scenic Imagination 
 
Gans offers the originary hypothesis as a new form of humanistic analysis in The 
Scenic Imagination: Originary Thinking from Hobbes to the Present Day, where 
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generative anthropology provides the heuristic key for an inquiry into tracing both 
the history and the anthropological import of those thinkers found primarily in the 
Western philosophical tradition. Generative anthropology is a field of study premised 
on the theory that the origin of the human was a distinct, punctuated event—although 
this may have occurred many times across disparate locations in time and space—
whence all things human are generated. The scenic, for Gans, denotes that all human 
thought is generated through the representation of an original event where the first 
sign—or gesture—was transmitted by a protohuman onto others in near simultaneity.  
 
The scenic, for Gans, offers a topographic model of the human: an economy of 
thinking, where one can situate concepts in terms of centres, margins, and exchanges. 
Indeed, the emission of the first sign was the moment of the birth of the human as 
human. For, not only is all human thought generated through the representation of a 
scene, the horizon of human thought is itself scenic. Indeed, the emergence of the 
human coincides with the birth of the scene. Of course, non-scenic thinking would be 
any form of thinking that does not engage human culture, language, or consciousness 
as fundamentally human phenomena. Gans’s minimal thesis of the human, then, is 
that the human is “uniquely characterized by scenic events recalled both collectively 
and individually through representations, the most fundamental of which are the 
signs of language.”110 Consequently, scenic thinking involves the ability to generate 
or theorise a scene of human origins: Gans calls this the scenic imagination, where 
the only conceivable way to found—and generate—human culture is via a beginning 
of the human. Gans’s focus in The Scenic Imagination, then, is to situate the 
importance of each of the thinkers he examines with respect to their anthropological 
insight—into thinking in terms of the “scenic.”111 Each thinker Gans engages with in 
The Scenic Imagination appears to generate (theorise) a particular scene of the 
human. Yet despite the ability of these thinkers to posit a scene, Gans’s contention is 
that they generate “too much order from too much preexisting culture.”112 Gans calls 
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this inability to formulate an originary hypothesis a particular “quandary.” The heart 
of this quandary, Gans claims, lies in the history of the scenic imagination.  
 
Gans’s point of departure is Hobbes. He begins by putting forth the proposition that 
Hobbes’s “Leviathan” constitutes the first generative model of a human institution. 
In other words, there are no prerequisites beyond the specifically human for such an 
institution to exist. Nevertheless, Gans’s contention that there is “too much order 
from too much preexisting culture” relates to Hobbes’s thought experiment of the 
“Leviathan,” which he sees as too “dependent on the emergence of socioeconomic 
reciprocity in early market society.”113 This means an already established mode of 
symbolic activity must exist before Hobbes’s social contract theory can fully 
accommodate a genuine generative anthropological model. In short, Hobbes already 
assumes what he is attempting to explain. His scenic thinking, therefore, inevitably 
falls short of a genuine, originary theory of the human. Furthermore, Gans claims 
that there is always in Hobbes an irredeemable reliance on the metaphysical or some 
postulate that in itself requires explanation. For instance, Gans’s criticism of 
Hobbes’s scenic thinking is that he relies on a “metapolitics”; similarly his criticism 
of Freud is that he relies on his “metapsychology.” Ultimately for both thinkers Gans 
challenges the validity of their originary models by reminding us that they could not 
theorise a scene of origin as the very foundation of human existence.  
 
Therefore, The Scenic Imagination situates the variety of generative models of the 
human from the Enlightenment onwards. Gans chooses the Enlightenment as the 
defining moment where human institutions are conceived of as self-generating. For 
Gans, a “generative model” is one that outlines a scene in which the human can be 
situated. For instance, we have the father of the scientific method, Francis Bacon, 
generating “a scene of objective empirical knowledge protected from the ‘idols’ of 
collective mimesis.”114 Gans proposes that Bacon, here, has constructed—or 
imagined—a scene of human representation that avoids the collective mimesis of 
violence; in its place, we have a scene that triggers modern scientific inquiry. 
Similarly, Gans describes Hobbes’s political philosophy, found in Leviathan, as 
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theorising a scene that situates the human as a political animal. The only prerequisite 
required for Gans’s selection of scenic thinkers is that each of these thinkers must in 
some way attempt to specifically situate the human within a scene of the human. 
Gans employs the same approach when he imagines a particular scene Nietzsche 
generates for the human.  
 
Indeed, Nietzsche’s philosophy, for Gans, is placed in the metaphysical category, 
precisely because it does not explore the human beyond the declarative sentence; 
indeed the fatal theoretical flaw of all philosophy, according to Gans, is its 
presupposition that the proposition is the fundamental linguistic category. Rather, 
generative anthropology’s emphasis lies within the emergence of the 
ostensive/imperative and the emergence of the sacred (centre). If Gans’s hypothesis 
is correct, generative anthropology’s primary concern with philosophy, as a tradition 
of thought, is its inability to conceive of how the proposition (declarative) itself can 
be accounted for. A question that must be asked, then, is: Does Nietzsche’s 
postulation(s) on the origin of language offer a morphogenetic account of the 
emergence of propositions? There is a fundamental case to consider when examining 
Nietzsche’s theories on the origin of the human in relation to this question. There is a 
body of work that contends Nietzsche’s early work on the origin of language reveals 
more than just propositions, particularly Claudia Crawford’s The Beginnings of 
Nietzsche’s Theory of Language. Not only is it well known Nietzsche received his 
professional training as a classical philologist; his unpublished early notes such as 
“On the Origin of Language,” “On Music and Words,” and On Truth and Lie in an 
Extra-Moral Sense, indicate a young Nietzsche very much preoccupied with 
language as, at least, a foundational event for the human. Notably, one might argue 
that Nietzsche’s revival and “greatest teaching” of the “eternal recurrence” is, 
indeed, both an application of his earlier theories on language and an attempt at a 
reversal of metaphysics, as will be discussed in chapter 4. Ultimately, the aim of 
reexamining Nietzsche in light of generative anthropology is to give new emphasis to 
just how tantalisingly close Nietzsche was to a fully developed theory of the origin of 
the human. It is generative anthropology, however, that expands Nietzsche’s scenic 
imagination by rearticulating the central importance of the originary sign as the 
foundation of the human. 
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In the introduction to The Scenic Imagination, Gans states: “Nietzsche replaces the 
triumph of historical reason with the triumph of the individual will over the 
imprisoning force of falsely universal truth. This paradoxical struggle of the 
Nietzschean self with its ‘own’ representations has been the obsession of philosophy 
ever since, arguably even of analytic philosophy, haunted by the same paradoxes in a 
more dryly schematic form.”115 It is important to note that Gans employs the term 
“representation” in his critique of philosophy and its singular preoccupation between 
the self and the external world. What does Gans mean when he states that the 
Nietzschean self has its “own representations”? Why is the struggle of the self with 
its own representations paradoxical? In the generative anthropological sense, to truly 
have one’s “own representations” is paradoxical precisely because the self cannot 
distinguish between the “own-ness” of the self and the external world. In other 
words, if the human is the measure of all things, then there is no way to observe or 
verify whether or not the self is its own, as it cannot know what-is-not. Indeed, the 
predilection towards categorically designating philosophy as a language-based 
pursuit is always aimed at the declarative.  
 
There are many elements in Nietzsche’s work, I believe, generative anthropology 
might have reason to reexamine. First, through an analysis of The Scenic 
Imagination’s “Nietzsche’s Scenic Utopia,” accompanied by Signs of Paradox, I will 
endeavour to situate one of Nietzsche’s important early works, The Birth of Tragedy, 
within a more comprehensive framework than that offered by current generative 
anthropology scholarship. In order to understand Nietzsche’s originary scene, closely 
aligned with the Dionysian dithyramb, we must examine his earlier theory of 
language, where he claims language ultimately arose from the outpouring of a 
universal “Will” through music. Although Nietzsche would reject the universal 
“Will” as early as On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1872), we find, in his 
earlier works, the most explicit propositions concerning the origin of language. Once 
we have a clear indication of Nietzsche’s view on the origin of the human, found in 
his early works, the later part of his philosophical work will be examined. We will 
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now move our discussion to Gans’s position on Nietzsche’s philosophy as a kind of 
“vision” for a “scenic utopia.” 
 
 
Gans: Nietzsche’s Scenic Utopia 
 
In Nietzsche’s eyes, the scene of aesthetic representation is constituted by 
the suspension of the ethical.—Eric Gans116 
 
In the chapter entitled “Scenes of Philosophy” in The Scenic Imagination, Gans 
conceives of Nietzsche’s philosophy as exemplifying a scenic imagination aimed at a 
particular vision of utopia.117 In the words of Gans: “[Nietzsche] replaces the petty 
pleasures of worldly exchange and conflict with a utopian communion in death and 
life.”118 Gans rightly contrasts Nietzsche with his “predecessors,” with Nietzsche 
being the first thinker of modernity to posit the human scene of representation as 
both an ethical and aesthetic model. Indeed, for Gans, Nietzsche identifies the 
“emergence of self-consciousness, in its ethical as well as its aesthetic mode, in 
human history.”119 In other words, consciousness and all other modes of expression 
of the human are situated within the domain of the human; that is, since the 
ostensible origin of the human, all thought, culture, invention, and history can be 
attributed to the human and not some otherworldly phenomena.120 For Gans, 
Nietzsche’s ethical and aesthetic dimension for a human anthropology is what 
distinguishes him from his predecessors. Nevertheless, Gans rejects Nietzsche’s 
aesthetic model of the human. Gans states: “[i]n Nietzsche’s eyes, the scene of 
aesthetic representation is constituted by the suspension of the ethical.”121 In fact, the 
origin of the human for Gans is ultimately an ethical matter (we will discuss this 
matter shortly).  
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Gans contends that Nietzsche’s early work, The Birth of Tragedy (1871), develops an 
originary hypothesis of sorts. The work explores the beginnings of Greek tragedy 
and how it was relevant to nineteenth-century European culture. Nietzsche’s 
configuration of the Greek god Dionysus was originally utilised for an aesthetic 
theory that functioned in opposition to the Apollonian: the Apollonian–Dionysian 
duality. The brilliant beams of rationality, reason, and architectonic perfection of the 
ancient Greek world could not function without the dark, androgynous, violent 
impulses of music, tragedy, ecstasy, boundary dissolution, and irrationality. 
Dionysus represented the underlying chaos and suffering of all existence. The 
extrusion of Apollonian form from the formlessness of the Dionysian, for Nietzsche, 
worked in a fragile balance that allowed for the creation of the dramatic and 
particularly the tragic arts of ancient Greece. Nietzsche believes that this dynamic 
had not been repeated since the rise of ethics with the post-Socratics. The 
overarching theme of The Birth of Tragedy is that the tragic hero attempts to make 
Apollonian sense in an unjust and chaotic Dionysian world. Ultimately, the hero dies 
unjustly, as in the plays of Sophocles. Gans equates Nietzsche’s famous aesthetic 
duality of the Dionysian and Apollonian with the opposition between the sign and 
the sacred centre of the original scenic event, which marks the advent of language, 
the ethical, and the fundamental human categories. He writes: “The discharge of 
Dionysian energy into Apollonian form is the process by which the unconscious 
mimetic rhythm of desire is transformed into a formal opposition between sign and 
sacred object; in other words, it is a model of the original event.”122 In generative 
anthropological terms, the Dionysian represents the absence of the sign and 
formlessness of a “horizontal,” non-human activity, where Apollo would represent 
the emission of the sign. Indeed, Nietzsche’s Dionysus, for Gans, bears a close 
resemblance to the sparagmos (the dismemberment of a victim). Apollo is the visual 
configuration (the sign) that represents the sacred, Dionysian centre of mimetic 
desire.  
 
Yet, however closely the Nietzschean Dionysian/Apollonian dichotomy is aligned 
with the originary hypothesis, Gans asserts that Nietzsche’s formulation of the origin 
                                                             
122  Gans, Scenic Imagination, 132. 
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of aesthetics always falls short in describing a specific scene of origin. For Gans, 
Nietzsche is still reliant upon the aesthetic to already be in place before the 
emergence of the Apollonian sign. He writes: “Nietzsche’s theory of the scene 
begins in medias res with the aesthetic already in place and the Dionysian ‘witches’ 
brew’ of sacrificial ritual well behind us.”123 In other words, Nietzsche’s 
“hypothesis” finds itself in the impossible position of presupposing the existence of 
the Dionysian before the emergence of the ostensive sign. Indeed, Gans admits that 
Nietzsche’s scene “eliminates the constitutive tension between sacred centre and 
human periphery” by means of a perfect equilibrium between both the formless 
(Dionysus) and form (Apollo), thus deferring violence in one sense.124  
 
The Birth of Tragedy can be accurately situated in generative anthropological 
terms—but what of Nietzsche’s later works that omit the Dionysian–Apollonian 
dichotomy? It was Nietzsche’s aim to obliterate the oppositions by exposing 
dichotomies as a by-product of the arbitrariness of the sign; it was Nietzsche’s very 
suspicion of the validity of the sign that pre-empted his relentless critiques of the 
Graeco-Roman, Judaeo-Christian traditions of the West. Indeed, Nietzsche became 
well aware of the problem of the impossibility of oppositions—they can only be 
invented by human language. Nietzsche’s solution to this was to “dehumanise 
nature” and “naturalise man.” Briefly, this task set by Nietzsche was to remove the 
sign world (anthropomorphisms) from the external world; in the process of this 
removal, man would come to realise his authentic place in a world of “becoming.” It 
is here where Gans only hints at Nietzsche’s later ontological doctrines of Dionysian 
becoming, the will to power, and eternal recurrence. He writes: “Nietzsche’s 
appreciation of the human centrality of the scene of representation made him its first 
genuine theoretician; his uncritical affirmation of his discovery led him to invert, 
with the most terrible consequences, the Judeo-Christian tradition in presenting the 
scenic as the transcendence of the ethical, ‘beyond good and evil.’”125 Instead of 
situating the scene in terms of the origin of the ethical, Nietzsche’s Dionysus (for 
Gans, at any rate) depicts the scene as transcending its originary function: the 
                                                             
123  Ibid., 134. 
124  Ibid. 
125  Ibid., 139. 
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deferral of violence. For Gans, Nietzsche’s hypothesis on the birth of the aesthetic is 
one without originary violence. He writes: “Nietzsche’s eirenic picture of the 
aesthetic scene masks its originary violence; the world of art is a world of unanimity 
without contradiction, of collective suffering with neither agent nor victim.”126 Gans 
claims that Nietzsche’s vision of the collective suffering of a Dionysian existence, 
humanly conceivable only through the guise of the Apollonian form, is the first truly 
anthropological theory to place the human on the scene of representation. Gans may 
well be right to suggest that Nietzsche’s Dionysian/Apollonian scene of aesthetic 
representation embodies the suspension of the ethical. An exploration of Nietzsche’s 
suspicion of language, however, is required to situate his philosophy of the “eternal 
return” and the “Dionysian” in scenic terms. At the conclusion of his critical 
originary analysis of Nietzsche, Gans leaves us with the idea that we are still yet to 
see what the world makes of Nietzsche’s Dionysian model of the human. Gans 
writes: “We will be able to evaluate objectively Nietzsche’s anthropological 
achievement only when neither the Right, as in the Nazi era, nor the Left, as in our 
own, is able to exploit this transcendence for its own ends.”127 
 
A multitude of question marks and Nietzschean nooks arise when we read Gans’s 
originary analysis of Nietzsche. Clearly, a most prominent concern—to be raised by 
those who would dare presume to be experts in Nietzsche’s “philosophy,” no 
doubt—would be that Gans never appears to draw on either Nietzsche’s early work 
on the origin of language nor on the central tenets of his thinking: the will to power, 
and eternal return, which, I argue, stems from his inherent position on the 
arbitrariness of the metaphor. Gans only ever seems to examine Nietzsche’s early 
work The Birth of Tragedy, accompanying that examination with a brief 
acknowledgement of The Genealogy of Morals underlined by Nietzsche’s “will to 
power.” Indeed, there is a legitimate concern that Gans brings to bear a somewhat 
nuanced reading of Nietzsche’s thought. One question would be: How would one 
situate Nietzsche’s position on the origin of language in light of what we know Gans 
has written about Nietzsche, and in light of what he has not? Nevertheless, before we 
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begin to examine this in detail, we must first travel to the beginning of Nietzsche’s 
professional academic career.  
 
In the following chapter, I will offer an originary analysis of the unpublished works 
“On the Origins of Language” (1869), “On Music and Words” (1870), The Birth of 
Tragedy (1871), the published works On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense 
(1873), and The Gay Science (1882), where I will emphasise the central importance 
Nietzsche has given to the position of language as both a precursor to consciousness, 
and the fundamental characteristic that defines what it is to be a human, however 
suspicious he may be of the human. Indeed, it is essential for us to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of Nietzsche’s emerging position on language in order 
to appreciate the originary complexity of his thought in light of generative 
anthropology.
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Chapter 2: 
An Originary Analysis of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language 
 
The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human 
drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for 
one would thereby dispense with man himself.—Friedrich Nietzsche1  
 
The sign points before it imitates; its horizontal, metonymic relation to its 
referent turns back on itself as verticality, metaphor.—Eric Gans2  
 
The main goals of this chapter are (1) to situate Nietzsche as a theorist of both human 
origins and language origins, and (2) to provide an originary analysis—the study of 
the human in its most minimal terms—of his developing theories of the origin and 
development of language, which I argue greatly influences his wider philosophical 
inquiries into the ethical, resentment, the will to power, and eternal return. This 
chapter will pay particular attention to the divergent claims made by Nietzsche and 
Gans in terms of the relationship between language and the ethical. It is important to 
examine the ethical in light of language precisely because both Gans and Nietzsche 
make bold claims about the ethical, which, again I argue, derive from their 
understanding of the function and origin of language. Nietzsche’s ideas about 
resentment, the will to power, and eternal return will be examined in detail in 
following chapters. In order to provide an originary analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of 
language, however, one must begin with the fundamental tenets of the originary 
hypothesis; that is, the function of language is essentially ethical, the deferral of 
                                                             
1  Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, Accessed March 17, 2017. 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth_and_Lie_in_an_Extra-
Moral_Sense.htm  
2  Eric Gans, Signs of Paradox: Irony, Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 15. 
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violence through the aborted gesture of appropriation on the scene of human origin. I 
make the claim that Nietzsche’s suspicion of the sign, however, leads him to also be 
suspicious of the ethical.  
 
The primary texts examined in this chapter from Nietzsche’s works will be “On the 
Origins of Language,” “On Music and Words,” On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral 
Sense, and The Gay Science.3 These texts position Nietzsche first and foremost as a 
theorist of the human and of human origins. In other words, Nietzsche specifically 
theorises about the origin of language and what generative anthropology refers to as 
the minimal categories of the human in the above works. What is ultimately brought 
to our attention in them is Nietzsche’s idea that it is precisely because language is a 
most recent development in the human, so too is the ethical. In order to conduct an 
originary analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of language, I will also examine Gans’s Signs 
of Paradox: Irony, Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures, which claims that 
language and the ethical are coeval. Indeed, both Gans and Nietzsche concede that 
there is a fundamental relationship between language and the ethical. Therefore, by 
examining the main arguments espoused in Signs of Paradox about the nature of 
language, in concert with Nietzsche’s own thinking about language, this chapter will 
open up a dialogue between each thinker’s position on the ethical.  
 
What are we to learn from positioning Nietzsche as a theorist of origins, however? 
Further, what are we to learn from the analysis and comparison of Nietzsche’s 
philosophical-philological approach to language, morality, and value, and the 
figuration of the human as this appears in Gans’s hypothesis on the origin of the 
human? Is there something we can learn from these two approaches in concert? 
Examining Nietzsche’s theory of language, I argue, is relevant to not only philosophy 
of language, but to philosophical anthropology, the field of inquiry that allows 
Nietzsche and Gans to cross paths. Both of them, I argue, share a quality in that they 
                                                             
3  The early works, On the Origins of Language, “On Music and Words,” On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral 
Sense, and the middle work, The Gay Science. Of course, these periods of Nietzsche’s writing are to be read as 
a continuity of thought, not as distinct, abrupt changes in his thinking. Nietzsche’s ideas about language are 
rarely examined in contemporary scholarship, particularly in their relationship to his later works. As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, many scholars risk explicating only some of the elements of Nietzsche’s work to 
suit the needs of their own hypotheses. In contrast, a more insightful way to study Nietzsche’s work—as I have 
set out to do in this thesis—is in chronological order, to examine whether there are any major linguistic themes 
that remain present in his later thought. 
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both theorise transcendence out of immanence. In other words, both theorise that the 
human is responsible for the transcendent and the metaphysical. Despite the 
predominantly Heideggerian interpretation of Nietzsche that situates Nietzsche as the 
last metaphysician, Nietzsche, I argue, theorises a non-transcendent origin of the 
human, and is therefore separate from his postmodern interpreters. Nietzsche often 
looks to origins as a strategy to critique longstanding intellectual presuppositions on 
religion, philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, science, and the like.  
 
However, despite the topical proximity of Nietzsche and generative anthropology, 
there is a divergence in thinking about the ethical in relation to language. Gans, on the 
one hand, claims that the emergence of language is also the emergence of the ethical. 
Nietzsche, on the other hand, considers the ethical to have emerged from the aesthetic 
phenomenon of language, which is, according to him, representative of an error in the 
development of the human. By accounting for the minimal elements of Nietzsche’s 
theory of language, I aim to provide an insight into his configuration of the ethical.  
 
First, I will consider the intellectual climate of nineteenth-century Europe, which was 
more concerned with human origins than any previous century. In this section, I will 
consider Nietzsche’s own ideas about human origins as very much a product of the 
age. Examining Nietzsche’s close affinity with the works of theologian, Johann 
Gottfried Herder; philologists Jacob Burckhardt and Friedrich Ritschl, and most 
notably Gustav Gerber will allow us to have a more comprehensive understanding of 
Nietzsche’s theory of the origin of language and of the human proper. From here, I 
will engage with Nietzsche’s early period of writing on the origin of language: his 
lecture notes, “On the Origin of Language,” “On Music and Words,” and On Truth 
and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense. These earlier works of Nietzsche’s will also be 
examined with the help of the ideas found in Roger Hazelton’s “Nietzsche’s 
Contribution to a Theory of Language,” Claudia Crawford’s The Beginning of 
Nietzsche’s Theory of Language, and Joao Constancio’s Nietzsche on Instinct and 
Language. Thereafter, I will provide a detailed analysis of Nietzsche’s idea that 
language is “false consciousness,” as posited in The Gay Science. I will explore 
Nietzsche’s notion of language as false consciousness in relation to Gans’s 
understanding of language as being inherently paradoxical—as posited in Signs of 
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Paradox—in the sense that the sign is simultaneously intangible yet functions as a 
catalyst for the mutual understanding between individuals. What is also important in 
an examination of The Gay Science is that Nietzsche’s suspicion of 
language/consciousness as false leads him to a critique of the ethical.  
 
As has been discussed in “Nietzsche’s Scenic Utopia,” Gans claims Nietzsche’s 
vision of the human is an expression of aesthetic elitism stemming from 
ressentiment.4 In other words, not all of us will gain access into Nietzsche’s vision of 
the world. I will argue that Nietzsche has somewhat more to offer generative 
anthropology than this, in terms of a discussion of the value of language as the most 
important characteristic of the human. Most importantly, I will show that Nietzsche’s 
thinking on the emergence of the human is not only more closely aligned to 
generative anthropology than has previously been suspected, but also that his thinking 
asks fundamental questions about language that generative anthropology might take 
into consideration.  
 
Nietzsche was first and foremost a philologist. Indeed, Nietzsche had published a 
substantial amount of work dedicated to the origin of many human characteristics: 
tragedy, aesthetics, consciousness, religion, values, the value of values, as well as 
language. One line of argument proposed by this dissertation is that Nietzsche’s 
doctrine of eternal recurrence (discussed at length in chapter 4) has diverted the 
attention of Nietzsche scholarship from the very origins of Nietzsche’s early thoughts 
on language that are, indeed, tied into and deeply influence his later works. Yet before 
we begin to explore Nietzsche’s three periods of writing, we must consider—however 
briefly—both the intellectual climate of nineteenth-century Europe, and that era’s 
obsession with human origins.  
 
Beyond the above concerns, two fundamental questions must be taken into 
consideration in this chapter: (1) Was Nietzsche aware of the limitations of 
philosophical language in terms of its inability to account for the origin of language? 
Some Nietzsche scholars indicate that he was. (2) Did he show glimmers of a truly 
                                                             
4  Nietzsche’s conception of resentment will be examined in detail in the following chapter. 
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originary hypothesis that can stand on its own without the support of generative 
anthropology? Indeed, if Nietzsche’s propositions on the emergence of language hold 
up to scrutiny from generative anthropology, this would justify a reorientation of the 
way in which Nietzsche scholars view his work; that is, it would justify viewing him 
as a theorist of origins.  
 
 
Nietzsche as Nineteenth-Century Thinker  
 
In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of Nietzsche’s theory of the origin of 
language, it is extremely important to give an account of the intellectual climate of the 
nineteenth century, which inevitably influenced his work on not only the genesis of 
language, but his entire oeuvre. If one were to think of a century where the focus of 
intellectual energy would echo Plato’s obsessions and demand a theory of the origin 
of language (the human), then surely one would think of the nineteenth century. If the 
eighteenth century was one of wearied romantics in search of meaning in the shadows 
of the Enlightenment, the nineteenth century would be the age that struck the final 
nail in the proverbial coffin of a human- (or God-)centred model of the universe.  
 
The nineteenth century would bear witness to the natural sciences becoming fully 
fledged professions. Out of this era emerged Charles Darwin, whose The Origin of 
Species set the agenda concerning discussions on the origins of man in an objective, 
empirical, rational way. Nietzsche’s thinking too is inherently Darwinian. Although 
Nietzsche only sporadically mentions Darwin—and when he does so it is always to 
rebuke him—his explanatory terms “drives” and “instinct” can be understood only in 
a Darwinian sense. Nevertheless, the great shapers of the nineteenth century belong to 
a period that would denounce the promise of a universal knowledge through reason. 
Indeed, Nietzsche’s project, as I argue, was one of a reinterpretation of all human 
knowledge through a rigorous examination of language. Despite Nietzsche’s 
ambitious project, however, philosophy, once the queen of the sciences, has retreated 
74 
 
in part because of Darwin and rational scientific investigation.5 Now, in the second 
decade of the twenty-first century, Darwin’s hypothesis that all life emerges from a 
common ancestor (the notion of “common decent”) remains the most revolutionary 
scientific discovery since Nicolai Copernicus’s astronomical observations, which led 
to a model displacing the earth as the centre of the cosmos. During (and after) the 
nineteenth century’s scientific pursuit of a theory concerning the origin of the human, 
however, a great number of philosophers, anthropologists, and linguists would 
attempt to unravel these mysteries through means that were not considered scientific; 
namely, through reflections on language. The sheer number of serious intellectual 
works engaged with human origins—particularly with the origin of language—in the 
nineteenth century reflects the existential anxiety faced in the knowledge that the 
human was becoming decentred. This was also true of theoretical anthropology; while 
it examined “other” cultures, it also contributed to the decentring of the West. Indeed, 
nineteenth-century thought in the West would rapidly change its position from the 
human being in the centre of a cosmos divinely ordained, to a clever species of ape, 
gradually adapting over millennia. One of the many aspects of modernity is the death 
of an enchanted world and the rise of a mere “higher” animal. A great anthropological 
chasm was left in the wake of nineteenth-century discoveries/realisations, one that 
would require what Gilles Deleuze’s refers to as a Nietzsche who had to consider— 
indeed, evaluate—the very value and sense of “value” and “sense.”6 Indeed, 
Nietzsche’s preoccupation with the value and sense of the human would lead him to 
the problem of creation itself.  
 
Besides the natural sciences, which have dominated popular consciousness since the 
nineteenth century, one popular method for understanding the origin of the human has 
been to study language, its function, and its origins. Linguistics begins not in the 
nineteenth century, however, but in the late eighteenth century, with a student of 
Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, and his Treatise on the Origin of Language 
(1772). Herder’s work, whose romantic contention that language was a divinely 
                                                             
5  Indeed, this is true for the humanities in general. Nevertheless, there are those who still consider philosophy 
the “queen” of the sciences. See: P. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-
Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). 
6  Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1983), 1.  
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bequeathed, “reflective exercise of the soul,” greatly influenced nineteenth-century 
European trends in thinking. After Herder’s work, we see a mass of literature devoted 
to the genesis of language, until an eventual banning of the discussion of this question 
by the French Academy of Sciences in 1866. Notwithstanding this, the towering 
philosopher of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche, also shared the obsession of the age. 
Although a vigorous “anti-Darwinist,” through reading Wilhelm Roux’s The Struggle 
of Parts in the Organism,7 Nietzsche was greatly influenced by nineteenth-century 
contemporaries such as Herder (who was a preeminent philosopher and theologian), 
philologists Jacob Burckhardt and Friedrich Ritschl and, most notably, Gustav 
Gerber, through his Language as Art.8 For a topic rarely discussed in academic circles 
after the ban in 1866, a young Nietzsche was still devoted to the question of the 
genesis of language; he set out to answer this question of questions first by means of 
sketching out the relationship between Schopenhauer’s “universal will” of music and 
the later development of language as a secondary phenomenon. For Schopenhauer, 
music is that which expresses the universal will of all existence. For a young 
Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, the word itself is entirely dependent on what he 
would deem “the absolute sovereignty of music.” This position of the sovereignty of 
music would go through many transformations, but it was nevertheless a position he 
held until the end of his active career.  
 
Nietzsche would continue to develop—and redevelop—his theory of the genesis of 
language and the human from an explicitly philosophical problem (as opposed to a 
scientific one) to an anthropological problem. When we assert that Nietzsche’s 
approach to language was philosophical, however, it is by no means a series of 
statements on the origin of language. Rather, Nietzsche’s work on language is, as is 
true with most of his work, primarily suggestive and evocative. However, at the very 
least, Nietzsche’s developing theories of the origin of language remain consistent. 
Nevertheless, one sees the sweeping changes between a young Nietzsche’s Über 
Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn (On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral 
                                                             
7  After the Darwinian revolution, Roux’s The Struggle of Parts in the Organism postulates that there exists a 
kind of Darwinian “struggle” at all levels of the organism, where even the organs, tissues, cells, molecules are 
competing with one another for survival. After reading Roux, Nietzsche would propose that the struggle for 
survival is really the will to power. 
8  Nietzsche was vehemently opposed to the Darwinian notion of “self-preservation,” and instead proposed that 
organisms strive towards a violent multiplication and extension, that is, the “will to power.” 
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Sense), where his early theory emphasises the emergence of a community of humans 
as a consequence of a consciousness of language through the natural instinct of 
metaphor creation, and Götzen-Dämmerung, oder, Wie man mit dem Hammer 
philosophirt (Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophise with a Hammer), which is 
indicative of a mind that is no longer preoccupied with origins, but rather attempts to 
recreate language itself, and thus recreate its values. In other words, language 
essentially becomes the transformative element for the human. In these later years, 
Nietzsche figures language to be a form of action and, in turn, the arbiter of values.  
 
 
The Search for the Origin of Language: Johann Herder’s “Instinct” and Gustav 
Gerber’s Language as Art 
 
In contrast to the vast body of work claiming that Nietzsche was a theorist of non-
origins (Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida), Claudia Crawford’s work, The Beginnings of 
Nietzsche’s Theory of Language, presents Nietzsche as a theorist very much 
preoccupied with human origins. Crawford, for example, proposes that the early 
works of Nietzsche—“Vom Ursprung der Sprache” (On the Origin of Language), 
“Zur Teleologie” (On Teleology), and “Musik und Worte” (On Music and Words)—
indicate a clear interest in the study of the origin of language. Nietzsche’s early work 
on the origin of language, indeed, continually informs his later works. The much later 
work The Genealogy of Morals (1888), for example, upholds and applies Nietzsche’s 
early theory on language. Not only is it important to take into consideration 
Nietzsche’s own conclusions about the origin and development of language, I assert it 
is also important to uncover what thinkers and works are responsible for shaping 
Nietzsche’s position on language. Examining the intellectual influences on a young 
Nietzsche points to a thinker fascinated, even obsessed, with the origin of the human. 
Many scholars neglect this point. Moreover, Nietzsche’s early studies on language 
indicate that he was influenced by the nineteenth-century trends of the suspicion of 
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the “limited value” of symbolic language right from the beginning of his career, 
which would greatly influence his later works.9  
 
From 1865 until the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s early works on language origins 
was “hidden.”10 Indeed, many of Nietzsche’s earlier works were not published until 
after the Second World War. Unsurprisingly, Nietzsche’s first influential thinkers—
beside Schopenhauer and The World as Will and Representation (1818)—were also 
dedicated to uncovering the “riddle” of the origin of language and, indeed, of the 
human: Herder’s Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772), Friedrich Albert Lange’s 
Geschichte des Materialismus (History of Materialism), Eduard von Hartmann’s 
Philosophie of Unbewusst (Philosophy of the Unconscious), and most importantly 
Gustav Gerber’s Die Sprache als Kunst (Language as Art). From 1865 until the 
publication of On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873), a primary concern 
of Nietzsche’s was to find a plausible hypothesis for the origin and development of 
language. Indeed, other scholarly works agree with this contention, such as Claudia 
Crawford’s The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language, which supports the 
notion that Nietzsche was, indeed, a theorist of origins.11 Crawford’s work on 
Nietzsche’s theory of language is the only one to comprehensively survey Nietzsche’s 
speculations about the origin of language in a systematic way. 
 
Since the emergence of the Western rational tradition, humans have been interested in 
the origin, function, and meaning of language. Nietzsche is no exception. The origins 
of what we may consider to be the first philosophy of language—at least in Western 
history—should be credited to Plato’s Cratylus. A dialogue begins with Cratylus and 
Hermogenes, who cannot come to terms with whether the words/sounds/grunts we 
utter are a true representation of the objects we refer to. For the first (and only) time, 
Socrates is invited to argue over “the correctness of names.” In short, Socrates 
concludes that names (ὄνομα) come from the “imitative significance of primary 
                                                             
9  In no way is this section an exhaustive illustration of Nietzsche’s intellectual influences. Rather, the aim here 
is to indicate Nietzsche was very much preoccupied with the origin of language and the human right from the 
beginning of his professional career. 
10  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), vii. 
11  See: Claudia Crawford, The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language (Munich: Walter de Gruyter, 
2011). 
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sounds, corresponding to single letters of the alphabet.”12 Socrates’ conclusion differs 
greatly from the Saussurian understanding of the structure and development of 
language, where the signifier is arbitrary. Platonic semantics, however, falls short in 
its ability to satisfy a hypothesis for the genesis of language because modern thinking 
no longer gives credibility to a transcendental model of human language. Clearly, the 
greatest difficulty in constructing a valid human anthropology lies in the riddle of the 
origin of the human sign: to use language to critique itself is nothing short of a 
performative contradiction. Claude Magnion, for example, echoes this sentiment in 
his essay, “Nietzsche’s ‘Origin of Language,’” where he asks: “how does one, 
positioned within consciousness, prove that which is beyond or outside the realm of 
consciousness?”13 In other words, is language sufficient to prove the existence of say, 
a rock, by means of symbolic representation? Or, is it sufficient to just symbolically 
represent a rock, and therefore, to prove its existence? Indeed, one of the major 
considerations Nietzsche had in relation to verifying the external world through 
language is twofold: (1) the plausibility of grasping the “thing-in-itself” through 
symbolic representation, and (2) the determination of whether or not language is 
sufficient to justify life, considering it is the fundamental characteristic par excellence 
of the human. The above problems involved with language were given very much 
consideration by a great number of thinkers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
 
For Nietzsche, All thinking must have an origin. Nietzsche’s “beginning theory of 
language” begins with the “unconscious” and “instinct.” Both of these terms were 
borrowed from Hartmann’s Philosophie of Unbewusst (Philosophy of the 
Unconscious) (1869) and Herder’s Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772). On the 
one hand, the unconscious aspect of language, which Nietzsche borrows from 
Hartmann, represents the inability of the human to recognise language as essentially 
figurative. On the other hand, instinct, which Nietzsche borrows from Herder, is the 
precursor to language itself. Nietzsche places a heavy emphasis on the unconscious 
and instinct, which are the necessary elements that allow language to emerge. As 
some scholars observe, for Nietzsche, language originates from a human instinct 
                                                             
12  Daniel Sedley, Plato’s Cratylus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 5. 
13  Magnion, Claude, “A Critical Commentary on Nietzsche’s ‘On the Origin of Language.’” New Nietzsche 
Studies 8, no. 3/4 (2011): 35–45, accessed March 3, 2017, https://philpapers.org/rec/MANACC. 
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through the unconscious. For Nietzsche, all human characteristics emerge from the 
instinct of language: consciousness, community, religion, ritual, science, resentment, 
and so on. Crawford, for example, aptly summarises Nietzsche’s early idea for a 
model of the origin of language. She writes: “There is first a continual physiological 
unconscious origination of language through instinct, and then consciousness, 
community, the pathos of truth, and science, grow out of these origins as secondary, 
weakened processes.”14 Nietzsche attempts to describe language as a secondary 
process that is doubly removed from reality. Quite simply, language, according to 
Nietzsche, is a secondary characteristic of the human, emerging through a herd 
instinct. Nietzsche appropriates the term “herd instinct” from Herder’s own theory of 
language.  
 
The most significant influence upon Nietzsche’s early theory of language, however, 
was Gustav Gerber’s Die Sprache als Kunst (Language as Art); Gerber himself was 
influenced greatly by Herder. Gerber’s Language as Art presents language as a purely 
aesthetic phenomenon. He demotes both the linguistic terms of syntax and lexicon as 
purely descriptive terms that fail to grasp what he calls Lebendigen (living language). 
Indeed, Gerber designates language as an unconscious form of creativity, resulting in 
what he calls the art instinct. For Gerber, the first step in the development of language 
lies in the “thing-in-itself,” which prompts a nerve stimulus. The notion of a “nerve 
stimulus” being prompted by an outside force to produce language will appear in 
Nietzsche’s thought time and again.  
 
Many of Gerber’s ideas are echoed throughout Nietzsche’s early works, particularly 
On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, where Nietzsche’s focus is on rhetoric and 
metaphor. Crawford, for example, agrees with Gerber’s very significant influence on 
Nietzsche when she writes: “Gerber offered Nietzsche a new metaphor, that of 
rhetoric, for a body of ideas concerning language which Nietzsche already had in 
place by 1871.”15 For Nietzsche, the idea of the production of metaphors is a 
recurring theme in his later works. With the help of Gerber, Nietzsche becomes highly 
suspicious of the “certainty” or “honesty” of conscious productions that stem from 
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metaphor. According to Crawford, for “Nietzsche’s beginning theory of language, 
conscious language provides only an image of an image, a symbol of a symbol, and 
after Gerber, a metaphor of a metaphor.”16 Echoing Gerber’s theory, Nietzsche offers 
this hypothesis in the notes On Truth and Lie. In this essay Nietzsche contends that 
language first originates from a nerve stimulus triggered by the instinctive 
imagination, which we are unconscious of, as a response to the outside world, where 
we at once see the primacy of an individual, and the artistic uniqueness of language 
evolution. Crawford, for example, emphasises the notion of an individual uniqueness 
in terms of language, where “the individual has a unique unconscious and artistic 
language of his or her own in images.”17 When the individual translates these images 
into sounds that can be understood by a community, the image “loses its uniqueness 
and becomes merely conventional, becomes herd language.”18 Not only is the early 
Nietzsche deeply influenced by Hartmann, Herder, and Gerber concerning the 
relationship between a “herd language” and the language of the individual: one can 
also find this influence in later works, such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra,19 and The Gay 
Science, where Nietzsche presents a genealogical interpretation for the human need 
for communication. In fact, all of Nietzsche’s work presupposes that language cannot 
be trusted, as it is a removed, secondary process of the human drive, or “instinct” to 
artistically represent the “thing-in-itself,” which is gradually transmogrified into the 
communal need for “self-preservation.” Now, having given an account of Nietzsche’s 
early influences, I will shift focus to a discussion of his early works, which heavily 
emphasise the development of language as an aesthetic phenomenon. 
 
 
Nietzsche’s Notes “On the Origins of Language” (1869) 
 
“On the Origins of Language” (1869) is Nietzsche’s first work on the origin of 
language. An analysis of this work is important for two reasons: (1) “On the Origins 
of Language” presents Nietzsche’s position on language as a product of instinct. 
Consequently, Nietzsche would utilise instinct in his later works as a model for the 
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human; (2) it highlights the notion that Nietzsche from the beginning perceived that 
language must have originated from the human, and not been divinely created. It 
predates The Birth of Tragedy, his first published work, by two years. It begins with a 
riddle:  
 
Althes Rathsel: bei Indern, Griechen, bis auf die neueste Zeit. Bestimmt zu 
sagen, wie der Ursprung der Sprache nicht zu denken ist. (Old puzzle: 
with the Indians, Greeks, up to the present. To say with certainty how the 
origin of language is not to be contemplated.)20 
 
The riddle concerns the question of how one ought not to theorise the origin of 
language. Nietzsche presents the origin of language as a riddle because his position—
at the time—was that the very perceptibility of the origin of language lies beyond 
human memory. Another reason for Nietzsche to posit the question of the origin of 
language as a riddle was to indicate that to pinpoint the origin would be no easy 
undertaking. In “On the Origins of Language,” originally written for a lecture series 
on Latin grammar, Nietzsche gives a brief historical account of the intellectual 
developments of theories of the origin of language, beginning with Plato’s Cratylus 
and ending with Schelling.21 Nietzsche consequently rejects all previous theorisations 
of the origin of language, claiming that these thinkers were all unable to theorise the 
origin of language without the help of something non-human. For instance, when 
Nietzsche criticises Lord Monboddo’s theory of the genesis of language, he writes: 
“he [Monboddo] still must resort to super-human help: the Egyptian demon-kings.”22 
Despite the failure of the thinkers of Nietzsche’s time—and before—to give a 
credible account of the origin of language by means of the divine, what other 
possibilities remain for Nietzsche to give an account?  
 
For Nietzsche, language is a consequence of instinct (Ger.: Instinkt): “It remains only 
to consider language as a product of instinct, as with bees—the anthill, etc.”23 Here 
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22  Ibid.  
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Nietzsche is distancing himself from the transcendent, otherworldly source of 
language, and attempting to give the origin of language a wholly human dimension. 
Clearly, then, Nietzsche’s idea of anthropology would stem from a description of 
“instinct.” So, what is instinct for an early Nietzsche? He claims that instinct is not the 
product of conscious reflection, nor is it the “consequence of bodily reflection.” 
Rather, instinct, for Nietzsche, is part of “the innermost kernel of a being.” In other 
words, all things human, including language (and consciousness), derive from the 
drives of the instincts. For Nietzsche, the instincts are the basest driving force for all 
organic beings. The fundamental reason for Nietzsche to shift the emphasis of the 
origin of language from something diachronic (that is, something developing over 
time) to something synchronic (that is, instinct) is to emphasise that the instinct of 
language is synchronous with the human. Indeed, if the instinct to create language is 
the effect, the human is the cause. Nietzsche explains his position on instinct. He 
writes: 
 
Instinct is not, however, the result of conscious reflection, not merely the 
consequence of bodily organization, not the result of a mechanism which 
lies in the brain, not the effect of a mechanism coming to the spirit from 
outside, which is foreign to it, but the most particular achievement of 
individuals or of the masses, springing from character. Instinct is one with 
the innermost kernel of being.24  
 
The “innermost kernel of being” for Nietzsche, in its most general sense, describes the 
most basic, primitive “drives” of all organic beings; every characteristic of a “species” 
derives from the instincts. Yet despite the vagueness of Nietzsche’s early analogical 
conceptualisation of instinct in “On the Origins of Language,” he would later develop 
a more nuanced and complex conception, particularly in book 5 of The Gay Science, 
where Nietzsche claims instinct “is neither the conscious work of individuals nor of a 
majority.”25  
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After renouncing theories of the origin of language from Plato to Rousseau, Nietzsche 
would echo Kant’s Critique of Judgement for its recognition of the correlation 
between the teleology of nature (nature as an end in itself) and worldly phenomena 
that can exist without consciousness. In “On the Origins of Language,” for instance, 
Nietzsche writes: “The right insight [into the origin of language] only has currency 
since Kant, who in The Critique of Judgement recognises teleology in Nature as 
something actual, but on the other hand, emphasises the wonderful antinomy that 
something expedient can be without consciousness. This is the reality of instinct.”26 
From the outset, instinct is the progenitor of language, which in turn is the progenitor 
of consciousness, and so on. Nietzsche claims that the reality of instinct is this very 
correlation. At the end of “On the Origins of Language,” Nietzsche quotes Schelling’s 
Philosophie der Mythologie, regarding the nature of language.  
 
Since without language there could be nothing philosophical, and in 
general no human consciousness is thinkable, the foundation of language 
cannot lie in consciousness. Yet, the deeper we look into it, the more 
surely it is discovered, that its depth far exceeds that of the most 
conscious productions. It is with language as it is with organic beings; we 
think we see them come blindly into existence and at the same time, 
cannot deny the unfathomable intentionality of their formation even in the 
smallest detail.27 
 
Let us pause for a moment to consider Schelling’s claims. Shelling here is claiming 
that language is the very foundation of human consciousness. Simply put, without 
language, the human would not exist. Nevertheless, the “depth” of what drives 
“organic beings” is something that operates far beyond, or beneath, our conscious 
productions. Nietzsche approves of Schelling’s notion that all “organic beings” are 
“blind” because their instinct (that is, the instinct of language in humans) presupposes 
consciousness. Nietzsche’s reason for examining the various theories of the origin of 
language in “On the Origin of Language” is, through Schelling, to draw attention to a 
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fundamental problem that exists within this field of inquiry: that is, all human thought 
is possible only through the instinct of language.  
 
“On the Origins of Language” is an essential work of an early Nietzsche because it 
equates the human production of language to the instinctive qualities of a worker bee 
or a soldier ant. This text is also important in relation to generative anthropology as it 
allows us to peer into the very beginnings of Nietzsche’s career as a theorist who 
situates language as something deriving from the human, and not some otherworldly 
phenomenon. As his thinking progresses, however, Nietzsche elaborates upon the 
notion of instinct having primacy, arguing that the relationship between language and 
thought is both rhetorical and figurative. In other words, the production of language is 
the fundamental characteristic allowing humans to represent the external world. The 
word, and therefore metaphor, according to Nietzsche, is the lasting paradigm of 
language.  
 
 
Nietzsche on Music and Language: Notes from a Lecture “On Music and 
Words” 
 
According to an early Nietzsche, the origins of language and music are inseparable. 
Indeed, music (Dionysian) and language (Apollonian), for Nietzsche, work in unison 
to create new metaphors. In order to gain a greater appreciation of Nietzsche’s 
development as a theorist of origins, and to gain a greater appreciation of his way of 
thinking in The Birth of Tragedy, I will examine a fundamental characteristic of 
Nietzsche’s theory of language, the relationship of the sign to music. The essential 
theoretical aim of this section is to understand Nietzsche’s view of music as emerging 
in unison with symbolic language as an “artistic instinct,” or drive, to recreate the 
external world in the image of the human. The important distinction to make here is 
that Nietzsche proposes that language (and music) does not have a metaphysical 
source, but, indeed, a human one.  
 
Through a close examination of Nietzsche’s “On Music and Words,” followed by an 
examination of Maria Branco’s “Nietzsche on Metaphor, Musicality, and Style: From 
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Language to the Life of the Drives,” Kathleen Higgins’s Nietzsche on Music, and 
Roger Hazelton’s Nietzsche’s Contribution to a Theory of Language, I will assess the 
importance of Nietzsche’s position that neither the symbolic sign nor music can 
emerge without the other. Indeed, this early formulation of the symbiosis of music 
and words echoes Nietzsche’s position on Greek aesthetics, the Dionysian/Apollonian 
opposition. More importantly, Nietzsche’s position on the relationship between music 
and language finds resonances in Gans’s The Beginning and End of Aesthetic Form, 
where Gans claims that “any discussion of esthetic form should take music as its 
model.”28 After an examination of Nietzsche’s position on music and language I will 
engage with Gans’s position on music’s relationship to language. 
 
In order to emphasise the importance of the relationship between music and symbolic 
language in Nietzsche, I will now examine the lecture “On Music and Words,” which 
was delivered one year before the publication of The Birth of Tragedy. In “On Music 
and Words,” Nietzsche divides the “essence” of language into two fundamental 
categories: the tonality of the speaker and gesture-symbolism of the speaker. The 
basis of his argument as postulated in “On Music and Words” is that there exists an 
artistic drive to tonality, which is a fundamental characteristic in the emergence of 
language. Indeed, Nietzsche considers that language itself has a dual origin: that of the 
“connection of tone with metaphor.” He writes:  
 
the enormous universality and originality of vocal music, of the 
connection of tone with metaphor and idea guarantee the correctness of 
this utterance. The music of every people begins in closest connection 
with lyricism, and long before absolute music can be thought of, the 
music of a people in that connection passes through the most important 
stages of development. If we understand this primal lyricism of a people, 
as indeed we must, to be an imitation of the artistic typifying Nature, then 
as the original prototype of that union of music and lyricism must be 
regarded: the duality in the essence of language, already typified by 
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Nature. Now, after discussing the relation of music to metaphor we will 
fathom more deeply this essence of language.29 
 
Indeed, this “artistic typifying Nature” is a continuation of Nietzsche’s position of the 
origin of language as a natural, instinctive development. One might consider 
Nietzsche’s view of the origin of language as the dual origin of language. Yet 
according to Nietzsche, what drives this artistic imitation of Nature is an even more 
primitive bodily sensation response deriving from the instincts. Nietzsche proposes 
that the emergence of tonal language derived from the “unfathomable” sensations of 
pleasure and displeasure, which are symbolised through the “tone of the speaker.” 
Conceptual language, however, or what Nietzsche deems “gesture-symbolism,” is 
preceded by the tone of the speaker. He writes:  
 
All degrees of pleasure and displeasure—expressions of one primal cause 
unfathomable to us—symbolize themselves in the tone of the speaker: 
whereas all the other conceptions are indicated by the gesture-
symbolism of the speaker. In so far as that primal cause is the same in all 
men, the tonal subsoil is also the common one, comprehensible beyond 
the difference of language.32  
 
In terms of the two categories of the dual essence of language, we can extract what 
Nietzsche considers to be the most important element to language, its tonality as a 
universally “primal” expression of the “unfathomable,” which Nietzsche would later 
coin the Dionysian. Indeed, in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche describes the musical 
sonority of the Dionysian and the imagetic Apollonian in perpetual reciprocation, thus 
making new metaphors possible. It is the tone of the speaker, for Nietzsche, that 
symbolises the first metaphor. Of course, if we are to consider Nietzsche’s position of 
language as “pure metaphor,” then we must reject the notion of a rigid, semantic 
meaning attached to the symbol itself. Instead, what we are left with is a tonal 
expression or “primal melody” of pain and pleasure, stemming from an 
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incomprehensible, primordial Dionysian “Will,” as he calls it later on, discharged 
through the Apollonian drive to represent the incomprehensible. Beyond this, 
Nietzsche considers the gestural-symbolic aspect of language to be a secondary 
phenomenon. He considers the consonants and vowels of symbolic language to be 
nothing other than “positions of the organs of speech.” He continues: 
 
in short, gestures-; as soon as we imagine the word proceeding out of the 
mouth of man, then first of all the root of the word, and the basis of that 
gesture-symbolism, the tonal subsoil, the echo of the pleasure-and-
displeasure-sensations originate.30  
 
Nietzsche claims that there is a “tonal subsoil” found beneath all “gesture-
symbolism.” In other words, gesture-symbolism is the expression of a pain–pleasure 
stimulus emanating from the subsoil of universal tones, through a strophic repetition 
developing consonants and vowels all the way down to the muscular movements of 
the organism.  
 
We are now familiar with Nietzsche’s position on the origin of tonal language through 
the response to pleasure and displeasure emanating from a “Will”; however, he 
reveals that the “Will” is not the origin of music.31 He writes: “the Will is the object 
of music but not the origin of it, that is the Will in its very greatest universality, as the 
most original manifestation, under which it is to be understood as all becoming.”32 
Indeed, the “metaphorically unapproachable Will” is “the proper content and object of 
music.”33 Tonal language, for Nietzsche, originates “beyond all individuation”; it is 
the most basic imitation of nature. Therefore, one should assert that Nietzsche 
considers music and symbolic language to emerge simultaneously. Before ending his 
lecture, Nietzsche gives an example of Beethoven’s last quartets, which describe the 
fallibility of gesture symbolism in favour of the purely sonorous creation of imagetic 
metaphors. He writes: 
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During the highest revelations of music we even feel involuntarily the 
crudeness of every figurative effort and of every emotion dragged in for 
purposes of analogy; for example, the last quartets of Beethoven quite put 
to shame all illustration and the entire realm of empiric reality. The 
symbol, in face of the god really revealing himself, has no longer any 
meaning; moreover it appears as an offensive superficiality.34 
 
To extend the above passage, it must be noted that Nietzsche regards Beethoven’s last 
movement of the Ninth Symphony as an adequate expression of the Dionysian 
excitement that allows for allegorical, symbolic expression, where, all of a sudden, 
there is “something to communicate” to the crowd. In other words, individuation 
arises out of Dionysian formlessness through symbolic communication vis-à-vis a 
tonal language.  
 
It is clear that Nietzsche’s preoccupation in “On Music and Words” is focused on the 
relationship between the formation of language and music. Nietzsche’s obsession with 
the creation of new metaphors through the relationship between music and language 
is found throughout his oeuvre. According to Nietzsche, the creation of new 
metaphors is dependent on the musical sonority of a kind of primordial Dionysian 
instinct. In a similar vein, Nietzsche scholar Maria Branco points out that there exists 
“a dynamic, infinite and creative process” linking music, the muscles, and symbolic 
gesture for the creation of metaphor.35 In “On Music and Words,” and The Birth of 
Tragedy, Nietzsche considers the vocalisation of music to be the fundamental driving 
force in creating, and in the process, destroying metaphors. Branco points out, for 
example, that “Nietzsche valorizes vocal music as a guide for a theory of language, 
declaring that ‘we must regard the duality in the essence of language’ which is 
prefigured by nature as the original model of that combination of music and poetry.” 
According to Nietzsche, music and language are inseparable at their origin. Through 
Nietzsche’s assessment of the naturalistic, instinctive emergence of language, coupled 
with music, Nietzsche hints at the scene of human origin, beginning as a kind of 
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natural vocalising sonority; thus removing the origin of language away from a 
metaphysical source, and into a human one. It is clearly evident that Nietzsche 
maintains his position on language in The Birth of Tragedy. Branco, for example, 
asserts: 
 
[T]he relationship between music and language, like the relation between 
the Dionysian and Apollonian drives, brings about a comprehensive and 
expressive gain that is not purely logical, but aesthetic or sensitive, and a 
heightened intelligibility to both spheres. Music prevents its textual 
metaphor from reducing itself to a fixed or determinate meaning, and text 
allows music to show itself in its most concrete, sensitive dimension and 
not as abstract or “absolute” music.36 
 
Indeed, the cause of distress at the “Socratic” removal of words from music is that the 
delicate balance between the creation of ever-new abstractions through the synthesis 
of music and language is destroyed. Instead, the gesture symbolism of words becomes 
concepts. Nietzsche elaborates on the formation of concepts in On Truth and Lie in an 
Extra-Moral Sense.  
 
Nevertheless, there are those scholars who disagree that Nietzsche considers language 
to have a dual origin. For instance, Kathleen Higgins’s Nietzsche on Music discusses 
the absolute importance of understanding Nietzsche’s position that he considers music 
to be “a transcendental precondition for the possibility of language.”37 At the outset, 
Higgins contends that music is a more fundamental human category than language 
because it transcends symbolic representation. Yet, what meaning does music convey 
without its Apollonian representation? Through an examination of The Birth of 
Tragedy, Higgins examines Nietzsche’s position on the “meaning” of music. Higgins 
goes so far as to claim that music is “the paradigmatic vehicle for the expression of 
this Dionysian mode of self-understanding.” 38 She claims that what we find in 
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Nietzsche is the “startling suggestion that we can communicate at all only because 
ours is a world in which music is possible.” 39 Why is it the case that music is required 
for humans to communicate? What is the basis of Higgins’s argument here? Higgins 
tells us that “the human capacity to experience music, according to Nietzsche, is 
something like a transcendental precondition for the possibility of language.”40 
Indeed, what makes this capacity to experience, and, in turn, to re-present music in 
the form of symbolic gesture possible, requires, as Nietzsche argues, a catalyst such 
as the Dionysian/Apollonian synthesis. As Nietzsche claims, music is the 
“paradigmatic Dionysian art.”41 For Nietzsche, music is the direct expression of all 
that underlies existence. Yet, unlike Higgins, I contend that, along with Branco, 
symbolic language, which stems from a tonal vocalisation of the “unfathomable,” is 
represented for us to conceive of music.  
 
As opposed to Higgins, Roger Hazelton maintains the position that an early Nietzsche 
was primarily dedicated to a theory of the dual emergence of language and music. 
Hazelton offers a general overview of Nietzsche’s theory of language during both 
Nietzsche’s early and late periods of writing in “Nietzsche’s Contribution to the 
Theory of Language.” In his article, Hazelton correctly suggests that Nietzsche’s early 
influences, during his academic and philological career, in terms of a theory of 
language, were primarily Herder and Gerber, along with Burckhardt and Ritschl, seen 
through the lens of a Schopenhauerian esthetical doctrine of a universal “Will.” 
Hazelton, for example, writes: “Nietzsche is primarily interested in the problem of the 
origin of language, which he approaches by discussing the relations between language 
and music.”42 Moreover, and unlike Higgins’s proposal, Nietzsche rejects any effort 
to trace the origin of music to more “specialized phenomena such as feeling, ideas or 
images.”43 Instead, Nietzsche claims that tones can produce both metaphors and 
feelings, but metaphors and feelings cannot produce tones. Hazelton offers an insight 
into Nietzsche’s contribution to the theory of the relationship between the origin of 
music and the origin of language when he writes: “Unlike music, language depends 
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on pictures and concepts and the like, arising in the effort to communicate them. It 
owes a curious dual allegiance, to its source in tone and to its objects in the 
phenomenal realm.”44 This is the very same tension that exists between the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, in which he 
explores this musical/linguistic (Dionysian/Apollonian) dichotomy in depth. Hazelton 
quotes Nietzsche as writing that a gesture-symbolism is “a strophic text to that primal 
melody of the pleasure and displeasure-language … as our whole corporeality stands 
in relation to that original phenomenon, the Will, so the world built up out of its 
consonants and vowels stands in relation to its tonal basis.”45 Ultimately, music, for 
an early Nietzsche is an essential step for language to emerge, playing an integral part 
in the development of the human.  
 
Music, for Nietzsche has the ability to create new metaphors, but language has the 
ability to recognise music as music. Nietzsche scholar, Douglas Smith, writes: “Music 
then has the capacity to generate myth by translating its Dionysian intuition into an 
allegorical image.”46 Indeed, if music provides the immediate insight into existence, it 
is the symbol, the metaphor, that furnishes Nietzsche’s Dionysian, primordial 
unutterable with its human representation. 
 
 
The Scene Revisited 
 
Before I begin an originary analysis of Nietzsche’s early thinking about the origin of 
language, it will be beneficial to the reader to revisit Gans’s originary scene of human 
representation as postulated in the introduction to The Scenic Imagination.47 For 
Gans, the origin of the human is a protoscene where a group of hominids surround a 
central object of desire. Since not all of the members of the group can acquire the 
object (perhaps a recently deceased or dying animal) all at once, were they to try, an 
outbreak of violence would be inevitable. At this instant appears what Gans calls the 
                                                             
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid., 49. 
46  Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, xii. 
47  For a more detailed analysis of the originary hypothesis, see: Eric Gans, The Origin of Language: A Formal 
Theory of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). 
92 
 
“aborted gesture of appropriation.” One member of the group emits a sign or signal 
that re-presents the central object of desire through a gesture that at once points to the 
object and, at the same time, defers acquisition. In other words, we have a gesture of 
rescinded appropriation that functions to defer violence, and becomes a referent in- 
and of-itself. This, Gans claims, is the event of the emergence of human 
consciousness. Language, then, emerges from the symbolic representation of a central 
object of desire.48 This symbolic representation, or sign, constitutes the deferral of 
what would normally be the outbreak of violence. The mediation of the sign replaces 
the object of desire with something imaginary and intangible. Because of the sign, all 
in the group can now “imaginarily possess” the representations of the central object 
(although the centre cannot be possessed, but only its representation) instead of it 
being appropriated through violence. The sacred centre—now represented by the 
sign—increases the mimetic activity of the protohumans; the new locus of collective 
attention now becomes the scene of possible violence due to the asymptotic increase 
in mimetic activity. Subsequently, the early humans must have perpetually re-
presented the scene of human origins in order to survive. Not only is the sign an 
ostensive act of deferral leading to the birth of the human, it is the scene where the 
“name-of-God” emerges. Gans writes:  
 
The sign that designates the inaccessible centre may be called the 
originary name-of-God. What humanity has from the beginning 
designated as God is not the object that occupies the centre of the circle 
but the Being of the centre itself, which subsists after the destruction of its 
original inhabitant and whose will, conceived as the force that held the 
circle and its centre in equilibrium at the moment of the emission of the 
sign, guarantees the sign’s timeless meaning. What we understand as 
God’s immortality is of the same nature as that of the sign, which belongs 
to an ontological universe beyond mortality to which we have access 
through the scene of representation.49  
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The paradoxical invention/discovery of God is reliant upon, and animated by, the 
emergence of the intangible yet conceivable sign; it is the impossibility of accessing 
the centre through the sign that creates the name-of-God and the originary resentment 
that follows.50 Because the emitted sign is intangible, it cannot be appropriated. 
Therefore, language, for Gans, functions as the ethical. 
 
 
Nietzsche, Gans, and the Aesthetic 
 
The music of a Dionysian chorus, for Nietzsche, is the definitive model for 
experiencing—as opposed to representing—the “essence of nature” or “Will” of 
existence.51 For Nietzsche, music is the fundamental precursor to conceptual language 
and is an essential component for the particulars that comprise symbolic language. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche considered symbolic language a secondary phenomenon, 
ultimately deriving from the wellspring of vocalised sonority. One might safely posit, 
then, that what Dionysian music is to Nietzsche, is what the sign is to Gans, however 
tangentially. For Nietzsche, the Dionysian lies at the heart of the origin. For Gans, it is 
the ostensive sign that creates the centre around which there is a human periphery. For 
generative anthropology, however, the sign must precede everything else human for 
there to exist a human at all. Following Schopenhauer, Nietzsche considers music, or 
the Dionysian, as “the unmediated language of the will.”52 Nevertheless, as we will 
discuss in the next section, Nietzsche would eventually separate himself from the 
classic transcendent model of the origin of language (from consciousness, to 
language, to communication) to a human anthropology (instinct to 
language/communication, to consciousness). The aim of this section is not to oppose 
Gans’s originary analysis of Nietzsche’s first published work. Rather, the aim is to 
uncover the essential, minimal sections of Nietzsche’s work that have perhaps been 
overlooked. Indeed, the relationship of Dionysian music to the allegorical image, is 
the most fundamental element of this work that deserves examination.  
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The most decisive and important element of Nietzsche’s early theory of language in 
terms of an engagement with generative anthropology is his proposal that music—or, 
at least, the human recognition of music—arrives alongside the transmission and 
communal recognition of the sign. Nietzsche proposes that everything essentially 
human stems from a primordial urge to create metaphor from music. What interests us 
here is the separation of music and the symbol. How does generative anthropology 
reconcile Nietzsche’s motivation for the origins of tragedy out of the “spirit of 
music”? Music is, of course, non-representational; it is essentially what Nietzsche 
refers to as the Dionysian. The sign, then, is the aborted gesture of appropriation that 
presents an object. In other words, music, for Nietzsche, is the very precondition on 
which language relies. Can one draw any logical synergies from the ideas set forth in 
“On Music and Words” and The Birth of Tragedy with generative anthropology?  
 
One way of analysing the proximity of Nietzsche’s notion of the role music plays in 
the creation of language is to examine Gans’s article “The Beginning and End of 
Esthetic Form.” As the title suggests, the aesthetic form has a beginning and an end. 
The aesthetic form begins with the “opening” of a mimetic crisis (either real or 
representational), and it ends with a formal closure, thereby deferring mimetic 
conflict. We are already aware that Gans considers the originary aspect of language to 
have the double function of deferring conflict and of representing the originary scene, 
not to uncover truths. Nevertheless, in “The Beginning and End of Esthetic Form,” 
Gans attempts to utilise music as the general model for the aesthetic. Indeed, the 
aesthetic for Gans is a “crisis-deferral.” For him, all cultural phenomena stem from a 
collective crisis of sorts. Indeed, to defer what Gans calls “real violence,” the 
collective must enact and reenact a controlled form of crises and deferrals through the 
various aesthetic forms. Gans contends the aesthetic form, “music, like language, 
constructs a temporal sequence of elements presented in a well-defined order, subject 
to often complex rules of composition or ‘syntax,’ but without any ‘semantics’ to 
speak of.”53 Here, Gans recognises music as the most complete “esthetic form.” What 
is the aesthetic, for Gans, however? Gans claims that the aesthetic is simply the 
experience of form; the aesthetic is also the mimetic repetition and reproduction of an 
                                                             
53  Gans, “Beginning and End,” 12.  
95 
 
event. He further claims that this repetition of an event is something wholly 
representational, where we are able to “imagine it to be real without believing it to be 
so.”54 Gans’s definition here of the aesthetic becomes clear when we examine the 
relationship between language and art. He writes:  
 
This operation becomes less mysterious if we reflect on the obvious 
parallel between art and language. Words too are not real in the worldly 
sense, and yet we understand them by constructing imaginary models that 
correspond to their meaning, whether we believe in their truth or not. It is 
the strength of this parallel that makes it appropriate to consider all art, 
even so nonobjective an art as music, as a form of representation.55  
 
Thus far, we know that Gans’s position on the aesthetic is the representation of 
“worldly” phenomena, music notwithstanding. From here, Gans takes pains to relate 
contemplation with the aesthetic experience. He writes:  
 
The esthetic experience is that of form. The signs of language and other 
sign-systems are “transparent” to their meanings. In everyday 
communication, we do not contemplate words, we consider what they are 
trying to tell us and take the appropriate action. But we contemplate art 
and take as a result of this contemplation no worldly action at all, since art 
does not refer to the world.56 
 
So, if we are to analyse the nonobjective aesthetic form of music, what is it that we 
are actually contemplating? Gans claims what is actually happening during an 
experience of form is an oscillation between “a form-of-object-as-desire” and “the 
form-in-itself.” In other words, if we are to take the aesthetic form of music as our 
case in point, the spectator “oscillates between an imaginary belonging to the world of 
the artwork and awareness of the formal barrier to this belonging.”57 In short, there 
must exist an operation of formal closure of an object of perception if there is to exist 
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the aesthetic. Therefore, for Gans, the ostensivity of the sign precedes music. Let us 
take into consideration the following statement. Gans writes: 
 
It is not sufficient that man perceive musical relations; he must have the 
potential to experience them as significant with sufficient force to make 
their formal closure, independently of reference to other activities 
(including the other arts), an adequate motivation for the oscillatory 
experience we call the esthetic effect. It is not enough to be able to hear 
music; one must be capable of perceiving it as beautiful.58  
 
We cannot ignore the fundamental difference between Gans’s notion of music as 
existing only through the sign’s formal closure, and an early Nietzsche’s supposition 
that symbolic language is constructed out of an instinctive, Dionysian, musical 
intuition. So, how do we account for Gans’s proposition that the sign must come 
before the presentation of music in light of Nietzsche’s position that music precedes 
language by means of a Dionysian instinct that transforms into an allegorical image 
(sign)? Indeed, Gans’s proposition that ostensivity must precede the aesthetic clearly 
indicates that symbolic language must logically precede the “experience” of the 
aesthetic. The only fundamental distinction to be made between Nietzsche’s theory of 
language and Gans’s is that of the formal closure of the sign needed to contemplate 
the pure aesthetic form of music. Nietzsche, by contrast, relies on an external nerve 
stimulus that is transmuted into a sonorous-like gesture, and then into a first 
metaphor. Nevertheless, Gans, like Nietzsche, is careful not to reduce music to a mere 
element of an originary sign. Rather, Gans “integrates” music into his minimal 
hypothesis. He writes:  
 
But if human musicality cannot simply be deduced from the originary 
hypothesis, neither is it merely posited. It must be integrated, as I have 
attempted to do here very briefly, into a model of the scene of human 
origin. This is a model that tends toward the deductive while remaining 
fundamentally narrative. By adding “musicality” to it we do more than 
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merely increase its content. We understand the capacity to appreciate the 
play of pure form as a necessary consequence of man’s fundamental 
capacity for linguistic representation; but this necessity cannot be said to 
be inherent in the concept of language, or in the concept of the human. 
This extension of the concept is the originary model for Kant’s “synthetic 
a priori.”59  
 
Indeed, this “capacity to appreciate the play of pure form” is the same capacity for 
symbolic representation. In some ways, this is not at odds with Nietzsche’s theory of 
language; there is only a reversal in Nietzsche’s scene of origin. Nietzsche contends 
that if the human is musical, then the human can speak. Gans, on the other hand, 
claims that if the human can reproduce an external event through formal closure, then 
she/he has the ability to recognise music as an aesthetic form. He writes: 
 
We conclude that if man can speak, he must be musical. But we cannot 
deduce this abstractly, because there is no abstract Idea of speech or music 
to refer to. There is only human speech, and human music. To study either 
speech or music, or both, is to engage in anthropology.60 
 
There is no denying that a synergy exists between Gans’s idea that music and 
language stem from the human and Nietzsche’s contention that language and music 
have a dual essence. In other words, both theorists contend that the transcendent 
emerges from the immanent. Now that an account of Nietzsche’s early thoughts on 
language (“On the Origins of Language” and “On Music and Words”) have been 
provided, I will discuss the topical proximities and distances between Nietzsche’s 
later development on a definitive account for the emergence of language with that of 
Gans’s work Signs of Paradox, in relation to On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral 
Sense (1873). 
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From Nietzsche to Gans: On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, and Signs of 
Paradox 
 
I will now move the discussion to On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873), 
where besides Nietzsche’s early lecture notes (“On the Origins of Language” and “On 
Music and Words”), there is nowhere else in his work that gives such a complete 
description of a theory of the origin of language. Indeed, On Truth and Lie is the 
precursor to all of Nietzsche’s thinking about the origin of language, where his 
position changes very little right up to Ecce Homo (1888). Yet how does Nietzsche’s 
unfinished work, published over one hundred years ago, compare to Gans’s 
hypothesis of the origin of language? First, Gans would suggest that a “theory” does 
not equate to a scene. A theory still assumes the existence of the declarative sentence, 
without offering a hypothesis for the declarative sentence itself. Nevertheless, 
Nietzsche, I argue, depicts a compelling scene of human representation in On Truth 
and Lie by deflating universal constants and questioning the epistemology of 
objective truth through a particular understanding of the origin and function of 
language. Drawing upon On Truth and Lie, I will evaluate the precise elements in 
Nietzsche’s work that remain valid in comparison to Gans’s hypothesis on the origin 
of language, as found in Signs of Paradox, paying particular attention to the chapter 
“The Two Varieties of Truth.”  
 
On Truth and Lie is a critical text for generative anthropology to examine for several 
reasons: (1) It is Nietzsche’s first well defined, established attempt at dealing with 
what he calls the “genesis of language.” One aim, then, is to see where Nietzsche’s 
theory of language aligns with generative anthropology and where his explanation of 
language has shortfalls. (2) Nietzsche’s notion of “truth” as an established convention 
is not, I would argue, outside the realms of generative anthropology. Indeed, Gans’s 
hypothesis on the origin of language models the originary sign as an arbitrary 
convention of sorts (even if every word is “the name of God”). The importance of the 
sign is not whether or not it is arbitrary, but its paradoxical function as appropriating 
the external referent and becoming a sacred, remembered moment. (3) Nietzsche 
designates language as being entirely within the arena of the human; there is no 
metaphysical intervention. Similarly, one of generative anthropology’s fundamental 
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assertions is that the emission of the first gesture triggers the event of the emergence 
of the human as human. (4) It is in this text where Nietzsche also develops a thesis of 
the genesis of concepts from words. Again, Gans offers a hypothesis on the birth of 
conceptual thought in “Plato and the Birth of Conceptual Thought,” in Signs of 
Paradox. Indeed, there many intriguing passages to be found in Nietzsche’s early 
account of language that appear, at first hand, to complement Gans’s originary 
hypothesis in more than one way. For example, we have both parties in agreement on 
the social cohesion that emerges from the use of language. Not only this, but 
Nietzsche describes the human mind as something that arose for the preservation of 
the individual and group through the “simulation” of the external world: a clear 
synergy with Gans’s notion of the purpose of the aborted gesture of appropriation. At 
first glance, Nietzsche is at an historical disadvantage due to the magnitude of rational 
inquiry about language origins made since his death. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s theory 
still resonates with contemporary thinking on the origin of language. For instance, 
Nietzsche contends that language is a phenomenon that gradually developed in unison 
with consciousness, which in turn was the precursor to human communities. The 
fundamental structures of generative anthropology, I contend, are in agreement with 
Nietzsche on many levels. For one, Gans agrees with Nietzsche’s notion that language 
must have emerged communally in order for the sign to be reciprocated. I will 
examine this contention below. 
 
According to the first section of On Truth and Lie, language is something that arrived 
quite late, perhaps through the synergies that existed through musical tonality and 
imagetic representation (as was discussed previously). What do we make, however, of 
Nietzsche’s understanding of the function of language? What is its purpose? Once 
language begins its precarious journey, what is its meaning for the human? And what 
is its relationship to the human? Written one year after The Birth of Tragedy (1872), 
On Truth and Lie is a work whose focus orbits around the notion that the established 
“truths” designated by the conventions of language are merely a socially, obligatorily 
imposed consensus whose function is to both create and maintain order within a 
community. Simply put, this text challenges the certitude of human knowledge 
through a natural-cultural theory of both the origin and development of language. 
Indeed, humanity has, according to Nietzsche, forgotten that our arbitrary lexicons are 
100 
 
merely nerve stimuli (triggered by external phenomena) converted to images, then 
sounds; finally we “believe” we know something about an “X” and so make our 
moral value–judgements based on these false, all-too-human assumptions. Yet as the 
title suggests, Nietzsche’s early work is about the relationship between truth and 
human language through the lens of a non- or extramoral sense. It was Nietzsche’s 
early contention in this work that the origin of symbolic language was an impulse, or 
“will,” to imitate an object as a response to pleasure–pain nerve stimulation. Although 
this text does not explain the direct passage from horizontal animality to symbol-
using humans, On Truth and Lie does offer a complete account of Nietzsche’s theory 
of the emergence and limitations of language. 
 
Nietzsche introduces On Truth and Lie with an allegorical fable on the invention of 
knowledge. He claims that a certain type of “clever animal” (humans) once inhabiting 
the earth had invented “knowledge.” Moreover, “after nature had drawn a few 
breaths,” the clever animals had to die. From this passage, Nietzsche reminds us how 
“shadowy and flighty, aimless and arbitrary” the human intellect appears in relation to 
a nigh-infinite cosmos. Nietzsche gives us an account of exactly what this shadowy 
“intellect” is. He writes: 
 
The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, unfolds its 
chief powers in simulation; for this is the means by which the weaker, less 
robust individuals preserve themselves, since they are denied the chance 
of waging the struggle for existence with horns or the fangs of beasts of 
prey.61 
 
Nietzsche’s contention is that the “intellect” is a means for the preservation of the 
individual by means of simulating various external phenomena. What does Nietzsche 
mean here by the intellect unfolding its powers in simulation? Of course, to simulate 
something is to imitate it. Indeed, the chief function of the human, for Nietzsche, is to 
imitate something it sees and hears in the external, languageless world. Interestingly, 
the above passage from Nietzsche is startlingly close to Girard’s mimetic theory—we 
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will arrive at this thought later. Nevertheless, according to Nietzsche, the imitation of 
an external object is then incorporated into the body first as a nerve stimulus, then 
down the causal chain from word to sound. Here we arrive at the word. He writes: 
 
The “thing in itself” (for that is what pure truth, without consequences, 
would be) is quite incomprehensible to the creators of language and not at 
all worth aiming for. One designates only the relations of things to man, 
and to express them one calls on the boldest metaphors. A nerve stimulus, 
first transposed into an image—first metaphor. The image, in turn, 
imitated by a sound—second metaphor.62 
 
Here, Nietzsche is pointing out that it is quite impossible to “know” the “thing-in-
itself” by means of a perception that stems from a nerve stimulus into an image-sound 
(word). Indeed, every word is merely the metaphorical representation of the 
relationship between external phenomena we presuppose to exist with us. Nietzsche 
identifies that, as a consequence of the human only ever able to value the relation 
between itself and the eternal world, the “X” thing-in-itself remains forever hidden 
from our purview. From this premise, Nietzsche turns his gaze to the notion of 
“truth.” In a most famous passage, he writes:  
 
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations which have been 
enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and 
which after long use seems firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: 
truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they 
are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins 
which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as 
coins.63 
 
Here, we must entertain that the way in which this “sum of human relations” has 
taken hold of (perhaps invented) “truth” is by means of a slow, drawn-out, gradual 
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process seemingly spanning generations in order to become a sign system whose 
participants have lost a gesture’s original poetic and rhetorical singularity. These 
metaphors, which first arrive as nerve stimuli, then as images, then finally 
sounds/gestures/grunts were originally a kind of outburst in reaction to the external 
world. The relaying back and forth of these same “metaphors” over the long distances 
of time betrays the human memory. We arrive at the present with an endless 
combination of these metaphors, but we have forgotten their origins as having little 
significance when discussing the idea of “meaning” or “truth.” What is ultimately 
important in On Truth and Lie, in relation to generative anthropology, is Nietzsche’s 
emphasis on language as lacking truth. The only “truth” arising from language is the 
“pact” made between individual humans for the sake of social cohesion. Indeed, if 
each nerve-stimulus response is entirely unique and individual, there cannot be 
anything beyond a sum of relations, but only the imperfection of metaphors.  
 
I will now summarise Nietzsche’s proposal of the emergence of language as proposed 
in On Truth and Lie. Nietzsche outlines a hypothesis for the gradual development of 
language. For the creation of language, there are three steps to be taken: (1) There 
exists a nerve stimulus from the external world that is transposed into an image, for 
instance, a rock. (2) The now transposed imagetic nerve stimulus becomes, for 
Nietzsche, the first metaphor. (3) The image is responded to by an acoustical “drive” 
(sonorous articulation) that attempts to simulate the external image: the second 
metaphor.64 What is of interest here, in terms of generative anthropology, is 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on the origin as being a “nerve stimulus” that is expressed 
through metaphor, derived from a primordial “drive.” Indeed, Nietzsche posits that 
metaphor cannot give a true account of the “thing-in-itself” by the very nature of 
being anthropomorphic. Nietzsche’s suspicion is that the human has no verifiable way 
to obtain truth through metaphor; everything human is metaphor, even our truths. 
Perhaps one day we will find another intelligent, conscious life-form that can verify 
our projections and representations of “objects” as holding some truth 
correspondence. For, as Nietzsche proclaims: “One is always wrong, but with two, 
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truth begins.—One cannot prove his case, but two are irrefutable.”65 Nevertheless, we 
are a suspicious lot who may even suspect the validity of the “signs” emitted by a 
future interstellar neighbour.  
 
Ultimately, Nietzsche considers the guttural, sonorous articulations of the early 
human as a mere reaction to an external stimulus through an ancient “drive.” It is this 
interaction between drive and metaphor that forms the basis of Nietzsche’s arguments 
in On Truth and Lie. As has been noted, generative anthropology’s account of the 
emergence of language and the human arrives with a scene. As we take into 
consideration Nietzsche vague conception of a nerve stimulus, could we not find 
proximity between the generative anthropological scene and Nietzsche’s external 
stimulus? I will discuss this shortly.  
 
 
An Originary Analysis: On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense?  
 
On the one hand, Gans’s originary hypothesis is inherently universalist. Gans claims 
that all humans originated with the emergence of language on a scene, where the 
gesture of appropriation is aborted through the paradoxical function of the sign as a 
gesture of representation. Indeed, this suggests that there is a minimal, universal claim 
to be made for the human: language. On the other hand, we have Nietzsche explicitly 
stating that there is no universal, objective truth, whether it be from the sciences, 
language, or religion. Ultimately the first forms of human language, for Nietzsche, 
were “artistic” impulses, experienced by individuals on individual levels; hence, the 
imperfection of collective metaphors. These artistic impulses (arising from a drive to 
represent the external world) were gradually replaced with linguistic conventions for 
the sake of communal cohesion. Clearly, Nietzsche is demonstrating the problem of 
“truth.” Accordingly, for him, the foundation of language is the “drive” to represent 
external phenomena (for instance, a rock). If, indeed, each individual responds to a 
particular external stimulus via an imagetic symbol, then we must characterise each 
individual response as closed off from another’s individual response to the same 
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stimulus. Therefore, each human metaphor is entirely distinct from every other. 
Hence there cannot be any communion, for Nietzsche, between the thing-in-itself and 
symbolic language charged by an instinctive “artistic drive” to represent stimuli. 
According to this logic, the very metaphysical notion of “truth” is ultimately 
erroneous. One theoretical manoeuvre to reconcile Gans and Nietzsche is to consider 
generative anthropology’s position on the notion of truth in relation to the originary 
hypothesis as found in Signs of Paradox. 
 
In On Truth and Lie, Nietzsche writes: “whence in all the world comes the urge for 
truth?”66 The chapter “The Two Varieties of Truth” in Gans’s Signs of Paradox 
considers the problem of truth in relation to his hypothesis of the origin of language. 
For Gans, there are two distinctive variations of truth. The first category of truth is the 
ostensive (the truth of faith); the second, the declarative (the truth of reason). 
Language begins with the ostensive; that is, the first sign/grunt/gesture’s “intention” 
was to directly demonstrate its object of inquiry. Ostensive truth, for Gans, simply 
means “significance is prior to signification.”67 Of course, the ostensive emerges 
before declarative truth. Indeed, if we were to peer beyond the propositional thought 
of the declarative we would arrive at the original ostensive gesture that was to 
simultaneously defer violence and produce formal closure of the originary sign. To go 
beyond propositions, toward the ostensive, means, for Gans, the escape from the 
“metaphysical prison-house of language,” whence ostensive truth “liberates from the 
formal propositions of metaphysics.”68 Yet what is ostensive truth? Obviously, 
ostensive truth must be explained through a “model of the familial declarative 
conception.”69 Here Gans offers the analogy of a child pointing to a cat, but the child 
declares the cat to be a “dog.” The use of the ostensive in this example “cannot be 
understood as simply equivalent to the use of the correct sign.”70 What is vitally 
important for the ostensive truth of the sign, according to Gans, is the “significance 
prior to signification; the question of whether it is appropriate to use a sign at all 
[pointing to the cat] outweighs that of the appropriate sign to use [using the incorrect 
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declarative “dog”].”71 In other words, we cannot conceive of the originary, ostensive 
sign as having a correlation to an assigned meaning. Rather, Gans claims the 
ostensive truth lies in the potential of something worth being re-presented in the first 
place, something a “nascent community” of protohumans can draw their unified 
attention to, and something that may be a cause of mimetic violence (if the gesture 
was not to be uttered or enacted). In other words, the thing that is to be signed through 
an ostensive gesture must be charged with the potential for the protocommunity to 
perceive it as a source of unity or disunity. For Gans, the truth of the ostensive is the 
“birth of the human.”72 Why is the ostensive truth the “truth of faith,” however? Gans 
would content that the “gesture of representation” (the first sign) instead of a “gesture 
of appropriation” is the communally accepted truth “as revelation of central Being.”73 
In other words, the ostensive sign (or, pointing to an object of dual relevance: unity 
and disunity), for the emerging community of protohumans, reveals not the object in-
itself. Rather, the ostensive sign “recognises an object that can only be represented.”74 
The sign that replaces an object in its absence is the emergence of the imperative 
(declarative). Gans claims that there is a tension in the absence of the ostensive, 
which leads to the “awaiting characteristic of the imperative.”75 In other words, the 
imperative is the “making present” of what is now absent from the scene. For Gans, 
this making present is an expression of desire. 
 
Let us go back to Nietzsche’s theory of language as espoused in On Truth and Lie. 
What are we to make of Gans’s contention of ostensive truth in relation to Nietzsche’s 
theory of language? It would be useful to remember Nietzsche’s position that the 
representation of a nerve stimulus is an instinctive, superfluous, overreaching “artistic 
drive.” An obvious observation is that this “artistic drive” corresponds to Gans’s 
notion of the desire that stems from the imperative, making the absent referent present 
in the imagination. Yet can we reconcile Gans’s ostensive sign with Nietzsche’s 
theory? Towards the end of the first section in On Truth and Lie, Nietzsche offers a 
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striking example of the problem of truth in metaphors by examining the formation of 
concepts. He writes:  
 
Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this 
ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve 
an image into a concept. For something is possible in the realm of these 
schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: 
the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the 
creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly 
marked boundaries—a new world, one which now confronts that other 
vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more, universal, better, 
known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus 
as the regulative and imperative world. Whereas each perceptual 
metaphor is individual and without equals and is therefore able to elude 
all classification, the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity 
of a Roman columbarium and exhales in logic that strength and coolness 
which is characteristic of mathematics. Anyone who has felt this cool 
breath [of logic] will hardly believe that even the concept—which is as 
bony, foursquare, and transposable as a die—is nevertheless merely the 
residue of a metaphor, and that the illusion which is involved in the 
artistic transference of a nerve stimulus into images is, if not the mother, 
then the grandmother of every single concept.76 
 
To go back to first premises, for Nietzsche, “a word is the image of a nerve-stimulus 
in sounds.” Yet there is a fundamental difference between Nietzsche’s artistic 
transference of a response to a nerve stimulus and Gans’s hypothesis. On the one 
hand, Nietzsche is referring to the artistic drive, or instinct, to utter a word. On the 
other hand, Gans is referring to the production of the sign as self-demonstrating 
something significant for it to be uttered in the first place. For one, Nietzsche must 
rely on the aesthetic for the human to emerge as a human. In the face of generative 
anthropology’s originary sign, we must declare that Nietzsche has come compellingly 
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close to a logically plausible hypothesis of the origin of language. Nietzsche’s theory 
of language as espoused in On Truth and Lie closely approximates many fundamental 
theoretical postulates found in the originary hypothesis: (1) the emergence of a 
community with language, (2) the emergence of human consciousness as language, 
(3) the primacy of language as an anthropological model for the human, and (4) the 
recognition that language is something immanent, not transcendent. If only Nietzsche 
had taken a step further to consider the importance of the primacy and function of the 
sign itself.  
 
Indeed, Nietzsche’s Apollonian response (the sign) to a Dionysian flux of nature 
(external stimulus) does give an indication of the ostensive, but it offers no transition 
to the imperative. We have here in Nietzsche’s theory as espoused in On Truth and 
Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense an ostensive without communal recognition. Indeed, 
Nietzsche, like Gans, understands the problems with truth. For Nietzsche, there are no 
metaphysical truths, but only anthropomorphic ones. Ultimately, Nietzsche would 
conclude: “this conceptual edifice is an imitation [artistic process] of temporal, 
spatial, and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor.”77 Nevertheless, On 
Truth and Lie proposes—even by today’s standards—an almost tenable (albeit 
gradualistic) hypothesis for the origin of language.  
 
Yet if we are to reconcile Nietzsche’s early theory of language with the originary 
hypothesis, we must align his thinking with Gans’s proposition that there exist three 
steps in the evolution of language: the ostensive, imperative, and declarative. For 
Nietzsche, language is not communally reciprocated as such. Instead, a single 
individual, or protohuman, allocates a sign to an object (this is a pure expression of 
the will to power, as will be discussed later), where resentment is the outcome for 
other individuals for not having allocated the sign first.  
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The Gay Science 
 
The Gay Science (1882), represents what most Nietzsche scholars agree to be the 
beginning of his middle period of writing, and the end of his relationship with Richard 
Wagner. The Gay Science is a work that houses many ideas on language. Yet, the 
work indicates no real change in Nietzsche’s thinking about language as emerging 
from an instinctive impulse, as outlined in On Truth and Lie. Rather, Nietzsche 
utilises his theory of language in On Truth and Lie to illuminate many other 
philosophical problems, as we will see. What this indicates is that Nietzsche 
implements the same logic as Gans, by examining human problems from human 
beginnings. By examining problems from a point of reference, from an origin, The 
Gay Science covers a wide array of subjects, including science, religion, morality, 
metaphysics, and mathematics.  
What is interesting about this book is that, quite often, Nietzsche will examine a 
particular subject from first premises, which he considers to be constituted by the 
error of language and consciousness.  
 
This work marks the beginning of many of Nietzsche’s mature ideas, such as the first 
glimpse of his philosophy of the “eternal return.”78 More importantly—and rarely 
attested to by scholarship—it is an explicit examination of the origin of the human 
and of many human categories, including the ethical. Not only this, but Nietzsche’s 
late addition to The Gay Science indicates that his thoughts on language and 
consciousness remain consistent from 1883 (On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral 
Sense) to 1888 (book 5 of The Gay Science). The titles of the aphorisms speak for 
themselves: “What preserves the species,” “Consciousness,” “The consciousness of 
appearance,” “On the origin of poetry,” “Origin of knowledge,” “Origin of the 
logical,” “Origin of sin,” “Of the origin of religion,” “Origin of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’” 
“On the origin of scholars,” “Once more on the origin of scholars,” “On the origin of 
religions,” “On the genius of the species,” “The origin of our concept of knowledge.”  
 
                                                             
78  See chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of Nietzsche’s “eternal return” in light of generative anthropology. 
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Here, I will examine key aphorisms found in The Gay Science that are emblematic of, 
and a continuation of, Nietzsche’s earlier work that tackles the problem of the origin 
of language (and consciousness). I will also examine the possibility that Nietzsche’s 
view of consciousness in The Gay Science allows him to also discredit the ethical 
aspect of language as a mere aesthetic phenomenon. Finally, I will analyse selected 
passages from The Gay Science alongside Gans’s Signs of Paradox in order to explore 
where Nietzsche’s view of language and the ethical lies on the originary scene of 
human representation.  
 
From the outset of book 1 of The Gay Science, under the aphorism entitled “The 
teachers of the purpose of existence,” Nietzsche declares that there exists an ancient 
instinct responsible for the preservation of the species. Regardless of the conscious 
intentions of an individual, Nietzsche claims that this instinct encompasses the 
singular task of the human. He writes:  
 
Whether I contemplate men with benevolence or with an evil eye, I 
always find them concerned with a single task, all of them and everyone 
of them in particular: to do what is good for the preservation of the human 
race. Not from any feeling of love for the race, but merely because 
nothing in them is older, stronger, more inexorable and unconquerable 
than this instinct—because this instinct constitutes the essence of our 
species, our herd.79  
 
Indeed, wherever Nietzsche speaks of consciousness in The Gay Science, he declares 
it to be something that has emerged quite recently alongside language (language and 
consciousness are the same thing in Nietzsche’s thought) and that stems from the 
instinct for the preservation of the species. In book 1, under the aphorism 
“Consciousness,” Nietzsche examines consciousness as the latest development of the 
human, which, for Nietzsche, is the most “unfinished” and “unstrong.” He writes:  
 
                                                             
79  Nietzsche, Gay Science, 73. 
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Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and hence 
also what is most unfinished and unstrong. Consciousness gives rise to 
countless errors that lead an animal or man to perish sooner than 
necessary, “exceeding destiny,” as Homer puts it. If the conserving 
associations of the instincts were not so very much more powerful, and if 
it did not serve on the whole as a regulator, humanity would have to 
perish of its misjudgments and its fantasies with open eyes, of its lack of 
thoroughness and its credulity—in short, of its consciousness: rather, 
without the former, humanity would long have disappeared.80  
 
Thus, according to Nietzsche, the fundamental mechanism to conserve the human is 
the instinct for preservation. Nietzsche continues: 
 
This ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness has 
the very useful consequence that it prevents an all too fast development of 
consciousness. Believing that they possess consciousness, men have not 
exerted themselves very much to acquire it; and things haven’t changed 
much in this respect. To this day the task of incorporating knowledge and 
making it instinctive is only beginning to dawn on the human eye and is 
not yet clearly discernible; it is a task that is seen only by those who have 
comprehended that so far we have incorporated only our errors and that 
all our consciousness relates to errors.81 
 
Clearly, the above passage indicates Nietzsche is suspicious of consciousness to the 
point that he considers consciousness a recent and unfinished development of the 
human. The above passage also hints at another of Nietzsche’s philosophical aims, 
that is, to naturalise language and consciousness into the stronger instincts, to be a 
second nature, and guided by the will of the instincts or drives. Yet, not only is 
Nietzsche suspicious of the sign world (consciousness) because it is a late, recent, 
retroactive development, but he also claims that there is an excess of consciousness 
by means of the evolutionary need for humans to communicate quickly and 
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effectively. He writes: “Where need and distress have forced men for a long time to 
communicate and understand each other quickly and subtly, the ultimate result is an 
excess of this strength and art of communication.”82 In the same aphorism, Nietzsche 
emphasises the notion that the sign is merely a surface reality; consciousness is 
merely a web, or collection of surface symbols whose utility is merely the “pressure 
of the need for communication.” Nietzsche writes:  
 
Supposing that this observation is correct, I may now proceed to 
summarise that consciousness has developed only under pressure of the 
need for communication; that from the start it was needed and useful only 
between human beings (particularly between those who commanded and 
those that obeyed); and that it also develops only in proportion to the 
degree of this utility. Consciousness is really only a net of communication 
between human beings; it is only as such that it had to develop; a solitary 
human being who lived like a beast of prey would not have needed it.83 
 
Nietzsche continues: 
 
Man, like every living being, thinks continually without knowing it; the 
thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this—
the most superficial and worst part—for only this conscious thinking takes 
the form of words, which is to say signs of communication, and this fact 
uncovers the origin of consciousness.84 
 
The superficiality of consciousness, for Nietzsche, is precisely why he is suspicious of 
the sign world, of words, of consciousness, of language. The words that are thought 
and executed or communicated consciously are the most “superficial” and “worst 
part” of consciousness. According to this passage, words, or “signs of 
communication,” reside in the instinct for the need to communicate within the herd, or 
herd instinct. Nietzsche writes: 
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In brief, the development of language and the development of 
consciousness (not of reason but merely of the way reason enters 
consciousness) go hand in hand. Add to this that not only language serves 
as a bridge between human beings but also as a mien, a pressure, a 
gesture. The emergence of our sense impressions into our own 
consciousness, the ability to fix them and, as it were, exhibit them 
externally, increased proportionately with the need to communicate them 
to others by means of signs.85 
 
According to this logic, consciousness engenders language and language develops 
consciousness. As Nietzsche says, the two go hand in hand. There exists a drive that 
“drives” us to “exhibit” signs externally. Yet as the community of speakers grows, the 
“need” to exhibit these external signs apparently grows. Nietzsche continues: 
 
The human being inventing signs is at the same time the human being 
who becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself. It was only as a 
social animal that man acquired self-consciousness—which he is still in 
the process of doing, more and more.86 
 
In no way, according to Nietzsche, are we ever able to understand a universe in utter 
chaos by means of human language. He writes: “The total character of the world, 
however, is in all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack 
of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for 
our aesthetic anthropomorphisms.”87 To conceive of a theory of language as an 
aesthetic phenomenon allows Nietzsche to critique human “knowledge” and “logic” 
in the aphorisms “Origin of knowledge,” and “Origin of the logical.” In “Origin of 
knowledge,” Nietzsche rebuffs his ideas in On truth and Lie. He writes: “Over 
immense periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of these 
proved to be useful and helped to preserve the species: those who hit upon or 
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inherited these had better luck in their struggle for themselves and their progeny.”88 In 
“Origin of the logical,” Nietzsche elicits the same idea: that which stems from 
language cannot be trusted. The aphorism is worth quoting at length. He writes:  
 
How did logic come into existence in man’s head? Certainly out of illogic, 
whose realm originally must have been immense. Innumerable beings 
who made inferences in a way different from ours perished; for all that, 
their ways might have been truer. Those, for example, who did not know 
how to find often enough what is “equal” as regards both nourishment and 
hostile animals—those, in other words, who subsumed things too slowly 
and cautiously—were favoured with a lesser probability of survival than 
those who guessed immediately upon encountering similar instances that 
they must be equal. The dominant tendency, however, to treat as equal 
what is merely similar—an illogical tendency, for nothing is really 
equal—is what first created any basis for logic.89 
 
The above passage, written in 1882, is clearly echoing Nietzsche’s theory of language 
in On Truth and Lie. For example, in On Truth and Lie, Nietzsche postulates the 
formation of concepts. He writes: 
 
Let us still give special consideration to the formation of concepts. Every 
word immediately becomes a concept, inasmuch as it is not intended to 
serve as a reminder of the unique and wholly individualized original 
experience to which it owes its birth, but must at the same time fit 
innumerable, more or less similar cases—which means, strictly speaking, 
never equal—in other words, a lot of unequal cases. Every concept 
originates through our equating what is unequal. No leaf ever wholly 
equates another, and the concept “leaf” is formed through an arbitrary 
abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the 
distinctions; and now it gives rise to the idea that in nature there might be 
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something besides the leaves which would be “leaf”—some kind of 
original form after which all the leaves have been woven, marked, copied, 
colored, curled, and painted, but by unskilled hands, so that no copy 
turned out to be a correct, reliable, and faithful image of the original 
form.90 
 
In the aphorism, “Cause and effect,” Nietzsche states that nothing can be explained in 
terms of cause and effect. Why? Again, it is the aesthetic anthropomorphisms we 
utilise to represent the world that fail to perceive what is actually there. Nietzsche 
writes: “How could we possibly explain anything? We operate only with things that 
do not exist: lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, divisible spaces. How 
should explanations be at all possible when we first turn everything into an image, our 
image!”91 Of course, for Nietzsche, the image is the first step in the process of 
metaphorisation. Yet even beyond The Gay Science, Nietzsche continually describes 
language and consciousness as surface phenomena. For example, in Beyond Good and 
Evil, the commentary and addition to his self-proclaimed magnum opus, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, he offers the attentive reader a close inspection into the ultilisation of his 
understanding of the function of consciousness as espoused in The Gay Science. 
Nietzsche explicitly states in Beyond Good and Evil that “consciousness is a surface 
phenomena” where “the greatest part of conscious thought must still be attributed to 
instinctive activity.”92  
 
 
Signs of Paradox: Eric Gans 
 
The fundamental proposition put forth by Gans in Signs of Paradox: Irony, 
Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures is that the human, including all human 
culture, was spontaneously generated “through the deferral of violence through 
representation.”93 In Signs of Paradox, Gans proposes a new way of looking at both 
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the human and the history of thought; he calls this originary thinking. Nothing short 
of a new way of looking at the human, Gans proposes with exactitude what originary 
thinking constitutes. For Gans, originary thinking constitutes, in a sense, the 
formalism of paradox; without paradox, thinking becomes impossible. Naturally, his 
book is dedicated to the relationship between paradox and the minimal elements of 
the human, stemming from language: irony, resentment, and other mimetic structures. 
Gans also accounts for the plausibility of his “new” way of thinking. He writes: “The 
purpose of originary thinking is not to supplant other modes of thought, but to provide 
a common point of departure that persists as a link between them.”94 Indeed, what 
establishes a link between modes of thought is the representation of the collective 
transmission of the first sign. The origin of language, then, is the fundamental 
characteristic that appears to situate the human as human. Gans opens his critique in 
Signs of Paradox by distinguishing between the “horizontality” of non-human animal 
activity and the “verticality” of the human sign. Gans claims that all things that are 
characteristically human “coincide at the moment of human origin, where the 
emission of the sign creates the subjective from the objective, the transcendental from 
the immanent.”95 
 
In the first part of Signs of Paradox, “Paradoxical Thinking,” Gans opens his inquiry 
by admitting that trying to determine what language is is nothing short of a 
bootstrapping operation. In other words, the paradox is that we cannot explain, 
through our use of language, the meaning and origin of language. Why paradox? 
What kind of paradox? This section will provide a detailed analysis of “Paradoxical 
Thinking” in order to understand how generative anthropology requires paradox and 
mimesis as its only presuppositions in order to be a valid hypothesis. Gans contends: 
“Paradox is the privileged road to understanding the human, because paradox reveals 
the seam—the umbilical hole—in the hierarchy of sign and referent that is the essence 
of human language.”96 The event of the emergence of the sign provides a vertical 
transcendence from horizontal animalistic tendencies. The sign emerges through a 
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conversion of an imitative gesture of the original mimetic model’s gesture towards an 
object of desire.  
 
This all begs the question: Where does Nietzsche’s theory of language fit in relation 
to the originary scene of representation as proposed by Gans? 
 
 
Nietzsche’s Ideas about the Ethical in relation to Language  
 
Language is in the first place ethical.—Eric Gans97 
 
We have here, in Nietzsche’s theory as espoused in On Truth and Lie and The Gay 
Science, the sign cut off from reciprocation, from the collective centre, as an 
individual artistic image, and the ethical therefore has no place within the aesthetic 
emergence of language. For Nietzsche, there are no metaphysical truths; there is only 
what Nietzsche refers to as metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms, which 
bear no relation to Nature. Ultimately, Nietzsche would conclude by stating: “this 
conceptual edifice is an imitation [artistic process] of temporal, spatial, and numerical 
relationships in the domain of metaphor.”98 From the early, unpublished writings of 
On Truth and Lie, up to his later works (The Gay Science, Beyond Good and Evil) 
Nietzsche draws many of his conclusions about the world from his theory of language 
as an artistic process, which lacks any objective truth whatsoever. Throughout his 
active career, Nietzsche maintains that metaphor has no truth value or truth relation to 
the phenomenal world. He is therefore suspicious of the world of signs, specifically in 
relation to the conceptual. Generative anthropology has had quite a bit to say about 
Nietzsche; to quote The Scenic Imagination: “Nietzsche was both the first genuine 
theoretician of the scene of representation and a dangerous mystifier whose historical 
hypothesis presents the scenic as the transcendence of the ethical ‘beyond good and 
evil.’”99  
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Nietzsche’s originary scene of aesthetic representation does not require the ethical. 
Furthermore, we have an “instinct” or “drive” towards the formation of metaphors. To 
relegate human language to being a mere instinct is to relegate the human to 
animality, to a kind of Darwinian nihilism, placing the human in the category of a 
mere higher order of animal. Nietzsche is conscious of this, where he later attempts to 
“naturalise man.” Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s theory of language assumes what he 
detests the most: a rigid dichotomy of commanding and obeying between both the 
drives and individual humans. In other words, Nietzsche proposes a scene of which 
the sacred centre is not the object of communal recognition to defer violence, but 
rather an instinctive drive to dominate nature, where he adamantly concludes 
everything is “will to power and nothing besides.”100 Gans, on the one hand, claims 
that language is coeval with the ethical—the deferral of violence through 
representation. Nietzsche, on the other hand, considers the ethical to have emerged 
from an aesthetic drive towards the formation of metaphors. The ethical exists as a 
kind of “slave drive” in service of a “social utility,” which according to him 
represents an error in the development of the human. Yet, if one were to think about 
generative anthropology while reading Nietzsche, one could not help but notice his 
profound understanding that language is the essential characteristic of the human, 
regardless of whether it has been developed from an “instinct” or proto-artistic 
impulse. On the one hand, Gans declares, “human experience, as opposed to that of 
other animals, is uniquely characterised by scenic events recalled both collectively 
and individually through representations, the most fundamental of which are the signs 
of language.”101 Nietzsche, on the other hand, would contest the notion that language 
and/or consciousness has any value in representing the external world—or any value 
at all—because language itself is derived from the lower instincts.  
 
Where Gans claims there is a series of singularities of scenes of representation, each 
echoing or representing the original scene, through communal recognition from the 
periphery to the centre, Nietzsche proposes a flux of drives and affects prompted by 
external stimuli, which are themselves incomprehensible by reason, stimulating the 
                                                             
100  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (London: Vintage Books, 
1982), 389.  
101  Gans, Scenic Imagination, 1. 
118 
 
nerves into an imagetic representation into an acoustical drive, forming metaphor. 
Language, for Nietzsche, is the “conserving association of the instincts,” where “all 
our consciousness relates to errors.”102 Yet the danger in Nietzsche’s originary scene 
of human representation lies precisely in his aesthetic vision of the production of 
metaphor, where Gans rightly suggests that the “paradoxical struggle with the 
Nietzschean self with its ‘own’ representations has been the obsession of philosophy 
ever since, arguably even of analytic philosophy, haunted by the same paradoxes in a 
more dryly schematic form.”103 The originary hypothesis, I argue, offers a solution to 
the symptoms of a postmodern uncertainty of language, the Nietzschean crisis that has 
plagued modern thinking, that is, thinking the self out of the self. What I have tried to 
impart is the idea that by looking at the minimal elements of Nietzsche’s 
understanding about language, its origin, and function, may give an indication of his 
particular formulation of the ethical. If language for Nietzsche is an instinct or drive 
towards the formation of metaphors, he is seeking the deeper Dionysian instincts, 
which are bereft of an imagetic Apollonian structure, concepts, but are rather a 
superfluous creativity where only the individual is on the scene of representation. 
Nietzsche’s theory of language is a language governed only by a proto-artistic 
instinct, or drive towards the formation of ever-new metaphor. What Nietzsche fails 
to take into account, however, is a minimal hypothesis of the origin of language that 
incorporates the primacy of the ethical and the ostensivity of the original sign. To 
think of language as some retroactive regulator of the instincts in the service of social 
utility, which relegates the ethical to an artifice of the aesthetic impulse to represent 
the external world, is a dangerous way of thinking about the human that continues 
today, in one form or another. 
 
In the next chapter I will explore Nietzsche’s notion of resentment as the fundamental 
driving force of morality. Not only does Nietzsche suggest resentment is the cause of 
a morality based on metaphysical faith, but Gans also positions resentment on the 
originary scene of human representation.
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Chapter 3: 
Nietzsche, Girard, Gans: On the Origin of Resentment 
 
That lambs bear ill-will towards large birds of prey is hardly strange: but 
is in itself no reason to blame large birds of prey for making off with little 
lambs.—Friedrich Nietzsche1 
 
Resentment is the interiorization of weakened revenge.—René Girard2 
 
What I call originary resentment is the resentment directed at the central 
object of the originary event—hence away from one’s fellows on the 
periphery—when the object’s very designation/sacralization by the sign 
makes it inaccessible to its designators.—Eric Gans3 
 
This thesis offers a new reading of the work of Nietzsche by drawing on the resources 
of generative anthropology. Resentment is an idea central to both generative 
anthropology and Nietzsche studies, and to studies of René Girard, whose work in 
mimetic theory makes significant contact with Nietzsche’s thought, and serves as the 
intellectual forebear of generative anthropology. Although resentment is understood 
somewhat differently among Gans, Girard, and Nietzsche, these differences will allow 
us to clarify precisely what is at stake in the re-reading of Nietzsche presented here. 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to configure Nietzsche’s own conception of 
resentment in generative anthropological terms. This particular reading of Nietzsche’s 
On the Genealogy of Morals allows us to situate him as a theorist of human origins, 
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and also to offer an insight into how his theory of human origins orients his ideas 
about the ethical.  
 
As has been discussed, Nietzsche’s status in postmodernism is paradoxical. His 
position as a father of postmodernism is paradoxical precisely because, in a flight 
from postmodern thinking, whose theories postulate the denial of human origins, 
Nietzsche offers—in On the Genealogy of Morals—an account of the origin of 
language, morality, religion, and most importantly for this chapter, ressentiment 
(henceforth: resentment). Nietzsche, like Gans, also considers resentment to be at the 
heart of the development of the human. Similar to Nietzsche’s project, and also a 
flight from postmodern thinking,4 generative anthropology examines the human with 
respect to origins: the origins of language, the ethical, the aesthetic, and of 
resentment. Nietzsche, Girard, and Gans bear differences and similarities in their 
understandings of resentment. For Nietzsche, the “man of resentment” has only one 
weapon, the memory of the symbolic to be used against the “forgetful master.” By 
following his theory of the Judaeo-Christian desacralisation of violence, Girard 
defines resentment as the interiorisation of weakened revenge. Finally, Gans 
considers resentment to be the outcome of the internalisation of the sacred centre, 
where resentment is the consequence of the inability of any given individual to 
possess the sacred centre. Generative anthropology posits an “originary resentment,” 
where all individual humans become defined as individuals precisely because of 
resentment. The fundamental question to be asked in this chapter is: Can we account 
for Nietzsche’s conception of resentment in relation to a generative anthropological 
framework? And if we can, what might this offer us in hermeneutic terms? 
 
There is also another important source to be integrated into re-reading Nietzsche’s 
philosophy in light of generative anthropology: Girard’s work on mimetic theory. 
Girard’s work is important to examine in relation to Nietzsche for two fundamental 
reasons: (1) mimetic theory is the precursor to generative anthropology, and provides 
it with some of its signal features; and (2) Girard’s analysis of Nietzsche’s ideas about 
                                                             
4  I concede that the term “postmodern” is a problematic one. No thinkers discussed in chapter 1 have ever 
accepted the label of “postmodern” for themselves. Nevertheless, postmodern thinking points to the 
intellectual attitude of not accepting theories of origin. 
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resentment will allow us to draw a closer link between those ideas and generative 
anthropology’s notion that resentment is an indispensable human category—that 
without resentment there would be no human as we know it. I will examine the shift 
in the value and origin of resentment with respect to each of these three thinkers: from 
Nietzsche’s vehement account and critique of resentment as an internal force of 
reactivity to “life,” to Girard’s position that resentment is a consequence of the 
blocking of revenge, and, finally, to Gans’s position that resentment is a direct 
outcome of the first re-presentation of an object of desire, which is something wholly 
inaccessible, and therefore resented from the periphery. Girard, and more importantly, 
Gans, offers a new and plausible way to situate Nietzsche’s notion of resentment from 
the perspective of looking at human origins. 
 
Gans asserts that Nietzsche is the first to situate resentment correctly by placing it 
close to human origins. Indeed, Gans directly borrows Nietzsche’s conception of 
resentment in order to situate it after the originary scene. In contrast to Nietzsche, 
however, Gans offers a view of the punctual genesis of language and culture, where 
resentment arrives immediately after language. For Gans, resentment emerges when a 
periphery of humans is unable to attain a sacred, central object of desire that triggered 
language. Gans calls this form of resentment “originary resentment.” For Nietzsche, 
on the other hand, the origin of resentment stems from the “slave’s” internal reaction 
to the “master”; resentment is that which is in direct opposition to those external, 
active forces of life that are able to discharge power effectively and naturally. 
 
There is good reason to believe that Nietzsche’s theory of human origins directly 
influences his thinking about the emergence of resentment. There are two factors that 
lead one to believe so:  
 
(1) Nietzsche claims that resentment emerges from an internal scene of 
representation, which is ultimately reactive and introspective, as opposed to active 
and instinctive. The claim made by Nietzsche that resentment emerges from an 
internal scene shares resonances with generative anthropology. A dichotomy exists 
between the “master,” who is far better equipped to forget, and who discharges his 
desires through action, and the man of resentment, who can only react internally to 
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the master through symbolic representation. Indeed, an internal scene of 
representation is precisely what defines resentment in Nietzsche’s thinking. 
Resentment, for Nietzsche, is action turned against itself into representation.  
 
(2) Nietzsche’s suspicion of symbolic representation as a late and superficial 
development of the human animal interacts on a number of levels with his theory of 
the “man of ressentiment,” and the “slave revolt of morals.” For example, in On the 
Genealogy of Morals—a main focus of this chapter—Nietzsche claims that the man 
of resentment requires “external stimuli” in order to exist, where resentment’s “action 
is fundamentally reaction.” In opposition to this, Nietzsche argues, the noble type of 
man requires no external stimuli, nor an internal scene of representation.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will return to Gans’s hypothesis of 
the origin of language, where he claims “originary resentment” marks the birth of the 
self. For Gans, resentment is not a Nietzschean “drive” as such, but rather a 
fundamental element in the structure of the originary scene of representation. Second, 
I will trace Nietzsche’s development of the idea of resentment as espoused in The 
Genealogy. This work is Nietzsche’s first serious attempt to theorise the origin of 
resentment, which, he contends, derives from the internal reaction of the “priestly 
caste,” “cunningly” deceiving the forgetful masters through symbolic representation. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche considers resentment to have flourished in the Judaeo-
Christian tradition. I will specifically engage with the first essay of The Genealogy, 
entitled “‘Good’ and ‘Evil’, ‘Good’ and ‘Bad,’” which introduces Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the origin, function, and consequences of resentment. Third, I will 
give a necessarily brief summary of Girard’s mimetic theory in order to shed light on 
his own analysis of Nietzsche’s position on resentment, which is deeply rooted in the 
idea of the surrogate victim. From here, I will examine Girard’s essay “Dionysus 
Versus the Crucified,” where Girard assesses Nietzsche’s conception of resentment— 
that resentment is one of the effects of Judaeo-Christian ethics. For Girard, the 
revelation of the victim makes victimage progressively more difficult, eventually 
forcing it to retreat into an internal scene—the withholding of violence becomes its 
internalisation. Christian resentment is precisely what denigrates Nietzsche’s vision of 
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a Dionysian world of continual destruction and creation, of will to power.5 The 
fundamental difference between Nietzsche and Girard is that the former sees 
resentment as the cause of Judaeo-Christian ethics, whereas Girard sees it as an effect 
of the same. From here, I will consider the difficulties that arise in both Girard’s and 
Nietzsche’s accounts of the value and origin of resentment.  
 
Further, I will investigate Gans’s position on resentment in relation to The Genealogy. 
I will point out some key similarities that exist between Gans’s idea of “firstness” and 
Nietzsche’s conception of the master. Through an examination of Originary Thinking: 
Elements of Generative Anthropology, I will situate Gans’s idea of originary 
resentment with Nietzsche’s, where both thinkers consider resentment to be an 
indispensable category of the human. For Nietzsche, however, resentment is 
something that must be “overcome.” For Gans, resentment is that which allows 
culture to perpetuate. Finally, I will present Nietzsche’s position on resentment as a 
direct orientation of his theory of language.  
 
For Nietzsche, a prerequisite for the emergence of the man of resentment is his 
internalisation of language. He considers language as re-active, instead of being an 
active discharge of energy springing from the all-encompassing will to power. For 
Nietzsche, an immediate willing to act is opposed to an internalised re-action. 
Consequently, resentment allows for an internal scene of representation to take place 
and be remembered. To have a memory is a burden, a sickness, for Nietzsche. An 
internal scene of representation, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, is to hold onto and 
remember events. In certain respects, generative anthropological thinking is congruent 
with Nietzsche’s position. Yet, for Gans, originary resentment is the internalisation of 
the no-longer-accessible sacred central object, where this object engenders resentment 
precisely because of its inaccessibility. Situating Nietzsche’s conception of 
resentment in relation to both Girard and Gans allows for a further investigation into 
the minimal elements of Nietzsche’s thinking about the human, the ethical, and the 
origin of language.  
 
                                                             
5  The next chapter will deal more specifically with Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power. 
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What Is Originary Resentment? 
 
All resentment is generated by exclusion from the centre, and resentment 
of others reflects our sense that someone else is closer to the centre and 
its significance than ourselves.—Eric Gans6 
 
Generative anthropology is a field of inquiry that hypothesises the punctual origin of 
language, where the human proper is generated from an originary scene. Resentment, 
too, has a place in this originary scene. For Gans, the first linguistic sign is an 
“aborted gesture of appropriation,” where this gesture is a re-presentation of its 
referent. Hence, the birth of the human proper is a scenic event. As has been 
discussed, the scenic, for Gans, denotes that all human thought is generated through 
the representation of an original event where the first sign—or gesture—was 
transmitted by a protohuman onto others in near simultaneity. The scenic, for Gans, 
offers a topographic model of the human: an economy of thinking, where one can 
situate concepts regarding the human in terms of centres, margins, and exchanges. 
The emission of the first sign was the moment of the birth of the human as human. 
For, not only is all human thought generated through the representation of a scene, the 
horizon of human thought is itself scenic. Indeed, the emergence of the human 
coincides with the birth of the scene.  
 
We can imagine the physical structure of the first scene to be circular. What leads to 
the first linguistic event is the mutual attraction between the protohumans for a central 
object. Since not all protohumans can consume the desired object at once, one 
member of the group (the first) emits a gesture, a sign, or a grunt to designate a 
referent that becomes immediately understood by all other members. Once the object 
has been designated, and then consumed, the now absent object is “remembered” by 
its referent. This, in turn, creates a centre, where the now sign-emitting humans stand 
on the periphery of the absent object. The missing original object becomes the sacred 
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centre. Thus, the sacred centre is resented precisely because it cannot be obtained, 
because a re-presentational gesture does not make the now missing desired object 
appear. According to Gans, resentment is inherent in the structure of the originary 
scene of human representation. Resentment is, in some sense, coeval with the birth of 
the individual, of the internal scene in the mimetic subject.  
 
According to Gans, resentment is the one human category that cannot be 
deconstructed, for “only resentment can know resentment; yet resentment knows 
nothing, since it distorts the reality of what it observes.”7 What is deemed “originary 
resentment” emerges immediately after the first symbolic representation in the 
originary scene. For Gans, in order for resentment to exist, it must emerge after the 
origin of language. In the introduction to Originary Thinking: Elements of Generative 
Anthropology, Gans examines the emergence of the individual—or self—as directly 
linked to originary resentment. Originary resentment, for Gans, is the “first mode of 
self-consciousness.”8 Why is the discovery of the self triggered by originary 
resentment, however? According to Gans, originary resentment is predicated on an 
individual’s focus on the originary sacred central object. Of course, the object is 
desired because other participants desire the same object, following the rules of 
mimetic attraction. Yet, the sacred object is impossible to obtain because the centre 
designated as such, as a sign, is impossible to obtain, at least in material terms. 
Therefore, there emerges an originary resentment immediately after the spontaneous 
emergence of the first sign. Gans writes: “The center, the object of a given 
participant’s desire, is inaccessible for the very reason that it is desirable, and 
therefore also the object of the convergent desires of the others. Yet originary 
resentment does not focus on the other peripheral humans, but on the centre that 
refuses itself to desire.”9 In other words, originary resentment is not resentment 
directed at fellow human beings (as both Nietzsche and Girard attest), but the central 
referent in the absence of the physical object. Gans writes: 
 
                                                             
7  Eric Gans, “Beyond ‘Generative Anthropology’ 1. Deferring Resentment,” Chronicles of Love and 
Resentment, no. 144 (1998), accessed May 14, 2017, http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/views/vw144/. 
8  Gans, Originary Thinking, 18. 
9  Ibid. 
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What I call originary resentment is the resentment directed at the central 
object of the originary event—hence away from one’s fellows on the 
periphery—when the object’s very designation/sacralization by the sign 
makes it inaccessible to its designators. What makes this the origin of the 
specifically human phenomenon of resentment is that it is focused in the 
first place on the sacred centre itself, accessible during the originary 
scenario, the designation/consecration of the central object would be 
followed by the sparagmos in which the object, but never the sacred 
centre itself, is divided and consumed. Thus in distinction to animals in 
conflict, who remain fixed in pecking-order rivalries, humans experience 
resentment through the mediation of the sacred.10 
 
Hence, originary resentment is directed at the sacred centre because it is desired but 
not accessible. The outcome is an internalised, individual scene cut off from the 
originary event. Yet, how does resentment function in terms of the creation of the self, 
as Gans claims? As Gans suggests, once the sacred centre is no longer accessible, 
after the community has devoured the object, the remembrance of the now missing 
object becomes resentment. To desire the sacred centre after it has dissipated through 
the sparagmos is to resent it. The sparagmos, for Gans, is the immediate 
dismemberment of the sacred object after its designation. Resentment takes form 
through an individual scene of representation via memory. Hence, since there was no 
sacred centre before the first aborted gesture of appropriation, there was also no 
internal scene. Thus, resentment has its origin immediately after the first gesture for 
the desired object. For Gans, resentment can exist only through the mediation of a 
sacred centre. 
 
In A New Way of Thinking: Elements of Generative Anthropology, Gans cogently 
makes the fundamental connection between resentment and the origin of language by 
calling the first sign emitted the “name-of-God.” The originary resentment of the 
sacred centre, or name-of-God, is coeval with the perpetuation of a human 
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community. Gans also claims that it is resentment, “Nietzsche’s resentment,” that 
prevents violence and leads to culture. Gans writes:  
 
If we seek to interpret the meaning of the first sign, to be sure, it 
represents the object and may therefore be said to mean it. But what the 
sign “means” under these conditions is the central object of a desire too 
powerful to be exercised. The object, in other words, appears by its very 
desirability to interdict its own possession. This power attributed to the 
central object is precisely that characteristic of sacred beings. We may 
therefore give as the “meaning” of the originary sign as the-name-of-God. 
Such an attribution must also create in the peripheral participants an 
originary resentment of the central object that each individual desires but 
cannot possess. The fundamental function of the human and its 
representational culture is to prevent mimetic violence, which is 
characteristically internalised as resentment, Nietzsche’s ressentiment. It is 
resentment rather than violence per se that is the primary focus of 
culture.11  
 
Each individual desires either to be as close to the central object as possible or to 
consume and possess it for oneself. Yet, it is impossible to possess that which is 
intangible, to obtain the sign that designates the central object. Gans considers 
resentment to continue beyond the originary scene, where resentment has its origins. 
Indeed, all of culture, for Gans, is the perpetuation of resentment towards the 
inaccessible centre. Gans writes: “No use of language can represent, and defer by 
representing its own resentment, yet all of culture is nothing but this attempt.”12 
Gans’s contention about the emergence of resentment at the origin of the human 
brings us back to Nietzsche’s idea that resentment is the internalisation of symbols, a 
reactive force directed at the “forgetful” masters. Of course, Nietzsche considers 
forgetfulness to be essential to action. Indeed, forgetfulness is central to Nietzsche’s 
ethical project. Ultimately, for Nietzsche, resentment replaces action. Yet before 
returning to the conception of the origin of resentment as espoused by generative 
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anthropology, an important question will be raised: How does resentment as 
designated by generative anthropology differ from the groundbreaking work in The 
Genealogy? 
 
 
The Birth of Morals 
 
The Genealogy is not only Nietzsche’s critique of Judaeo-Christian morality par 
excellence; it also provides a model for the origin of resentment, a resentment that 
predates the history of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.13 This work has greatly 
influenced the work of both Girard and Gans. Arguably his most famous work after 
The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s genealogical interpretation of the history of 
morality aimed to discredit the then fashionable interpretations of this history, such as 
that espoused in English utilitarian philosophy (John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham), 
psychology (Paul Rée), and in social Darwinism (Herbert Spencer). The essential 
premise of The Genealogy is Nietzsche’s claim that Judaeo-Christian values are the 
historical product of a struggle lasting for millennia between two types of morality: a 
master morality and a slave morality.14 At the heart of this struggle is resentment. 
Master morality precedes slave morality and is governed purely by a will to power; its 
ethic is an active, ruthless self-affirmation and forgetfulness. In Nietzsche’s terms, 
aristocratic morality is an active expression of the will to power. Slave morality, on 
the other hand, is driven by a resentment of the former, obsessed with self-
preservation and with revenge against the masters, and marked by a yearning for 
another world, which has also been invented by those afflicted with resentment. The 
“yearning” is for another life, the next life. The slave revolts against the master by 
internalising the action that can never take place: violent revenge. Through 
intellectual cunning, and the ability to remember, the priestly caste takes revenge 
                                                             
13  Much research has already examined Nietzsche’s ideas about ressentiment. Nevertheless, a brief exposition of 
On the Genealogy of Morals is essential in order to clarify the three configurations of resentment that are 
found in Nietzsche, Girard, and Gans, respectively. See: J. Hills, Nietzsche and Scheler on Christian Morality 
(2006), and J. Fruncillo, The Development of Ressentiment in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (2007).  
14  See aphorism 11 in Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals. According to Nietzsche, the aristocratic, noble 
type(s) of morality were a prominent characteristic among the “Roman, Arab, German, Japanese nobility, 
Homeric heroes,” and “Scandinavian Vikings,” who all seemed to share the “same need.” 
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against the master. Slave morality, for Nietzsche, becomes the dominating morality of 
our age, the morality of resentment and the morality of the sickness of remembering. 
 
Not only does Nietzsche attempt to situate two types of moralities, he attacks his 
contemporaries, whose positivistic propositions about morality are deeply reflective 
of Darwin; that is, their theory of human morality is predicated on notions of 
evolutionary necessity. Instead, Nietzsche argues that the vital forces animating the 
development of morality are the workings—and interplay—of the active (Dionysian) 
and reactive (resentful) forces or drives of the will to power. For Nietzsche, questions 
about “truth” and the “ascetic” are also intricately linked to moral value judgements 
deeply seated in resentment. Nietzsche considers that the slave aims to establish 
concrete, universal truths. Yet The Genealogy proves that Nietzsche’s interest in 
morality is anthropological through and through, where terms such as “morality” and 
“morals” are used as neutral markers to indicate sets of values and beliefs throughout 
history. I will now investigate the first essay of The Genealogy, “‘Good and Evil,’ 
‘Good and Bad,’” whose main concern is the origin of the morality of resentment. 
 
 
First Essay: “‘Good and Evil,’ ‘Good and Bad’” 
 
As I said, the pathos of nobility and distance, the enduring, dominating, 
and fundamental overall feeling of a higher ruling kind in relation to a 
lower kind, to a “below”—that is the origin of the opposition between 
“good” and “bad.”—Nietzsche15 
 
In the first essay of The Genealogy, Nietzsche sets out to investigate the origin of the 
“value of morals” by examining the etymological roots of certain ethical terms. 
Nietzsche claims the most fundamental insight gained from a genealogical 
interpretation of morals stems from an examination of the historical transformation of 
these terms: “good,” “bad,” and “evil” [Ger: Gut, Böse, Schlecht]. Nietzsche argues 
that the concept “good,” for the masters, was originally used in opposition to “bad,” 
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where bad would constitute everything dull, ugly, weak, and reactive. Anything that 
was unable to discharge energy into action was considered bad. In short, the “slaves” 
were considered “bad” as they were incapable of action. The “good” was 
representative of all that is beautiful, strong, active, and energetic. In short, the 
“good” was what the masters felt themselves to be. What is most important for the 
purposes of this chapter, however, is Nietzsche’s introduction of the concept of 
resentment, which is the “priestly caste’s” inversion of the notions of “good” and 
“bad” with “good” and “evil.” Nietzsche charges the priestly man of resentment with 
inverting the active, which once was constituted by “good” and supplemented the 
self-creating force of “bad” with “evil.” In this sense, the energetic, self-creating 
values of the aristocracy had now become “evil,” while the man of resentment had 
slowly become the “good.”  
 
For Nietzsche, in the presumably earlier stages of humanity, there existed knightly 
aristocratic peoples who considered themselves masters, declaring themselves to be 
good [gut]. Nietzsche contends that the good, for the masters, can be summarised into 
a simple equation pertaining to aristocratic values. He writes: “good = noble = 
powerful = beautiful = happy = God-beloved.”16 For Nietzsche, the aristocratic values 
of the “good” were guided by the instincts. Nietzsche draws the conclusion that these 
values were not governed by an internal scene, but rather by the less refined instincts, 
which appear to be active, more primordial, and trustworthy. The greater number of 
those who were “bad” or “common” resented the so-called masters. At some point in 
history, according to Nietzsche, the higher men of resentment, the priestly types, had 
become creative themselves through the use of language and the internal 
transformation of the active into the reactive. The slave morality of the “men of 
resentment” developed a new way of evaluating the world through symbols, through 
an internalised, reactive vision of the world. Through an internalisation of active 
forces and the inversion of good and bad, the men of resentment now deemed 
themselves to be good. According to Nietzsche, the masters were no longer 
considered bad by the men of resentment, but “evil.” Nietzsche writes: “the 
judgement ‘good’ did not originate with those whom ‘goodness’ was shown! Rather it 
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was ‘the good’ themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and 
high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of 
the first rank, in contradistinction to all that is low, low-minded, common and plebian. 
It was out of this pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values and 
coin names for things.”17 Thus, the value judgements of aristocratic morality were 
already self-established through the “pathos of distance.” In other words, the distance 
between those that were able to forget and those that were able to remember.  
 
Through the instinct of forgetfulness, the masters had no real conception of the value 
of good, bad, or evil. According to Nietzsche, these self-established, self-ordained, 
forgetful aristocratic values were preserved through hunting, war, competitions, 
sacrifice, dancing, sport, and anything else that involved strenuous physical activity. 
The slave revolt of morals, on the other hand, begins only when resentment (as a 
force, a drive) has itself become a creative agent and turns inwards on itself. 
Nietzsche writes: “The slave revolt in morals begins when ressentiment itself 
becomes creative and ordains values: the ressentiment of creatures to whom the real 
reaction, that of the deed, is denied and who finds compensation in an imaginary 
revenge. While all noble morality grows from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave 
morality from the outset says no to an “outside,” to an “other,” to a “non-self”: this no 
is its creativity The reversal of the evaluating gaze—this necessary orientation 
outwards rather than inwards to the self—belongs characteristically to 
ressentiment.”18 The impulse to revenge emerges from the inability of the resentful to 
act.  
 
The slave declares ‘no’ to an outside force, but needs these very outside, active, 
“external stimuli” in order to become creative, or reactive at all. In other words, the 
active forces of the will to power are also a necessity for the development of 
resentment. Nietzsche writes: “In order to exist at all, slave morality from the outset 
always needs an opposing, outer world; in physiological terms, its needs external 
stimuli in order to act—its action is fundamentally reaction.”19 Hence, the inward 
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“reaction” of an active, instinctive master morality is precisely the driving force of 
resentment. One must ask, however, whether Nietzsche’s master morality requires an 
external stimulus for the masters to be creative, to be active. Nietzsche continues: 
“The opposite is the case with the aristocratic mode of evaluation: this acts and grows 
spontaneously, it only seeks out its antithesis in order to affirm itself more thankfully 
and more joyfully. Its negative concept, ‘low’ [niedrig], ‘common’ [verbreitet], ‘bad’ 
[schlecht], is only a derived pale contrast to its positive basic concept, which is 
thoroughly steeped in life and passion—‘we the noble, we the good, we the beautiful, 
we the happy ones!’”20 For Nietzsche, the noble live in an open “trust” with 
themselves, while at the same time they live their lives out in a “certain naïveté.”21 
Whereas, on the other hand, the man of resentment, according to Nietzsche, “is 
neither upright nor naïve in his dealings with others, nor is he honest and open with 
himself.”22 The man of resentment cannot live a life in openness or trust precisely 
because his hatred for the master had never been discharged into action. 
 
As we have seen so far, resentment is the product of the internalisation of action. On 
the other hand, those that are “noble,” for Nietzsche, are characterised by an 
overabundance of energy, where we see a continual and spontaneous creation of self-
affirming values without the need to react to the “outside.” The masters are able to act 
because they are able to forget. He writes: “The right of the masters to confer names 
even extends so far that one should allow oneself to grasp the origin of language itself 
as the expression of the power of the rulers: they say ‘this is such and such’, they put 
their seal on each thing and event with a sound and in the process take possession of 
it.”23 Although the master is considered the inventor of language, he does not 
remember the event. For Nietzsche, the “words” of the masters are continually created 
and destroyed, akin to Heraclitus’s flux. The man of resentment, however, is 
characterised as the cunning, more intelligent, patiently waiting animal; he 
internalises his actions in order to seek revenge against the noble master. 
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Nietzsche contends that master morality is entrenched in a feeling of fortune, where 
there is no lying to oneself concerning this feeling of prosperity. He writes: “The 
‘well-bred’ felt themselves to be ‘the fortunate’; they did not have to construe their 
good fortune artificially through a glance at their enemies, to persuade themselves of 
it, to convince themselves through lying (as all men of ressentiment usually do).”24 In 
direct opposition to this, Nietzsche considers what happiness is to those afflicted with 
resentment. He writes: “All this is diametrically opposed to ‘happiness’ as understood 
on the level of the powerless, the oppressed, of those who suppurate with poisonous 
and hostile feelings, those for whom happiness appears essentially as narcotic, 
anaesthetic, calm, peace, ‘sabbath’, the expansion of feeling and the stretching of 
limbs, in a word, a passivity.”25 According to Nietzsche, the passive happiness of the 
man of resentment leads to an inward, resentful, reactive value judgement of the 
world. The slave revolt in morals, derived from resentment against the active masters, 
finally achieves “cleverness” through the creativity of resentment itself. Here, 
Nietzsche makes his final conclusion about the man of resentment. He writes: “His 
soul squints; his mind loves bolt-holes, secret paths, back doors, he regards all hidden 
things as his world, his security, his refreshment; he has a perfect understanding of 
how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to make himself provisionally 
small and submissive. A race of such men of ressentiment is bound in the end to 
become cleverer than any noble race, and it will respect cleverness to a completely 
different degree: that is, a first condition of existence.”26 The italicisation of the 
pronoun “his” [seine] is clearly an emphasis of the internalisation of action, in order 
to develop an interior world of chimeras and shadows, where the man of resentment 
himself conceives the “evil enemy.”27 Once an imagined enemy has been conceived, 
the man of resentment finally conceives of himself as the “Good man.”28 On the other 
hand, the noble type does not allow resentment to take hold because of a surplus of 
energy that immediately extinguishes hatred, and the noble type simply “forgets.”29 In 
contrast to the importance of intelligence as the first prerequisite for those afflicted 
with the “poison” of resentment, however, Nietzsche claims the early aristocratic 
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people “considered cleverness less essential than the smooth functioning of their 
unconscious regulating instincts.”30 Yet, if resentment does happen to occur in the 
noble man of instincts, Nietzsche claims it is because resentment “exhausts itself in an 
immediate reaction. For that reason, it does not poison.”31  
 
Nietzsche emphasises that the most important and consequential difference between 
the two words “bad” and “evil” resides in asking the question: “Who is actually ‘evil’ 
according to the morality of ressentiment?”32 Nietzsche himself responds to the 
question by concluding that “none other than the ‘good man’ of the other morality, 
none other than the noble, powerful dominating man, but only once he has been given 
a new colour, interpretation, and aspect by the poisonous eye of ressentiment.”33 
Nietzsche claims that the slave revolt in morals has led modernity into a conflict 
between two opposing values—that is, the values ascribed to the masters, “good and 
bad,” and the values ascribed to the man of resentment, “good and evil.” Nietzsche 
clearly indicates that the latter value system has dominated for at least the last two 
thousand years with the advent of Christianity. He writes: “For thousands of years, a 
fearful struggle has raged on earth between the two opposed value-judgements, ‘good 
and bad’ and ‘good and evil’; and as certain as it is that the second value-judgement 
has long been in the ascendant, there is even now no shortage of places where the 
outcome of the conflict remains undecided.”34 Yet, Nietzsche claims that the great 
battle being waged between the two opposing value judgements of a master morality 
and the slave revolt is symbolised best between Rome and Judaea. The dichotomy 
between Rome and Judaea, between the master and the slave, sheds light on 
Nietzsche’s ethical project. 
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Resentment Versus the Noble: Judaea Versus Rome 
 
In the concluding pages of the first essay in On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche 
turns his thoughts to the “slave revolt” of the weak. The resentment of the Judaeo-
Christian ethic is aimed at retaliating against Rome, which, according to Nietzsche, 
represents the triumph of the moral value judgements of the weak. The battle between 
Judaeo-Christian ethics and the ethic of the “strong” Romans, for Nietzsche, stands as 
the direct embodiment and symbol of resentment par excellence. He writes: “The 
symbol for this struggle, written in a script which has remained legible throughout the 
whole of human history up until now, is called ‘Rome against Judea, Judea against 
Rome’—so far, there has been no greater event than this struggle, this questioning, 
this mortal enmity and contradiction.”35 For Nietzsche, the forgetfulness, the 
exuberant joy, and the happiness of the Roman warrior, philosopher, emperor, who 
values this life and this world, is no match against the intelligence, cunning patience, 
and ability to remember of the slave morality of the Jews.  
 
Nietzsche claims that Rome positioned Judaea as its complete opposite, as a people 
whose resentment was so great that they had to invent an entire other world in order 
to justify their resentment towards the masters. He writes: “Rome felt the Jew to be 
something like the incarnation of the unnatural, its monstrous opposite, as it were: in 
Rome, the Jew ‘stood convicted of hatred towards the whole of mankind’: rightly, in 
so far as one is entitled to associate the salvation and future of mankind with the 
absolute supremacy of the aristocratic values, the Roman values.”36 Of course, the 
myopia and confusion felt by Rome towards Judaea resides in the very 
misunderstanding that a people could ever want a world beyond this one. Yet, one 
might be given an indication of the opposition between Rome and Judaea by looking 
at the perspective of the Jews, at least from Nietzsche’s eyes. He asks: “How, on the 
other hand, did the Jews feel towards Rome? A thousand signs give us an indication; 
but it is sufficient to call to mind once more the Apocalypse according to St John, that 
most desolate of all the written outbursts which vindictiveness has on its 
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conscience.”37 Of course, John’s revelation of the apocalypse, according to Nietzsche, 
is the literary manifestation of a yearning for the destruction of Rome, and the 
salvation of the Christian faith.  
 
Nietzsche is clearly opposed to a Judaeo-Christian moral value system that finds 
consolation in another world, where judgement will be handed out most harshly to 
those who possess—or are born into—a master, or noble, morality. Not only does 
Nietzsche conceive of the Romans as emblematic of a noble morality, but he 
considers the Romans to have attained the noblest morality in history. He writes: “The 
Romans were the strong and noble men, stronger and nobler than they had ever been 
on earth, or even dreamed themselves to be; every vestige left behind by them, every 
inscription is a delight, as long as one has an inkling of what is behind the writing.”38 
Yet it was the “genius” of the Jews, which Nietzsche declares had finally conquered 
Rome by its intuitive understanding of the power of the mob mentality. Nietzsche 
continues: “The Jews conversely were the priestly people of ressentiment par 
excellence, with an innate genius in matters of popular morality.”39 Nietzsche remains 
adamant that Judaea had finally conquered the Roman values of superfluity and 
strength through the slave revolt of morals given through the teachings of the New 
Testament. He writes: “Which of these is in the ascendant at the moment, Rome or 
Judea? But there is no room for doubt: consider before whom one bows today in 
Rome as before the epitome of all the highest values—and not only in Rome, but over 
almost half the world, wherever man has been tamed or wants to be tamed—before 
three Jews, as one knows, and one Jewess (before Jesus of Nazareth, the fisherman 
Peter, the carpet-maker Paul, and the mother of the aforementioned Jesus, Mary). This 
is most remarkable: there is no doubt that Rome has been defeated.”40 Clearly, 
Nietzsche’s concern lies in the ubiquity of resentment that now dominates Western 
culture. The morality of the strong, the forgetful, is inverted into the morality of 
memory, of resentment.  
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Resentment, for Nietzsche, is the cause of the moral inversion of values from the 
original meaning of the “good” and the “bad” into the “good” and the “evil.” For 
Nietzsche, Judaeo-Christian morality stands as the pinnacle of a slave morality, which 
now dominates the instincts. Of course, Nietzsche’s shorthand name for the 
aristocratic type of morality that he considers to be best observed in Roman culture is 
Dionysus. Dionysian, animal instinct, for Nietzsche, is the solution and opposition to 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition par excellence. For Nietzsche, resentment, memory, or 
internalised action is something that must be overcome. 
 
 
Girard: Origins, Mimetic Rivalry, Resentment 
 
In the introduction to How We Became Human: Mimetic Theory and the Science of 
Evolutionary Origins, Pierpaolo Antonello claims that the thinking of the twentieth 
century, at least in the humanities, has eliminated any consideration of human origins. 
He writes: “twentieth-century theorization has progressively expelled any 
consideration of the origins and the genesis of human culture and institutions, 
considered as a totally unattainable moment of human protohistory—a ‘lost Object’ to 
be vigorously ‘put out of mind,’ as decreed by the late-twentieth-century ideological 
turn against all ‘grand narratives.’”41 The claims made by Nietzsche and Gans 
couldn’t be further from the “ideological turn” of the twentieth-century theories of 
human non-origins.42 There is also another thinker who is intimately connected with 
Nietzsche and Gans, and who also shares the common interest in the origin of the 
human.  
 
This section will introduce Girard’s theory of mimesis in order to give further 
clarification to his interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of the origin of 
resentment, as well as to his own theory of the emergence of resentment. Much like 
Nietzsche, Girard considers resentment to be the internalisation of violence, the 
inability to take immediate action through revenge. Nevertheless, Girard considers 
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resentment to be the product of Christianity, not the source of Judaeo-Christian 
morality, as Nietzsche contends. The aim, then, of summarising Girard’s mimetic 
theory is simply to gain a greater understanding of his own reading of Nietzsche, in 
order that we might draw a closer link between generative anthropology, the progeny 
of mimetic theory, and Nietzsche. Mimetic theory contains a hypothesis on the origin 
of the sacred, of social order, of resentment, and is also a general theory of the 
emergence of culture. The most basic premise to be drawn from mimetic theory is that 
all human desire is borrowed, is imitative. In short, all human desire is mimetic. For 
Girard, desire is mimetic precisely because all of our desires originate in mimesis. 
More often than not, however, mimetic desire leads to violence.  
 
 In “Violence and Mimesis,” Girard illustrates the workings of mimesis through 
modelling the interaction of two individuals (A and B) confronted with an object of 
desire. Girard contends that all appropriating gestures of a desired object are “rooted” 
in the imitation of another individual (A imitates B’s gesture of appropriation). 
Hence, if A’s gesture of appropriation is imitative of B’s, we naturally assume that 
both individuals will reach for the same object. Therefore, since both individuals 
cannot acquire the same object at the same time, they become imitative rivals. Girard 
writes:  
 
[i]f the appropriative gesture of an individual named A is rooted in the 
imitation of an individual B, it means that A and B must reach together for 
the same object. They become rivals, for that object. If the tendency to 
imitate appropriation is present on both sides, imitative rivalry must tend 
to become reciprocal; it must be subject to the back and forth 
reinforcement that communication theorists call a positive feedback. In 
other words, the individual who first acts as a model will experience an 
increase in his own appropriative urge when he finds himself thwarted by 
his imitator. And reciprocally. Each becomes the imitator of his own 
imitator and the model of his own model. Each tries to push aside the 
obstacle that the other places in his path. Violence is generated by this 
process; or rather violence is the process itself when two or more partners 
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try to prevent one another from appropriating the object they all desire 
through physical or other means.43 
 
What Girard is suggesting above is that all individuals reciprocally imitate each 
other’s attempt to appropriate an object, thus becoming each other’s model. For 
Girard, the process of violence through imitation “throws a great deal of light on 
much of human culture, beginning with religious institutions.”44 From this standpoint, 
Girard claims that many (if not most) forms of religious prohibitions begin to make 
sense when they are interpreted as ways to avoid mimetic rivalry becoming 
contagious within human communities. According to Girard, many religious 
prohibitions and taboos bear directly on avoiding violence (or on mimetic behavior) 
by focusing on those objects most likely to incite mimetic rivalry.  
 
Furthermore, Girard claims that unlike the psychoanalytic readings of religious 
prohibitions and taboos, which dismiss them as irrational fears, Girard contends that 
taboos and prohibitions “bear on violence, or mimetic behavior, and on the potential 
objects of mimetic rivalry.”45 According to Girard, rituals found in primitive societies 
“are obsessed with the undifferentiation or conflictual reciprocity that must result 
from the spread of mimetic rivalry.”46 In other words, the rituals—and objects of 
obsession—of primitive societies reflect a deep understanding of the reciprocation of 
conflict, which occurs through mimetic rivalry. Not only rituals, however, but also the 
orientation of the narration of primitive myths owes its origin to mimetic rivalry. 
Girard writes: “the chaos, the absence of order, and the various disorders that prevail 
at the beginning of many myths must also be interpreted, I believe, in terms of 
mimetic rivalry; and so must the natural disasters such as plagues, great floods, or 
other mythical scourges that often include an element of conflict between mythical 
partners generally conceived as close relatives, brothers, or identical twins. These 
themes represent what mythology is unable to conceive rationally, the 
undifferentiated reciprocity of mimetic conflict.”47 The reciprocity of mimetic 
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conflict, according to Girard, is at the heart and origin of all human behaviour. To 
return to rituals, however, Girard focuses his attention on sacrifice, whether it be a 
real human sacrifice or a symbolic one.  
 
Sacrifice, for Girard, is a communal ritual where every member of the community 
who participates is able to purify the social sphere of disorder by means of the 
immolation of a victim. All the great myths, for Girard, account for the purifying 
element in a sacrifice.48 The purifying element in a sacrifice is the dissipation of 
mimetic rivalry immediately after the sacrifice has occurred. Sacrifice, however, can 
only occur at the “paroxysm of the ritual crisis.”49 How is the entire community 
purified by the immolation of a victim, however? According to Girard, sacrifice 
serves as the model for religious ritual because “sacrifice is the resolution and 
conclusion of ritual because a collective murder or expulsion resolves the mimetic 
crisis that ritual mimics.”50 Yet, in what sense is there a resolution and conclusion of a 
mimetic crisis? Here, Girard introduces what is called the “scapegoat mechanism.”51 
The scapegoat mechanism is “that strong process through which two or more people 
are reconciled at the expense of a third party who appears guilty or responsible for 
whatever ails, disturbs, or frightens the scapegoaters,” where they now have “a single 
purpose, which is to prevent the scapegoat from harming them, by expelling and 
destroying him.”52 How does this mimetic contagion—which ultimately leads to the 
sacrifice or murder of a victim—occur?  
 
According to Girard, when an object gains the attention of two or more humans, other 
members of the group will also tend to focus on the object of attention by means of 
imitation. The reason the other members of the group are attracted to the object at 
hand is entirely mimetic in nature. All members of the group become attracted to the 
object because of the “presence of mimetic desire.”53 Thus, because mimesis itself is 
mimetically attractive, and not all members of the group can acquire the same object 
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at the same time, the group becomes progressively undifferentiated and conflictual. 
Each individual becomes an obstacle and model to each individual who is in the way 
of the mimetically attractive object, to the point where the original object of attraction 
becomes irrelevant. Therefore, Girard contends that because mimetic rivalry emerges 
from mimetic attraction, violence also emerges. He writes: “The model is likely to be 
mimetically attracted by the desire of his imitator. He becomes the imitator of his own 
imitator, just as the latter becomes the model of his own model. As this feedback 
process keeps reinforcing itself, each constitutes in the other’s path a more and more 
irritating obstacle and each tries to remove this obstacle more and more forcefully. 
Violence is thus generated.”54 
 
Violence is not originary; it is a by-product of mimetic rivalry. Girard writes: 
“Violence is mimetic rivalry itself becoming violent as the antagonists who desire the 
same object keep thwarting each other and desiring the object all the more. Violence 
is supremely mimetic.”55 The intensity of the feedback loop of the effects of desiring 
an imitator escalates to such an extent that the object is ultimately no longer relevant. 
What is now relevant, however, is the need to end mimetic rivalry. Eventually, the 
members of the community focus their attention entirely upon a single individual 
through what Girard refers to as a “transfer of antagonism” once the original object of 
desire becomes irrelevant.56 Girard writes: “sooner or later a snowball effect must 
occur that involves the entire group minus, of course, the one individual, or the few 
against whom all hostility focuses and who become the ‘scapegoats,’ in a sense 
analogous to but more extreme than our everyday sense of the word ‘scapegoat.’”57  
 
Girard’s response to the reason that an arbitrary victim is chosen by a group to be 
destroyed is precisely because, unlike the original object of desire that cannot be 
consumed equally, the victim himself becomes an object of desire that the community 
can all share in his destruction. Girard continues: “Whereas mimetic appropriation is 
inevitably divisive, causing the contestants to fight over an object they cannot all 
appropriate together, mimetic antagonism is ultimately unitive, or rather reunitive 
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since it provides the antagonists with an object they can really share, in the sense that 
they can all rush against that victim in order to destroy it or drive it away.”58 Girard 
describes this entire process as “the true paradox of ritual—which is the genesis and 
regeneration as well as degeneration of the cultural order through paroxystic 
disorder.”59 Furthermore, Girard claims that religion and mythologies form systems of 
representation that appear to be “untrue of their own genesis.”60 According to Girard, 
religions and mythologies that narrate and ritualise the murder of a victim must 
perceive the victim as having an “enormous capacity for evil.”61 Hence, religions and 
mythologies hide the very fact that the scapegoat is indeed a victim.  
 
The above systems of representation position the scapegoat as necessarily “bad” and 
something/someone that must be destroyed to return communal order. In other words, 
the collective murder of an arbitrary scapegoat can only be justified if the victim is 
characterised, not as a victim, but as someone or something evil. Once the victim is 
destroyed, mimetic rivalry dissipates for a time. According to Girard, if the victim 
were considered an innocent victim, communal order would not be restored as such 
awareness would threaten to expose the mimetic basis of victimage. He writes: “An 
arbitrary victim would not reconcile a disturbed community if its members realized 
they are the dupes of a mimetic effect.”62 Therefore, mythic or religious systems of 
representation must ignore that the scapegoats are really victims and that all of the 
community are guilty participants in his murder. In other words, the participants 
involved in the murder of a single individual cannot and must not perceive themselves 
to be such. Thus, the mythic and religious representations of the event points to the 
victim as an evil that must be annihilated at all costs. Girard writes: “The victim 
cannot be perceived as innocent and impotent; he (or she, as the case may be) must be 
perceived if not necessarily as a culprit in our sense, at least as a creature truly 
responsible for all the disorders and ailments of the community, in other words for the 
mimetic crisis that has triggered the mimetic mechanism of scapegoating.”63 On the 
other end of the spectrum of the scapegoating mechanism, however, Girard points to 
                                                             
58  Ibid.  
59  Ibid., 14. 
60  Ibid.  
61  Ibid.  
62  Ibid.  
63  Ibid., 15. 
143 
 
the Bible, specifically to the Gospels of the New Testament, as belonging to the one 
religion that “sides with the victims.”64  
 
As the first example, Girard offers “the story told by the eleven brothers to their 
father,” where this biblical text rejects the perspective of mythology and sees the 
twelfth brother, Joseph, as an innocent victim, rather than justify his death. According 
to Girard, Joseph is a “victim of his brothers’ jealousy, the biblical formulation of our 
mimetic desire.”65 Girard claims the Bible differs from mythology and other religions 
in its “ethical demands.” In the Bible, according to Girard, the stories expose the 
killing of an individual as murder, not as a purging of evil. Girard suggests that many 
stories in the Bible espouse “the perspective of the victim rather than the mythical 
perspective of the persecutors.”66 Yet, even in the Old Testament, an ambiguity 
remains by the fact that “the responsibility of the victim’s death is placed squarely on 
the community” and the biblical texts also make sure that God is also “present and 
responsible.”67 The Gospels, however, remove the ambiguity of a wrathful God, and 
replace him with a nonviolent God, “whose demand is for nonviolence rather than 
sacrifice.”68 Christ’s death on the cross, for Girard, is the inversion of sacrifice, where 
Christ’s self-sacrifice exposes the surrogate victim mechanism. Christ’s sacrifice 
against sacrifice, according to Girard, “reveals its nature and origin by making 
sacrifice unworkable, at least in the long run, and bringing sacrificial culture to an 
end.”69 The Christian message, according to Girard, is the exposure of ritualised 
sacrifice as murder. This is where resentment comes into play for Girard.  
 
Similar to Nietzsche in many respects, Girard considers resentment to emerge from 
“the internalisation of weakened revenge.” Nevertheless, Girard contends that 
Christianity is the cause of this weakened revenge. Christ’s own sacrifice to man, 
according to Girard, exposes the scapegoat mechanism, leading to the internalisation 
of violence. The awareness that sacrifice is actually the murdering of an innocent 
victim, according to Girard, leads to resentment. I will now examine Girard’s 
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thoughts on Nietzsche’s ideas about resentment as espoused in Girard’s “Dionysus 
Versus the Crucified.” 
 
 
Girard, Nietzsche, Resentment 
 
One way to link Nietzsche’s configuration of resentment to Girard’s mimetic theory is 
to look where Girard examines Nietzsche’s notion of resentment in greater detail. In 
this section, I will examine Girard’s essay “Dionysus Versus the Crucified” in order 
to focus upon his interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought on resentment. “Dionysus 
Versus the Crucified” begins by examining how and why Nietzsche has been 
interpreted in the twentieth century in the way that he has, and the blunder that has 
been made by those who have failed to take into account what Girard considers to be 
Nietzsche’s main preoccupation—a critique of Christianity through the championing 
of paganism. For Nietzsche, action is required to ward off a reactive, internalised 
resentment vis-à-vis violence, murder, cruelty, sacrifice, hunting, and war games. 
These “instinctive” activities of the masters, for Nietzsche, are innocent and healthy 
discharges of energy. Of course, the pagan traditions are rife with violence, murder, 
cruelty, and sacrifice. Christianity, for Nietzsche, is the peak of the renunciation of the 
animalistic discharge of the master, who has no need to remember. For Girard, on the 
other hand, Christianity exposes sacrifice as the failure to eliminate resentment.  
 
“Dionysus Versus the Crucified” contrasts Nietzsche’s Crucified Dionysus and the 
Crucified Christ of the Gospels. James G. Williams, editor of The Girard Reader, 
claims that the thought of both Nietzsche and Girard is essentially “Christocentric.” 
Williams claims that Christ and Christianity are at the very heart of Nietzsche’s and 
Girard’s thinking. He writes: “the real point of departure for both is the Crucified as 
the centre of history.”70 The fundamental difference between these two thinkers is 
also well summarised by Williams. He writes: “For Nietzsche, the Crucified is the 
centre of past history but his reign over morality must end with the murder of God 
and the beginning of a new era. For Girard, the Crucified is the Innocent Victim who 
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reveals the scapegoat mechanism of human culture and the love that overcomes it.”71 
Where does resentment lie in this discussion, however? Christianity—or, the religion 
of the Crucified Christ—for Nietzsche, is the historical culmination of the “slave 
morality” of the Jewish tradition, which exemplifies resentment par excellence. As 
has been discussed, the key to understanding resentment, for Nietzsche, is the 
unconscious, inverted desire of those who consider themselves to be the victims 
taking revenge against the masters through the remembrance of symbols. Nietzsche’s 
answer to the domination of a morality he believes to be entrenched in resentment is 
the Overman [der Ubermensch], emblematic and embodied in the “other” Crucified 
god, Dionysus, whose “will to power” and forgetfulness annihilates resentment.72  
 
In the introduction to “Dionysus Versus the Crucified,” Girard rightly claims that 
Nietzsche’s “anti-Christian polemics” has been widely ignored since World War II. 
The ignoring of such polemics, according to Girard, is due to the “contemporary 
Nietzschean” who no longer sees the relevance of religion after Nietzsche’s 
declaration that “God is dead.” Indeed, as previously discussed, we come to see many 
Nietzsches in the twentieth century, but none who has a primary concern with 
Christianity; and yet, Nietzsche’s last words in Ecce Homo were “Have I been 
Understood? —Dionysus versus the Crucified.” Girard charges Heidegger with the 
twentieth-century obscuration of what Girard considers to be Nietzsche’s main 
preoccupation, that is, the combat between the master morality of paganism and the 
slave morality of Christianity: the eternal war between Dionysus and Christianity, 
between Christianity as the precondition for the emergence of resentment, and the 
immediate animalistic libidinal discharge of energy. It is this indifference to religion 
that Heidegger assumes that gives Girard the pretext to challenge him.  
 
Girard charges Heidegger as positioning Nietzsche’s thinking as the inversion of 
Platonism. Girard writes: “Nietzsche’s forced conversion to inverted Platonism is 
rooted in one essential Heideggerian tenet, which is the mutual incompatibility of 
religion and thought in the highest sense, the postphilosophical Heideggerian sense … 
Heidegger on the whole gives an impression of radical indifference to religion, an 
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attitude that has become a model for quite a few people.”73 Yet despite Heidegger’s 
predilection to situating Nietzsche as a decidedly non-religious thinker, Girard is 
adamant in his analysis of Nietzsche as the thinker primarily preoccupied with 
resentment and its relationship to Christianity. Girard writes: “None of Nietzsche’s 
achievements as a thinker can be divorced from ressentiment, whether the subject is 
Wagner, the divine, or Nietzsche himself in Ecce Homo.”74 Girard claims that despite 
Nietzsche’s contemporaries, whose positivistic relativising of all religions equated 
them all, Nietzsche understood the specific uniqueness of Christianity, separated from 
pagan religions and traditions.  
 
Girard claims that Nietzsche “maintained that the Christian spirit tries to stifle ‘life’ 
by repressing the most dynamic individuals of a culture. This is the famous ‘morality 
of the slaves’ verses ‘the morality of the masters,’ the one thing everybody knows 
about the Nietzschean distinction between paganism and Judeo-Christianity.”75 
According to Nietzsche, it is only the Dionysian impulse, force, or drive to 
annihilate—even the masters annihilating themselves—that suffices to breed the 
higher type, the Overman, the Ubermensch. Yet, as Girard suggests, Nietzsche is also 
aware of the horror and violent ferocity attached to the name of Dionysus. Girard goes 
on to say that Nietzsche is “too honest to dissimulate the disturbing sides, the ugly 
sides of the Dionysian.”76 Yet, Nietzsche’s valorisation of—even obsession with—
Dionysus is not a lust for violence. In fact, much like Girard, Nietzsche understands 
that violence plays a major role in the origin of the human, community, and culture.  
 
In light of mimetic theory, Girard writes: “Nietzsche clearly saw that pagan 
mythology, like pagan ritual, centers on the killing of victims or on their expulsion, 
which can seem perfectly wanton. He realised that this type of killing, which is 
reflected in many rituals as well as represented in the myths, is often executed by a 
large number of murderers; it is a collective deed in which an entire human group is 
involved.”77 Yet, what is of most interest to Girard is the emphasis on aphorism 1052 
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in Nietzsche’s unauthorised Nachlass, or, The Will to Power,78 where he “focuses his 
attention directly on the collective aspect of the god’s murder.” This aphorism is 
worth citing in full as it goes to the crux of Girard’s assessment of him. Nietzsche 
writes: 
 
Dionysus versus the “Crucified”: there you have the antithesis. It is not a 
difference in regard to their martyrdom—it is a difference in the meaning 
of it. Life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and recurrence, creates torment, 
destruction, the will to annihilation. In the other case, suffering—the 
“Crucified as the innocent one”—counts as an objection to this life, as a 
formula for its condemnation.—One will see that the problem is that of 
the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian meaning or a tragic 
meaning. In the former case, it is supposed to be the path to a holy 
existence; in the latter case, being is counted as holy enough to justify 
even a monstrous amount of suffering. The tragic man affirms even the 
harshest suffering … Dionysus cut to pieces is a promise of life: it will be 
eternally reborn and return again from destruction.79 
 
Girard contends that Nietzsche considers the collective murder of Dionysus to be 
equivalent to the passion of the Christ. Yet the difference between them does not lie 
in their martyrdom. Rather, the antithesis lies in the difference in the meaning of each 
sacrifice. Girard points out that Nietzsche, as well as the anthropologists, are well 
aware of the innumerable cults whose origins reside in sacrifice, where all sacrificial 
religions can and should be equated to each other. Nietzsche, however, “resorts to a 
single symbol, Dionysus, for countless mythological cults.”80 Nietzsche, unlike the 
positivists, who considered all religious cults to be equivalent, understands that there 
is a fundamental difference between Dionysus (the collective symbol of pagan 
religions) and Christianity. Nietzsche concludes that there are really only two types of 
religion: those that celebrate this life and all that comes with it (without resentment), 
and those that beckon another world, who resent this one. Girard writes, quoting 
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Nietzsche: “There are two types of religion, according to Nietzsche. The first one, the 
pagan, understands that ‘life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and recurrence, creates 
torment, destruction, the will to annihilate,’ and it says yes to all this; it assumes 
willingly the worst together with the best. It is beyond good and evil. ‘It affirms even 
the harshest suffering,’ as Nietzsche puts it. The second type of religion rejects this 
same suffering, Nietzsche thought.”81 For Girard, Nietzsche’s fundamental insight 
into Christianity is that, despite the most common criticism that it encourages 
suffering, Christian thought does the opposite: it rejects suffering. In the crucified 
Christ, Nietzsche envisioned supreme opposition to the Dionysian type of suffering 
through its very rejection. If the crucified Dionysus represents the justification of the 
eternal, immeasurable sufferings and joys of life, Christ represents the rejection of all 
of life’s sufferings and joys.  
 
Beyond the simple equation of a Dionysian “yes” and Christian “no” to life, 
Nietzsche claims Jesus’ crucifixion is a “hidden act” of resentment. For Nietzsche, 
Jesus represents resignation to, and revenge par excellence against, the tides of 
suffering and joy of a primordial, Dionysian celebration of life. Although Girard does 
not consider Christ’s death as an act of resentment, he echoes Nietzsche’s view of 
Christ in many respects. He writes: “Nietzsche saw clearly that Jesus dies not as a 
sacrificial victim of the Dionysian type, but against all such sacrifices. Nietzsche 
accused this death of being a hidden act of ressentiment because it reveals the 
injustice of all such deaths and the ‘absurdity’ not of one specific mob only but of all 
‘Dionysian’ mobs the world over.”82 Clearly, Nietzsche’s depiction of the genius of 
Christ is the rejection of that which Nietzsche considers more fruitful to life: the 
strong, the masters, and those individuals whose worth is embodied in their ability to 
create their own values, and to forget them in order to create again. What is 
fundamentally important to Girard’s reading of Nietzsche, however, is that he 
indicates what most thinkers have not. Girard focuses his attention on Nietzsche’s 
singular focus on Christianity. Girard writes: “He [Nietzsche] singled out the biblical 
and the Christian not because Jesus’ martyrdom is different but because it is not.”83 It 
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is Nietzsche’s condemnation of Christianity that precisely unveils Girard’s insights 
into the surrogate victim mechanism. Christianity, for Girard, is indeed the same 
sacrificial murder as the pagan one, but it is the “silent” and “definitive condemnation 
of pagan order, of all human order really.”84 Girard believes that the Gospels 
represent a reinterpretation of pagan religious violence in such a way that it invokes 
guilt in those that enact it.  
 
Yet even before the Gospels, Girard declares that the Jewish Bible gives great insight 
into the process of mimetic desire and its possible lead-up to violence. By comparing 
the similar stories of Romulus and Remus and Cain and Abel, where one brother kills 
another, Girard reveals that there is a fundamental difference between the two 
narratives, at least in their editorial purview. Where the murder of Remus by Romulus 
(pagan) is considered a triumph and the founding of Rome, Cain is found guilty of 
Abel’s murder. From the perspective of the Old Testament, Girard contends that Cain, 
Romulus, and even Dionysus, having committed the same deed, are all found guilty. 
Of course, a Nietzschean reading of Cain’s murder of Abel would be invariably an 
affirmation of life, of Dionysus, of the active will to power of the masters’ ability to 
ward off resentment. However, Girard suggests that Nietzsche understands the 
irreconcilability between pagan sacrifice and the Bible. He writes: “We do not have to 
share Nietzsche’s value judgement to appreciate his understanding of the 
irreconcilable opposition between the Bible and mythology … Nietzsche drew 
attention to the irreconcilable opposition between a mythological vision grounded in 
the perspective of the victimizers and a biblical inspiration that from the beginning 
tends to side with the victims and produces not only very different results from the 
ethical but also from the intellectual standpoint.”85 Girard concludes that because of 
this ethical difference, Nietzsche’s value judgement in valorising the violence of 
pagan mythology—through his conception of the active master morality—is, as 
Girard puts it, “untenable.”86  
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Echoing Nietzsche, Girard claims that resentment is the “interiorization of weakened 
revenge.”87 From this definition, Girard contends that Nietzsche himself “suffers so 
much from it that he mistakes it for the original and primary form of vengeance. He 
sees resentment not merely as the child of Christianity, which it certainly is, but also 
as its father, which it certainly is not.”88 As we have seen, Nietzsche does not consider 
resentment to be the child of Christianity at all. Resentment—although Nietzsche 
gives no concrete historical date—emerges well before Christianity. I will discuss this 
aspect of Nietzsche’s thinking soon. Nevertheless, Girard points out that resentment 
spreads when violence is hampered or weakened. According to Girard, we can 
directly attribute the weakening of Nietzsche’s Dionysian violence to the Bible, 
including the Gospels, which has turned violence into resentment. Of course, violence 
is not eliminated, but only exposes the innocence of the victim and promotes the 
bestowal of guilt onto the lynch mob.  
 
After claiming that Nietzsche’s quest to eliminate resentment is “untenable,” Girard 
turns his gaze to Nietzsche himself by claiming that he resented resentment itself, not 
fully aware that the real sickness of humanity is not resentment but vengeance. Girard 
writes: “He [Nietzsche] could afford the luxury of resenting ressentiment so much 
that it appeared as a fate worse than real vengeance. Being absent from the scene, real 
vengeance was never seriously apprehended. Unthinkingly, like so many thinkers of 
his age and ours, Nietzsche called on Dionysus, begging him to bring back real 
vengeance as a cure for what seemed to him the worst of all possible fates, 
ressentiment.”89 And so, the emphasis on the italicisation of “versus” in the aphorism 
“Dionysus versus the Crucified,” according to Girard, illuminates Nietzsche’s 
ultimate failure to revive the violence of the primitive sacred. Nietzsche’s resentment 
of resentment itself, according to Girard, became so unimaginably unbearable, that it 
led to his own destruction. 
 
Girard’s assessment of Nietzsche’s formula of the eternal war between Dionysus and 
the Crucified is in direct agreement with Nietzsche in a sense; Christianity has 
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allowed resentment to flourish precisely because the collective violence of the 
Dionysian sparagmos—the dismemberment of a victim—is, as Girard says, 
“weakened.”90 The Dionysian frenzy, or discharge of active energy, cannot take place 
after the crucified Christ without the victim(s) being exposed as innocent, and the 
perpetrators as guilty. Revenge turns in on itself, where resentment is, indeed, the 
internalisation and failure of the sparagmos. Yet it remains unseen precisely why 
Nietzsche’s valorisation of a master morality is “untenable” to Girard, other than to 
question the very tenability of violence. 
 
Despite Girard’s contention that the Apollo/Dionysus opposition, Zarathustra, and the 
Ubermensch are “no longer fashionable,” and “terribly outdated,” he declares, time 
and again, that Nietzsche’s discovery of resentment is one of the great triumphs in the 
intellectual world. Indeed, resentment is at the heart of both Girard’s mimetic theory 
and generative anthropology. Girard ultimately contends that Nietzsche himself was 
drowning in his own resentment; this is the lesson Girard wants us to draw from 
Nietzsche’s thinking, that all humans are the sufferers of resentment. In the foreword 
to Stefano Tomelleri’s Ressentiment: Reflections on Mimetic Desire and Society, 
Girard aptly summarises Nietzsche’s resentment in light of mimetic theory, and 
explains why Nietzsche’s resentment fails to be justified. For Girard, Nietzsche’s 
resentment fails precisely because the internal resentment of the “slave” is a failure to 
obtain that which is always impossible, the “other” who is beholden to an object of 
mimetic desire. Girard writes: 
 
At the beginning, the contribution of Nietzsche consisted of limiting the 
term (ressentiment) to the realm of revenge, and later, above all, in greatly 
strengthening the meaning of the initial re, which now indicates an 
unsurmountable obstacle: the other, the victorious rival. It is failure that 
transforms the original desire into a desire for revenge, but the revenge 
cannot overcome this obstacle any more than the original desire, and 
dissatisfaction increases. Like a wave over a rock, the desire for revenge 
shatters against the triumphant other and flows back toward the subject, 
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who is left to become continuously submerged in ressentiment. The result 
is a very unique type of human being, who in our world proliferates to the 
extent that, according to Nietzsche, democratic and modern societies can 
be defined through him: they are the societies dedicated to ressentiment, 
always marked by this type of man.91 
 
Girard concludes that Nietzsche’s conception of resentment is so entrenched in his 
own thinking, that he is the product of resentment itself. Girard continues:  
 
By default Nietzsche thought that the law of ressentiment was not valid 
for him. Betting everything on this certainty—and this is what he did—
meant embracing, almost unerringly, defeat in real relationships with 
others; it meant being infected with the illness that Nietzsche despised the 
most: ressentiment. Nietzsche is perhaps the only one to fall into the trap 
that he set for his fellow humans, and his madness forms part, I think, of 
his genius, of his increasingly desperate battle against the verdict that his 
thoughts forced him to bring against himself. The truth emerges in the 
deranged apologies of Ecce Homo: “Because I am so wise, so great, so 
beautiful.”92 
 
Girard goes on by stating that Nietzsche thought he could escape his own resentment 
by means of the will to power. Girard contends that Nietzsche considered himself to 
have a greater will to power than his fellow humans. According to Girard, Nietzsche 
made the mistake of placing resentment into “men’s will to power.” Girard writes: 
 
The philosopher’s error was to measure ressentiment with the rule of what 
he called the “will to power.” Nietzsche saw in the “will to power” a 
quality of being individual that, more or less, unfailingly determines the 
destiny of the individuals … For Nietzsche, those who have little will to 
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power become necessarily the slaves of those who have more of it, who 
have domination engraved in their being.93 
 
Finally, it is Nietzsche’s own resentment, according to Girard, that demarcates the 
present world. Through Nietzsche’s immeasurably important discovery of resentment, 
Nietzsche himself stumbled upon his own terrible resentment towards Christ. 
However, despite Girard’s inversion of Nietzsche’s understanding of resentment, we 
must compare Girard’s account of resentment to that of Nietzsche’s in relation to the 
origin of the human, and the origin of the ethical. Girard’s mimetic configuration of 
resentment—that is, resentment is caused by the desire to possess that which cannot 
be possessed—differs greatly from Nietzsche’s. In my view, Girard is correct in his 
assessment of Nietzsche as conceiving the Christian faith to be a hotbed of 
resentment. He nevertheless fails to recognise that Nietzsche places resentment closer 
to—in generative anthropological terms—the scene of human origins, and does not 
consider the Judaeo-Christian tradition to be the seat, or cause, of resentment at all.  
 
 
Returning to Origins: Problems with Girard’s Account of Nietzsche’s 
Resentment 
 
In Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, Girard accounts for the process 
of hominisation, quite specifically, by attributing the emergence of the human to a 
fixation on a cadaver, which is what Girard considers to be the first form of non-
instinctual attention. This non-instinctual attention is precipitated by the fact that the 
quasi object is behind the nascent community’s newfound peace. For Nietzsche, on 
the other hand, attention is that which emerges from resentment. The reactive force of 
resentment allows for memory and an internal scene of representation to develop in 
the first place. Although Nietzsche attributes the origin of language to the masters, he 
nevertheless declares that the symbols uttered by the masters were of little or no 
consequence precisely because the masters were able to forget. Rather, it is the 
priestly caste (long before the emergence of Judaism) that internalise action into 
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symbols. Through an internal scene of representation, the priestly caste were able to 
deceive the masters through a reactive will to power, resentment.  
 
What are we to make of Girard’s account of resentment in relation to Nietzsche’s? 
The entire argument concerning resentment drawn between Nietzsche and Girard can 
be reduced to a single dichotomy, the condemnation or the condoning of violence. For 
Girard, resentment is a product of Christianity; it is that which reduces violence by 
internalising revenge. For Nietzsche, resentment is the product of the reactive force of 
the will to power becoming creative, where action turns inwards on itself. On the one 
hand, Girard asks us to eliminate resentment through the Word of the Gospels. 
Nietzsche on the other hand, declares that resentment is something that must be 
overcome if humanity is to be able to cross the bridge over the abyss into 
Ubermenschdom. Resentment has its place in both thinkers, but it is the value placed 
on the importance of the ethical that differs greatly between Nietzsche and Girard.  
 
Plato famously credits Socrates for once declaring that all the souls of the righteous 
are immortal and divine. He writes: “all men’s souls are immortal, but the souls of the 
righteous are immortal and divine.” Ignoring Nietzsche’s vehement opposition to 
Socrates in The Birth of Tragedy—where he marks Socrates as the end of tragedy and 
the rise of rationalism—Socrates’ declaration will be used as an example to raise a 
fundamental flaw in Girard’s assessment of Nietzsche’s conception of resentment. 
The problem with resentment is in relation to the value ascribed to two opposing 
ethical models. One model pertains to the need for resentment in order to weaken and 
subdue violence. The other model is to eliminate resentment entirely—or, at the very 
least, to suppress it. For Girard, the Gospels expose the mimetic tension that leads to 
the immolation of an innocent victim. Resentment, for Girard, is the “interiorization 
of weakened revenge,” just as Nietzsche explicates. Resentment, for Nietzsche, is the 
driving force of Judaeo-Christian morality. But, for Girard, Christianity allows 
resentment to flourish precisely because it has exposed the fallacy of the scapegoat 
mechanism. Yet, Nietzsche claims resentment is more than just the interiorisation of 
weakened revenge. Resentment, for Nietzsche, leads directly to an internal scene of 
representation, of the symbolic, where the man of resentment develops an intellect 
and remembers. For Girard, it is the scapegoat mechanism that is at the heart of the 
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origin of the human, where resentment is internalised revenge against the other who 
possesses an object of desire. Nevertheless, the origin of language, for Girard, is to 
remain epiphenomenal. In other words, Girard gives no specific account for the 
emergence of language, other than as the consequence of the immolation of a victim, 
where the event is remembered and sacralised. The first human institutions—religion 
and language—emerge from the advent of the sacrifice of a victim, which is 
memorialised.  
 
We have one thinker who denounces violence, the other who justifies it. Here is what 
the argument comes down to: the justification or renunciation of violence. Yet, before 
I assess Nietzsche’s idea that resentment contributes to language and various 
configurations of the ethical, I will return to Socrates’ statement in order to provide an 
example of the error found in the argument put forth by Girard about Nietzsche. How 
would Nietzsche respond to Socrates? I claim he would respond in the same way as 
Girard responds to Nietzsche’s conception of resentment.  
 
In Nietzsche’s terms, the “righteous” is worlds apart from what we might have 
expected Socrates to mean by it. Nevertheless, the Nietzschean reversal of the concept 
“righteous” completely transforms what Socrates is expressing. The righteous, instead 
of following an ethos to be good, as Socrates would have it mean, is following 
instincts. For a soul to be immortal and divine, for Nietzsche, is to be a product and 
recipient of the active forces of the will to power. Of course, Girard is correct when 
he declares that Nietzsche’s notion of resentment is dependent on the will to power, 
just as he is dependent on his own theory of mimesis to reveal the “truth” about 
violence. Yet, although violence does not extinguish resentment—and this is the 
question Girard raises—what does it matter in relation to how one can justify or 
renounce violence? It is not enough to invert Nietzsche’s ideas about Christianity and 
to claim that violence is wrong. Girard claims resentment is that which weakens 
violence and is necessary for humanity if it wants to avoid total annihilation; 
resentment is the outcome of the message of the Gospels exposing the false promise 
of the sacrificial victim. Nietzsche, on the other hand, declares that resentment is the 
cause of the suppression of the healthy instincts of the forgetful masters. We find no 
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solution other than to accept the “value” of resentment from one or the other, Girard 
or Nietzsche. 
 
For Gans, on the other hand, resentment emerges before both Nietzsche’s slave revolt 
in morals as well as Girard’s failed sparagmos. Herein lies the resolution to the 
incongruity between Girard’s and Nietzsche’s accounts of resentment. Yet, 
resentment can be found on the originary scene of representation. By examining 
resentment from a referential starting point we can construct a model to assess the 
plausibility of Nietzsche’s conception of resentment as the reactive force of the will to 
power. Gans’s notion of resentment differs from both Nietzsche’s and Girard’s in one 
radical sense. It is in specific relation to language, like Nietzsche’s, and the ethical, 
like Girard’s. Girard does not account for an originary scene of language; Nietzsche, 
however, does. This is precisely why Nietzsche’s vision of the emergence of language 
(and resentment) is closer to the generative anthropological account of language. 
There is a way to examine Nietzsche’s conception of resentment without returning to 
decidedly opposing ideas about the emergence of resentment. If we are to place the 
ethical at the origin of the human, we can conceptualise how resentment emerges from 
originary resentment. For Gans, there exists an originary resentment embedded in all 
individuals, right back to the origin of the human.  
 
In The Girardian Origins of Generative Anthropology, Gans specifically outlines the 
function of resentment in contrast to Girard.94 He writes: “The fundamental function 
of the human and its representational culture is to prevent or rather defer mimetic 
violence, which is characteristically internalized as resentment, Nietzsche’s 
resentment. It is resentment, frustrated, potentially violent desire for an object of 
which we feel rightly or wrongly unjustly deprived, that is the primary focus of 
culture rather than violence per se.”95 For Gans, resentment emerges before violence. 
Girard, however, claims that resentment does not originate on a scene of human 
representation. Rather, resentment for Girard is the “internalisation of weakened 
revenge.” In the chapter “Resentment, Jealousy, and Mimetic Desire,” Gans claims 
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that despite Girard’s contention that generative anthropology is just a new “social 
contract” theory, Gans suggests that Girard’s anthropology is a precursor to generative 
anthropology without a theory of representation.96 Although Nietzsche has no hand in 
a theory of mimesis, nor an originary hypothesis, he does explicitly account for a 
theory of human representation, where resentment has a key place in its development. 
I will now reintroduce Gans’s idea of originary resentment in relation to Nietzsche’s. 
 
 
The Master Forgets, the Slave Remembers: Resentment and the Continued 
Suspicion of the Sign: The Birth of the Ethical 
 
In order to exist at all, slave morality from the outset always needs an 
opposing, outer world; in physiological terms, it needs external stimuli in 
order to act—its action is fundamentally reaction.—Friedrich Nietzsche97 
  
The individual language user has internalized the context of the originary 
event in a scene of representation, a private imaginary space independent 
of the community. The contrast between the private and public scenes, 
between imaginary fulfillment and real alienation from the center, gives 
rise to the originary resentment that is the first mode of self-
consciousness.—Eric Gans98 
 
Resentment is intricately linked to language in both Nietzsche’s and Gans’s account 
of the origin of the human. For Nietzsche, the reactive force of resentment manifests 
itself in the form of an internal scene of representation. Despite resentment being a 
“reactive force,” for Nietzsche, it is also the case with Gans that resentment is coeval 
with an internal scene of representation. The fundamental difference between both 
accounts of resentment, however, is that Gans conceives of resentment as the birth of 
self-consciousness, whereas Nietzsche—who argues the birth of the modern human to 
resentment—claims that resentment is a negation and abortion of this life; resentment 
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is a sickness. Yet, under closer inspection, might one not make the claim that all that 
characterises the human, according to generative anthropology, is what Nietzsche 
constitutes as resentment? Of course, these characteristics are the ability to remember, 
an internal scene of representation, contemplation of the aesthetic, culture, and the 
ethical. The master, as Nietzsche attributes, shares synergies with the protohuman, 
who has not yet “mastered” language. For example, those masters who do find 
themselves suffering from the poison of resentment immediately discharge it with 
action instead of internalising it into an imaginary world of symbols. Therefore, the 
natural order of hierarchy, as generative anthropology contends, continues. For 
Nietzsche, only those who cannot actively discharge energy, the men of resentment, 
have been able to remember through an internal scene of representation, an internal 
act, a re-action. Thus, if we are to take Gans’s idea that the human proper begins with 
language, we might also deduce that Nietzsche’s conception of resentment is to be 
configured as his own theory of the birth of the human. This final section in this 
chapter aims to establish a firm ground on which to examine Nietzsche’s theory of 
resentment in relation to both the origin of language and resentment as espoused by 
generative anthropology. For Nietzsche, the master invents language, but forgets; the 
slave remembers and internalises language through resentment.  
 
Nietzsche’s theory of language as espoused in On Truth and Lie greatly influences his 
thinking about resentment in The Genealogy. Gans, on the other hand, claims that all 
individuation can be attributed to originary resentment. For Gans, resentment is not a 
reactive offshoot of the will to power, but the reaction of the individual that emerges 
from the originary scene. Once the desired, sacred central object has been devoured, 
the sign remains, but the object cannot be accessed. It is the inability to obtain the 
centre that initiates resentment. For Gans, resentment is the birth of the self and of 
culture. Hence, there is a fundamental difference between Nietzsche’s account of 
resentment as the failed acting out of the active drives in relation to Gans’s notion of 
originary resentment. For Nietzsche, there must exist “external stimuli,” which is also 
true for Gans. Yet the difference that exists is the way in which Gans situates 
resentment—or, originary resentment—at the centre of self-consciousness and in an 
originary scene. What also separates Gans’s from Nietzsche’s conception of 
resentment is Gans’s notion that all individuals experience originary resentment from 
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the “center that refuses itself to desire.”99 Resentment, for Gans, is the foundation and 
driving force of all human culture precisely because resentment allows individuals to 
participate in reimagining the originary scene.  
 
Gans outlines the problem with Nietzsche’s idea contained in The Genealogy, that the 
forgetful master coins the first words. In Originary Thinking, Gans writes: “The 
minimal condition of the perpetuation of language in time—a sign used once and 
forgotten could scarcely be called “linguistic”—is that the members of the community 
recall through the sign the referent as something other than the sign. This minimal 
consciousness of language is all we need to share with the originary community in 
order to guarantee the continuity of our language with theirs. Similar arguments 
would apply to potential dialogue concerning other originary categories such as the 
ethical, the sacred, or the esthetic.”100 We must ask Nietzsche: How could a language 
be perpetuated without its being remembered? Without resentment, how could the 
human continue to represent? Perhaps this is Nietzsche’s point: that a world in flux 
makes no demands on the human animal to remember. According to Nietzsche, the 
opposing force of resentment was also bred into the animal man with startling 
consequences, namely memory. He writes: “Now this animal which needs to be 
forgetful, in which forgetting represents a force, a force of robust health, has bred in 
itself an opposing faculty, a memory, with the aid of which forgetfulness is abrogated 
in certain cases—namely in those cases where promises are made. This involves no 
mere passive inability to rid oneself of an impression, no mere indigestion through a 
once-pledged word with which one cannot ‘have done,’ but an active desire not to rid 
oneself, a desire for the continuance of something desired once, a real memory of the 
will.”101  
 
Perhaps Nietzsche considered the first language users, the masters, to be pointing at 
the same object again but with a different sign each time; he never elaborates on this, 
although he does attribute memory to the introverted reactivity of resentment. Gans, 
too, claims that resentment has a key place in the emergence of self-consciousness, of 
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remembering the sign and its referent. Indeed, it is precisely originary resentment that 
at once allows each individual human to know that she or he is conscious, to be 
aware, and maintains order through the deferral of violence through representation.  
In light of generative anthropology, one can see a clear indication that Nietzsche’s 
theory of resentment is a continuation of his suspicion of language, which leads to the 
ethical, the nonviolent. Nietzsche’s suspicion of language and the ethical changes 
little from On Truth and Lie until the end of his active career, where he considers 
Christianity to be the latest progenitor of the reactive forces of resentment. Indeed, 
The Genealogy, a work published fifteen years after The Birth of Tragedy, continues 
the theme of the suspicion of the “truth value” of language through an analysis of the 
origins of the morality of resentment. I would go so far as to suggest that Nietzsche’s 
early suspicion of language greatly orients his later thinking about slave morality and 
the intellectual cunning of the men of resentment in general. As we have seen, once 
resentment becomes a creative force through the priestly types, a slave revolt in 
morals occurs through the “cunning” trickery of the priests on the forgetful masters, 
who are eventually consumed by the same reactive force of resentment, of memory. 
Of course, a fundamental characteristic of the man of resentment is his cleverness and 
use of language as a weapon against the active forces of the will to power, as opposed 
to what Nietzsche refers to as the unrefined instincts of the “beasts.” Nietzsche 
considers that the less ability an individual has to become active, to immediately take 
revenge, the more the individual reflects, contemplates, symbolises, conceptualises, 
and resents. Furthermore, Nietzsche envisions the masters as having little time to deal 
with matters involved in symbolic representation, and who instead are guided by their 
instincts and an abundance of energy, which is routinely discharged at any cost. For 
Nietzsche, the intelligence and cunning of the priests—who were the catalysts for the 
slave revolt of morals—were the inventors of the “knowledge” that Nietzsche speaks 
of in On Truth and Lie. If we were to re-examine several passages in On Truth and 
Lie in conjunction with The Genealogy, we would find a direct link between 
Nietzsche’s ideas about the value of language and the ethical and the famous 
master/slave dichotomy. In On Truth and Lie, Nietzsche writes: 
 
The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, unfolds its 
chief powers in simulation; for this is the means by which the weaker, less 
161 
 
robust individuals preserve themselves, since they are denied the chance 
of waging the struggle for existence with horns or the fangs of beasts of 
prey.102 
 
As has been stated, On Truth and Lie is a juvenile work of Nietzsche’s. Yet, if we 
return to the mature, The Genealogy, we find the same view of language, that is, the 
“weaker, less robust individuals” are precisely the men of resentment, who internalise 
the world through symbols as a creative re-action to the masters, and who care little 
about, or do not know, how to contemplate the external world. Nietzsche writes: “In 
order to exist at all, slave morality from the outset always needs an opposing, outer 
world; in physiological terms, its needs external stimuli in order to act—its action is 
fundamentally reaction.”103 There is one quote, however, in Nietzsche’s first essay in 
The Genealogy that allows one to precisely configure his notion of resentment within 
a generative anthropological framework and that we should consider before we move 
onto an originary analysis of his conception of resentment. In the essay “The ‘Good’ 
and ‘Bad,’ ‘Good’ and ‘Evil,’” Nietzsche writes: “The right of the masters to confer 
names even extends so far that one should allow oneself to grasp the origin of 
language itself as the expression of the power of the rulers: they say ‘this is such and 
such’, they put their seal on each thing and event with a sound and in the process take 
possession of it.”104 The above passage comes extremely close to Gans’s idea of the 
ostensive and its relationship to resentment. Yet, for Gans, resentment does not reside 
in the internal reactions of the slave. Rather, resentment lies at the heart of the 
originary event itself, or what Gans refers to as originary resentment. To return to 
originary resentment, Gans writes:  
 
What I call originary resentment is the resentment directed at the central 
object of the originary event—hence away from one’s fellows on the 
periphery—when the object’s very designation/sacralization by the sign 
makes it inaccessible to its designators.105 
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For Gans, the sign that designated the sacred central object eliminated violence from 
the group by “concentrating it against the central figure.”106 In other words, originary 
resentment is directed at the centre because the centre designated as such is 
inaccessible. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the internal scene of representation is 
driven by resentment, and the memory of an individual’s inability to generate 
immediate revenge. For Gans, all individuals resent the centre from the immediate 
birth of language and the human proper. To return to Nietzsche, we find it is the 
masters who are accounted for as the bearers of the “origin of language,” according to 
generative anthropology, and who are already “corrupted” with originary resentment 
precisely because they cannot access that which they have designated.  
 
 
The Ethical 
 
The most important distinction to be drawn between Gans’s and Nietzsche’s 
understandings of resentment is these thinkers’ opposing views of the ethical. For 
Gans, the ethical is the outcome of the deferral of violence through representation, or 
what he refers to as the “primacy of the ethical.”107 For Nietzsche, on the other hand, 
the ethical is a mere tributary of the man of resentment, or “clever animal,” who 
conjures up symbols in order to dominate the masters. The ethical, for Nietzsche, is an 
aesthetic phenomenon. Yet Gans claims that language comes first, then originary 
resentment, then the aesthetic. Indeed, originary resentment, for Gans, is that which 
motivates the contemplation of the aesthetic. Gans claims that there exists a 
movement between the imagined possession of a designated sacred object and the 
recognised impossibility of attaining such a designated object. In Originary Thinking, 
Gans writes:  
 
Designation by the sign becomes an integral element of the object itself; 
this distinguishes the esthetic from the sacred object, the force of which is 
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conceived as independent of representation. In the esthetic experience, the 
individual imagines that the object of desire could be possessed, but must 
then imagine the object as the inviolate designatum of the sign in order to 
desire it. This oscillation between imaginary possession and recognised 
inviolability is characteristic of all esthetic experience, including that of 
“natural” beauty. What in the originary scene motivates the esthetic 
experience just described is the originary resentment of the peripheral 
participant toward the central object. The object is now not merely 
wanted, it is desired. But (the notion of desire includes its own “but”) it 
cannot be possessed. Resentment is the desiring self’s reaction to this 
exclusion. Indeed, the human self is first experienced as such in this re-
sentiment of dispossession from the centre.108 
 
Those that are closer to the centre, or fancy that they are (Nietzsche’s masters), and 
the slaves, those that have resentment directed towards those “closer” to the centre, 
reveal a direct synergy between generative anthropology and Nietzsche’s position on 
resentment. Gans’s reflection on the necessity of originary resentment begs the 
question: How are we to situate Nietzsche’s conception of the masters as the rightful 
inventors of language in relation to generative anthropology? When one examines the 
origin of resentment in light of generative anthropology, there is an inherent structural 
flaw in Nietzsche’s conception of the origin of language being attributed to the 
masters. Not only does generative anthropology expose this misconception, but it also 
accounts for the so-called master through what Gans and Adam Katz refer to as 
“Firstness.” I will examine this concept momentarily. 
 
In The Genealogy, Nietzsche attributes the origin of language to the “masters,” where 
instead of associating meaning or truth to a word would seal a “thing” or “event” with 
a pure expression of power, coining them with a sound. Nietzsche writes: “the lordly 
right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive of the 
origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say 
‘this is this and this,’ they seal every thing and event with a sound and, as it were, take 
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possession of it.”109 Yet, there are two expressions of power, for Nietzsche. One is the 
active expression of power, where a “thing” or “event” is coined by a sound, and 
immediately forgotten. The master has no need to remember, everything is as it is 
expressed, where it is to be immediately forgotten. The other power expressed is 
reactive, where the thing or event is indeed remembered, where a memory is forged. 
The reactive expression of power, for Nietzsche, is resentment. The “priestly caste” is 
charged with internalising “external stimuli” into a scene of representation through 
the reactive forces of resentment directed at those who are more powerful, the 
masters. Nietzsche writes: “In order to exist, slave morality always needs first a 
hostile world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at 
all—its action is fundamentally reaction.”110 Generative anthropology, on the other 
hand, claims that resentment is the key to the birth of the self, regardless of the master 
or slave. Yet, there is a way to position Nietzsche’s notion of the master within 
generative anthropology; that is the notion of firstness as developed by Gans and 
Adam Katz. This chapter will argue that the reactive force(s) of resentment, for 
Nietzsche, is a further development of language. According to Nietzsche, the 
“cunning intellect” and ability of the priestly caste to remember, to create a scene of 
internal representation from powerful external stimuli, such as the oppression of the 
forgetful masters, is the birth of memory.  
 
Nietzsche contemplates the masters as the originators of language. Nietzsche’s 
master, the founder of language has symmetries with Gans’s notion of “firstness.” 
Firstness, for generative anthropology gives a key insight into Nietzsche’s model of 
resentment. Yet, what is firstness? For Gans, firstness is beyond originary resentment, 
which all individuals experience, the resentment that comes after originary resentment 
is directed at firstness, or the first individual to invent the sign. We should equate this 
to the resentment of the man of resentment in Nietzsche’s model. Gans explains the 
concept of firstness on the originary scene of representation. He writes: 
 
GA [generative anthropology] first used the term “firstness” in reference 
not to the center but to the First to abort his attempt to appropriate the 
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object by intending his gesture as a sign. The first signing gesture is a 
renunciation of designs on the central object and consequently a source of 
pacification. In a situation of potential conflict in which all are rivals, the 
signer renounces appropriating the object in order to designate it as what 
cannot be appropriated, hence as the source of the group’s resentment.111 
 
Gans positions resentment in simpler, more minimal terms. For Gans, all fundamental 
human categories, including resentment, must be found on the originary scene of 
representation. Yet, beyond originary resentment, what is the motivation for the 
perpetuation of resentment? To answer this question, Gans again considers the idea of 
firstness. Although firstness, for Gans, does not appear immediately on the scene of 
representation, it is a prehuman, precondition of the scene, where one or two 
protohumans must have emitted the sign first. Gans writes: “the defining innovation 
of our species, the conversion of the appetitive gesture through its ‘abortion’ into a 
sign, must have begun as the behavior of only one or two participants. The specific 
point of innovation is the gestalt of the sign, which is no longer an action-toward 
intended to grasp the object, but a form, a gesture-in-itself, which as such could be 
imitated by the others.”112 Nevertheless, we must concede the logical impossibility of 
the master as the inventor of language if the master cannot remember.  
 
Nietzsche is closer to Gans with respect to resentment than one might initially think. 
He indeed situates resentment immediately after the origin of language through the 
masters. Yet how does the ethical relate to resentment for Gans and for Nietzsche? 
For Nietzsche, moral value judgements, whose origin is found in resentment, stifles 
life. For Gans, resentment is the “engine” that perpetuates the deferral of violence 
through representation. To extend this line of argument, we must consider that all 
participants in the originary scene, through mimetic desire, attempt to be the first to 
possess the sacred central sign/object. Instead of Nietzsche’s claim that resentment is 
the outcome of an aborted discharge of energy, Gans claims that originary resentment 
itself is what created firstness, what creates hierarchy. Nevertheless, the point to make 
                                                             
111  Eric Gans, “Religion and Firstness,” Chronicles of Love and Resentment, no. 496 (2015), accessed February 7, 
2017, http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/views/vw496/, emphasis in the original. 
112  Ibid. 
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here is that, for Gans, the ethical emerges before resentment. To equate what 
Nietzsche considers to be the masters, Gans agrees that it was the master, or “big-
man” or the first to emit the sign who was the source of the origin of language and the 
ethical. Gans writes: 
 
Yet the aborted gesture is nonetheless at a second remove a potential 
source of resentment. Unlike the appropriative gesture it replaces, it 
demands attention, the joint shared attention unique to our species. We 
cannot assume that the First was singled out in the originary event, for if 
he met any resistance he could not have inaugurated a symmetrical 
exchange. But if this originary firstness was uniquely successful, it is 
because it was uniquely able to designate for the first time the central 
object as a privileged target of the love-and-resentment that is sacred 
significance. Once the scene of representation exists, the one who reveals 
it to the others, while transferring his firstness to the center, is also 
reinserting himself in an already-existing relationship to that center, and 
effectively proclaiming his own derivative firstness in the human 
sphere—the prototype of the role of big-man.113 
 
There cannot be an exchange of human reciprocity without firstness, or what Gans 
refers to as the “big-man.” In Nietzsche’s terms, there must be a master in order for 
language to emerge. The master coins an object with a word, considers his creation 
“good” and immediately forgets, which Nietzsche considers to be the “healthy” 
instinct of forgetfulness. Yet, the most fundamental difference here is that resentment 
must exist for the human to exist, according to generative anthropology. This is the 
fundamental flaw inherent in Nietzsche’s evaluation of resentment as the source of 
the memory of the sign. 
 
Resentment, for Nietzsche, is the reactive force of the will to power. What about the 
active form of the will to power in relation to generative anthropology? What about 
the theory itself as a way of understanding the human? It is one thing to declare that 
                                                             
113  Ibid, emphasis in the original. 
167 
 
Nietzsche is a theorist of origins, but quite another to see how he comes to his 
conclusion about the will to power in relation to his theory of the origin of the human. 
In the following chapter, I will discuss at length Nietzsche’s concerns with the will to 
power and the problems his ontocosmology faces in light of generative anthropology, 
the hermeneutic lens of this dissertation. If we are to understand the scope of the 
value placed on resentment for Nietzsche, it is essential we explore the will to power, 
and the eternal recurrence, central elements of Nietzsche’s thinking.
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Chapter 4: 
An Originary Analysis of the Theory of the Will 
to Power and of Eternal Recurrence 
 
The world exists; it is not something that becomes, not something that 
passes away. Or rather: it becomes, it passes away, but it has never begun 
to become and never ceased to pass away—it preserves itself in both … 
the world lives on itself: its excrements are its nourishment. 
—Friedrich Nietzsche1 
 
What I have called the heuristic function of the originary hypothesis may 
also be put in terms of dialogue: whether or not we agree that it took 
place, or even that it is meaningful to ask the question, the originary event 
provides us with a minimal subject of conversation.—Eric Gans2 
 
Nietzsche’s “eternal return” thought experiment (the focus of which is not 
the “hypothesis” of the “eternal return” but on what your answer would 
be to the demon) is interested in nothing more than representing what it 
would really “mean” what one says and does (what would it mean to 
“affirm” one’s existence)—again, something for which no visible proof is 
forthcoming.—Adam Katz3 
 
                                                             
1  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (London: Vintage Books, 
1982), 548. (WP 548; cf. 12:2[193]). 
2  Eric Gans, Signs of Paradox: Irony, Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 6. 
3  Adam Katz, “The Question of Originary Method: The Generative Thought Experiment,” in The Originary 
Hypothesis: A Minimal Proposal for Humanistic Inquiry, ed. Adam Katz (Denver, CO: Davies Group, 2007), 
112. 
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As has been discussed in the previous three chapters, Nietzsche’s criticism of the 
ethical—along with his ideas on resentment—is deeply oriented by his theory of 
language as a fundamental “error” that occurred during the evolution of the human 
being. Indeed, almost every aspect of Nietzsche’s thought is underpinned by his 
suspicion of the truth value of language. In this chapter, I argue, the will to power, 
and the eternal recurrence of the same are part of an attempt to transcend traditional 
conceptions of the ethical through a renunciation of what makes the human most 
human: language. Indeed, Nietzsche considers the ethical formulations of “good” and 
“evil” as derived from an “aimless” and “arbitrary” language.4 In place of the old 
conceptions of good and evil—or, what Nietzsche considers an ethics of resentment—
he proposes the eternal recurrence of the same as an ethical imperative. Nietzsche 
claims that the new ethical imperative of the eternal recurrence is “beyond good and 
evil.” The ethical imperative, then, is to affirm, to say, “yes,” to an existence eternally 
recurring in the same sequence indefinitely.5 For Nietzsche, the old conception of the 
ethical is the product of language, where the man of resentment has gained the ability 
to remember the sign that the master invented; the man of resentment is re-acting to 
the forgetful master.6 As discussed in the previous chapter, these are the active and 
reactive elements of the will to power (Ger: Wille zur Macht). In an attempt to 
transcend the ethics of resentment, Nietzsche proposes a new set of values, a “re-
evaluation of all values,” which he describes as the will to power, and the eternal 
recurrence. In works following the famous proclamation of the “death of God” in The 
Gay Science, Nietzsche attempts to develop a kosmos anthropos in order to finally 
overturn the “falsity” of an ethics of resentment driven by the error of a reactive, all-
too-human language. Where Nietzsche increasingly tries to eliminate the very idea of 
the human, and with it the centrality of language. Generative anthropology, on the 
other hand, postulates the central importance of language as the defining feature of 
the human, where the ethical and resentment are both foundational elements of the 
human. From a generative anthropological standpoint, Nietzsche attempts to utilise 
the notions of the will to power and eternal recurrence to transcend—to 
                                                             
4  Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie, 2.  
5  Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 539. (WP 539; cf. 13:14[138]). 
6  As discussed in chapter 2, language (Sprache) and consciousness (Bewusstsein) are interchangeable. In fact, 
they are one and the same for Nietzsche. 
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dehumanise—the human, or to utilise them for what he refers to as man’s 
“naturalisation.” Founded on the basis that this argument itself takes place within an 
all-too-human language, it takes for granted the very same thing that allows him to 
make propositions to begin with: a plausible account of the emergence of 
representation and subsequently its dispensability. 
 
In light of generative anthropology, Nietzsche’s project, aimed at eliminating an 
ethics of resentment by replacing it with the will to power / eternal recurrence, fails 
on two fronts. First, Nietzsche’s theory of language is centred on the declarative, 
which, as Gans has shown, cannot be the most primitive linguistic form. Nietzsche, in 
other words, has no account of the ostensive. Second, given the plausibility of 
generative anthropology’s claim that the ethical is coeval with the human, it is hard to 
conceive of how the ethical per se could simply be abandoned. The act of designating 
an object with a sign is also an ethical act because it is the deferral of violence—an 
aborted gesture of appropriation. Furthermore, originary resentment, for generative 
anthropology, is essential to the human scene. Therefore, by implication, if Nietzsche 
aims at eliminating an ethics of resentment, he is also aiming at eliminating the 
human altogether. Both the ethical and resentment are indispensable elements of the 
human, whether Nietzsche concedes this or not. Resentment is not something that can 
be transcended. Rather, resentment is the space in which human culture takes shape.  
 
Regardless of the ubiquitous postmodern interpretations of Nietzsche, which are 
unable to adequately make sense of the will to power or eternal recurrence, generative 
anthropology does not necessarily exclude other interpretations of Nietzsche’s oeuvre; 
it does allow for a minimal subject of conversation concerning his work. The minimal 
subject of conversation is the one that generative anthropology proposes more 
generally—the scene of the punctual emergence of the human, where all minimal 
categories of the human owe their origin. In light of the generative anthropological 
position that all forms of thinking can be viewed from a point of origin, I will explore 
for the remainder of this chapter Nietzsche’s two major ideas: the will to power, and 
the eternal recurrence of the same. In this chapter, I will make the case that each idea 
does—and indeed must—emerge and take its shape from the scene of human 
representation. Nietzsche, on the other hand, claims that the human emerges (and 
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disappears) from an inexorably recurring will to power. As Nietzsche’s Zarathustra 
famously states, the human is merely a bridge towards the “affirmation” of the eternal 
recurrence, where there is no room for anything resembling traditional conceptions of 
the ethical. As Gans states, Nietzsche “presents the scenic as the transcendence of the 
ethical, ‘beyond good and evil.’”7 Indeed, the will to power and eternal recurrence are 
Nietzsche’s direct response to what he considers the error of language, the error of 
traditional conceptions of the ethical, the age of resentment, and the very belief that 
there is something that can be designated as “human,” unless the human is a bridge 
over the abyss aimed towards the affirmation of eternal recurrence. For Nietzsche, 
language and the ethical are mere tributaries of the aesthetic phenomenon of the 
world, which is an eternally recurring will to power “and nothing besides.”8  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, I will offer a selective reading of the 
Nachlass, or the unauthorised collection of notes found in The Will to Power, where 
Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power can be most readily explicated through the 
distinction between quality and quantity.9 I will examine the will to power and its 
problems as a theory in light of our understanding of human representation. Indeed, 
Nietzsche’s theory oddly attempts to disregard representation altogether by claiming 
that there are no “real” qualities, but only quantities of force. For Nietzsche, qualities 
are insurmountable barriers between us, and what he considers to be the sum total of 
reality from which the human cannot be distinguished. However, there is an inherent 
contradiction between theorising a “reality” that is the totality of the world, and, at the 
same time, attempting to claim that qualities—or, the verticality of the sign, for 
generative anthropology—are illusory. The very conditions of possibility for making 
this argument ultimately undermine the ontology that it hopes to establish. Generative 
anthropology would insist that the will to power is impossible unless there is a human 
there to designate/qualify it as such. The will to power, I argue, fails as a theory 
precisely because a subjectless will to power, the “sum total of everything,” is 
                                                             
7  Eric Gans, The Scenic Imagination: Originary Thinking from Hobbes to the Present Day (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2008), 139. 
8  Nietzsche, Will to Power, 549. (WP 549; cf. 11:36[26]) 
9  As opposed to the German anzhal (number) that is more closely associated with the English “quantity,” 
Nietzsche considers the abstraction of numbers to be yet another human error. Instead, he uses the term 
quanten (quantum), referring to an undisclosed magnitude. Although he claims that the world is an undisclosed 
magnitude, it is also finite. See, for example, the aphorism “Number” in Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too 
Human. 
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ultimately designated as such by a subject and has no reality apart from it. Second, 
after an examination of the problems inherent in the theory of the will to power, I will 
situate the theory within a generative anthropological framework. I will offer an 
originary analysis of will to power as the inherent appetitive force of the animal. I will 
analyse Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power, and his notion of “quantities of 
force,” in relation to the idea of “verticality” and “horizontality” found in generative 
anthropology. Nietzsche considers language to be the most recent and untrustworthy 
development in the human, claiming that bodily instincts are the more refined and 
trustworthy aspects of our nature because they are primordial and closer to what he 
considers to be the ultimate reality of the will to power, from which we have alienated 
ourselves. I will consider the arguments put forth by Gans and Nietzsche on the value 
of language, and the distinction between the verticality of the sign and the worldly 
appetite of the horizontal. I argue that Nietzsche’s primitive will to power is 
applicable to only the horizontal world of the non-human animal. For the human, will 
to power—as Nietzsche conceives of it—is an impossible project. 
 
Later in the chapter, I will discuss Nietzsche’s self-designated “greatest teaching,” 
where, following Heraclitus, Nietzsche considers the world to be in an eternal flux. 
Unlike the pre-Socratics, however, Nietzsche contends that everything returns in a 
self-same manner. The paralysing idea of eternal recurrence is Nietzsche’s last 
attempt at a radical escape from the ethics of resentment as a way of overcoming the 
human. On a cosmological reading, Nietzsche’s theory denies any “meaning” 
precisely because of the endless circularity of the world in the same sequence. In 
other words, there is no fixed point from which to make relations; an x cannot be 
designated as an x as such precisely because the x is part of the flux, part of the “one 
and all.” In Human, All too Human, Nietzsche writes: “the invention of the laws of 
numbers was made on the basis of the error, dominant even from the earliest times, 
that there are identical things (but in fact nothing is identical with anything else); at 
least that there are things (but there is no ‘thing’).”10 There have been few responses 
from generative anthropology to Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. A notable exception 
is Adam Katz’s The Question of Originary Method: The Generative Thought 
                                                             
10  Ibid., 26.  
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Experiment. Considering there is no forthcoming “proof” of the eternal recurrence, 
nor any possibility of one forthcoming, Katz claims the eternal recurrence rests on the 
originary scene of human representation as a self-reflexive thought experiment. We 
will consider this in due course. Finally, I will engage with the similarities and 
differences between Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence and the propositions set forth by 
generative anthropology by looking at the symbol of the Ouroboros. By examining 
this symbol, one can reconfigure the idea of eternal recurrence within that of 
generative anthropology. The Ouroboros is symbolic of an eternal recurrence, but also 
of the formal closure of the originary scene, where all attempts to designate an object 
recreate the originary scene. 
 
 
Nachlass: The Will to Power  
 
Nietzsche’s notes (Nachlass) published in the posthumous and unauthorised The Will 
to Power is comprised of the characteristically ironic aphorisms and parabolic 
prosody of an iconoclast whose thoughts still trouble contemporary philosophy. 
Although the will to power is a prominent idea found throughout the manuscript, 
Nietzsche’s intention was arguably to publish the majority of these notes—if this 
were ever to occur—as the “attempt at a revaluation of all values.” The Will to Power 
has been given both the highest praise and the harshest criticism since its 
publication.11 Although it is not entirely clear whether Nietzsche was to publish the 
vast collection of notes in The Will to Power, it remains an anthology that must been 
taken seriously for Nietzsche scholarship. For Nietzsche, everything is a 
manifestation of the will to power: the morality of the weak, the morality of the 
strong, existence itself. There is no cause, no subject, no unity, but only will to power. 
Yet, there are inherent problems with the claim that everything is will to power, 
which generative anthropology has the potential to highlight. 
 
                                                             
11  In the introduction to the 1968 edition of The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale give both 
praise and criticism to the collection of notes found in the manuscript. They offer praise for the manuscript 
shedding light on one or two central ideas in Nietzsche’s thought. They nevertheless provide criticisms for its 
lack of scholarship regarding whether or not Nietzsche had intended to publish these notes at all. 
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In the preface of The Will to Power, Nietzsche resumes his relentless attack on what 
he sees to be the predominance of Judaeo-Christian morality in the epicentre of 
nineteenth-century Europe. If one could express in a single axiom Nietzsche’s 
apprehensions about “modernity,” it is that it is characterised as a false morality, 
which it takes to be its raison d’être. Not only is all morality false, for Nietzsche, all 
interpretations—driven by affects—are moral interpretations, and thereby also false. 
Even today, the deeply ingrained Christian values of the West have led to even self-
proclaimed atheists (Richard Dawkins, Michel Onfray, Daniel C. Dennett, Michael 
Martin, Peter Singer, and others) presupposing—or taking as axiomatic—these very 
same values, that is, at the fundamental level, values that emulate the teachings of 
Christ as espoused in the New Testament. Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, 
however, lies not in his attack on Christ but on the gross misrepresentations of Christ 
made by Paul and the establishment of the empire church by Constantine I. 
Nietzsche’s observation of Christ was that he promoted precisely the opposite of the 
established Catholic Church. He writes: “Christianity: a naïve beginning to a 
Buddhistic peace movement in the very seat of ressentiment—but reversed by Paul 
into a pagan mystery doctrine, which finally learns to treat with the entire state 
organization—and wages war, condemns, tortures, swears, hates.”12 Thus, 
Nietzsche’s view of Christianity is that of a reactive slave morality seated in 
resentment. For Nietzsche, by the mid-nineteenth century the church had woken up 
and found itself without a God; there was nothing to be found but the 
incomprehensible Christian relics contained within great cathedrals, scattered across 
Europe like old bones (in some cases they are old bones) whose architecture once 
represented the grand, energetic movements of their age and were then left only as 
reminders of two thousand years of error. Indeed, with the death of God, there is no 
sanctioning whatsoever for a slave morality that has, in Nietzsche’s view, petrified the 
brain and left it utterly unable to understand the classical, pre-Christian world 
espousing eternal recurrence. 
 
In the wake of Christianity’s departure, and after two thousand years of moral error 
and herd-like “slave morality,” Nietzsche proposes a new set of values by which to 
                                                             
12  Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 56. (WP 56; cf. 13:11[150]). 
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live in The Will to Power; he deems this new set of values “the re-valuation of all 
values.” Nietzsche writes: “For one should make no mistake about the meaning of the 
title that this gospel of the future wants to bear. ‘The Will to Power: Attempt at a 
Revaluation of All Values.’”13 Yet before these revaluations can be successfully 
integrated into the world-as-will-to-power, Nietzsche claims we must first live 
through a final stage of nihilism before we can witness its reality. The final stage of 
nihilism is, for Nietzsche, a world without the old conceptions of the ethical. From a 
reading of The Will to Power, there are really only two aspects to Nietzsche’s entire 
intellectual endeavour: the eternal recurrence of the same and the will to power. The 
only law that exists within an eternally recurring “monster of energy” is, ultimately, 
the will to power—the will to become eternally. It is Nietzsche’s desire that we return 
to the pre-Christian, recurring model of a universe found in antiquity. 
 
 
The Problems of the Theory of the Will to Power 
 
Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power, or the perpetual will to (more) power, is one of 
the most debated aspects of his work. Along with the eternal recurrence, the theory 
attempts to eradicate traditional metaphysical beliefs passed down from Christian 
thought, Plato, Kant, and Schopenhauer, such as free will, causality, the duality of 
soul and body, substance, and unity. In the place of these beliefs, Nietzsche believes 
the will to power is a radical revision of the human and of reality. The will to power 
radically revises the human by eliminating agency and subjectivity. It revises reality 
precisely because the will to power, according to Nietzsche, is the only reality that 
exists. For Nietzsche, this world is nothing but the flux of quanta—or, irreducible 
quantities—of force, where everything “else” is illusion, including quality (human 
qualification), which stems from an all-too-human language as a way of merely 
describing reality—through giving quantities qualities—that Nietzsche believes 
evades description. Yet, for all of Nietzsche’s brilliant and novel insights emanating 
from this particular model of the world, the theory is clearly not without its problems.  
 
                                                             
13  Ibid., 3. (WP 3; cf. 12:10[192]). 
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The first difficulty with attempting to understand Nietzsche’s will to power as a 
coherent model of reality is that it is not coherently presented. We are left to reconcile 
disparate lines of argument and a variety of apparent contradictions. Indeed, the first 
difficulty in attempting to understand the theory is justified by the second. Even 
though we cannot deny that the will to power is a description of the world—or, a 
sketch of a theory of the same—we cannot assume that Nietzsche believed what he 
left were his final thoughts on the subject, or even thoughts that he would deem 
suitable for publication. Indeed, the comments found in the Nachlass describing the 
will to power are fragmentary and loosely ordered. Last, to be consistent, the theory 
of the will to power, as a representation of what it purports to represent, would appear 
to deny the conditions of its own assertability. For example, the theory of the will to 
power is a representation of its purported reality, yet the theory proposes that the 
reality far exceeds the ability of representation itself. For Nietzsche, there are no real 
subjects that can represent the will to power precisely because everything is the 
oscillation of wills, or centres of force that command and obey. For Nietzsche, 
representation is an epiphenomenon of the series of affects that impose themselves on 
some centre of force. On the contrary, Nietzsche claims that the reality of the will to 
power still involves the necessity of a qualitative representation of quantities through 
what he calls “willing centres.”14 In light of generative anthropology, I will examine 
the contrast between a subject and a subjectless world shortly. 
 
 
Components of the Will to Power: Quantities and Qualities  
 
This section will discuss the difference between Nietzsche’s notions of quality and 
quantity, which are, as Nietzsche suggests, unreliable but necessary linguistic 
descriptors of the “mechanisms” of the will to power. I will later discuss these ideas 
in relation to generative anthropology. Examining Nietzsche’s distinction between 
quality and quantity allows us to decipher the suggested “mechanisms” behind the 
theory in order to interpret the will to power in light of an adequate theory of 
representation. 
                                                             
14  Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Rudiger Bittner (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 251. 
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In its most illustrious form, the will to power is nothing short of the total nature of the 
world. Nietzsche claims that the will to power is “the tyrannically inconsiderate and 
relentless enforcement of claims of power.”15 Yet, for Nietzsche, even language is 
bereft of the ability to encapsulate the “tyranny” and totality of the will to power’s all-
encompassing dominion. Indeed, the reality of the will to power is so far beyond the 
comprehension of language that Nietzsche claims even conceiving of the words 
“tyranny,” “force,” “drive,” “will,” and “power” is essentially a futile endeavour. 
Nietzsche adds they are but “weakening and attenuating metaphors—being too 
human.”16 Still, Nietzsche relies heavily on the language of physiology for his 
conceptual armoury. According to Nietzsche, everything “organic” and “inorganic” 
derives from the totality of an utterly “inhuman” will to power. Nietzsche goes so far 
as to claim that the will to power is almost the antithesis of what we normally think of 
as the human.  
 
In its grand totality, the will to power attempts to obliterate both similarity and 
difference, object and subject, and cause and effect; Nietzsche claims that the final 
reality is that “everything else is bound to and conditioned by everything else.”17 In 
order to fully appreciate the scope of the will to power, one must read what is perhaps 
his most famous passage of all, aphorism 1067. Written very close to the end of 
Nietzsche’s life, the aphorism is worth quoting in its entirety. He writes: 
 
And do you know what the “the world” is to me? Shall I show it to you in 
my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without 
end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, 
that does not expend itself but only transform itself; as a whole, of 
unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise 
without increase or income; enclosed by “nothingness” as by a boundary; 
not something blurry or wasted, not something endlessly extended, but set 
in a definite space as a definite force, and not a space that might be 
                                                             
15  Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 220. 
16  Ibid., 22. 
17  Nietzsche, Will to Power, 551. (WP 551; cf. 13:14[98]). 
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“empty” here or there, but rather a force throughout, as a play of forces, 
and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and 
at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing 
together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous 
years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms; out of the 
simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most 
rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-
contradictory, and then again returning home to the simple out of this 
abundance, out of the play of contradictions back to the joy of concord, 
still affirming itself in this uniformity of its courses and its years, blessing 
itself as that which must return eternally, as a becoming that knows no 
satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my Dionysian world of the 
eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of 
the twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without goal, 
unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels 
will towards itself—do you want a name for this world? A solution for all 
its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most 
intrepid, most midnight men?—This world is the will to power—and 
nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and 
nothing besides!18 
 
From the passage above we surmise that the will to power is the result of itself, 
eternally recurring, where there is no “here” nor “there,” no subject nor object. Yet, to 
pinpoint the particulars of Nietzsche’s attempt to implement his vision of the “world,” 
represented as a self-serving magnitude, one is forced to discuss what Nietzsche 
refers to as “quantities” in relation to “qualities.” Everything that populates “the one 
and the many,” the flux of the “world,” according to Nietzsche, boils down to 
quantities of force—or, what he claims to be the equivalence of will—within a finite 
quantity of energy. Nietzsche claims that quantities of force perpetually seek power; 
the “goal,” then, of seeking power is only to seek even greater power. Power is 
attained by a quantity of force becoming a willing centre of many quantities of force. 
                                                             
18  Ibid., 550, emphasis in the original. (WP 550; cf. 12:2[83]). 
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The fundamental problem that arises when we are asked to consider the sum total of 
the world as “will,” or as quanta of force, is that it asks us to eliminate precisely what 
entertains the idea. The will to power eliminates what is needed to quantify quantities, 
that is, qualities. And so, an incompatibility exists within the “reality” of the world as 
will to power—as subjectless—that yet paradoxically accounts for the subject that 
represents it as such. So, how does Nietzsche account for the subject in a world he 
claims to be subjectless?  
 
According to Nietzsche, quantities of force continually oscillate between the active, 
which accumulates power, and the reactive, which attempts to resist the active. 
Whether active or reactive, these quantities are still, according to Nietzsche, 
subjectless, unless the definition of a subject is the “feeling of power” or the 
accumulation of more power toward a centre. The point that needs to be made, 
however, about the will to power is that even if it is “true” as a reality, it must be 
represented by a subject, the human, who qualifies the “true” and “reality.” If there is 
no subject, no agency to will, why does Nietzsche bother with the term “will” at all? I 
argue that the language of agency is unavoidable. At first glance, it appears that the 
will to power, the sum total of everything, owes a debt to what it hopes to refute. The 
theory of the will to power attempts to eliminate that which makes the theory possible 
in the first place.  
 
Nietzsche claims the will lies in the necessary illusion of “quality,” or “value.” For 
Nietzsche, the only quality a quantity of force has is its difference in having greater or 
lesser power, the struggle between active and reactive quantities, the “ranking of 
above and below.”1920 These particular quantities are what Nietzsche refers to as 
“centres of force” (Ger: Kraftzentrum), each blindly orbiting towards power, or 
resisting greater centres of force that have accumulated more power. To answer the 
question of why quality is a necessary illusion, Nietzsche provides a complex answer. 
He claims that to “see” the world as only quantity is impossible within the limits of 
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human language. Nevertheless, if the idea of the will to power is to have any 
“meaning” or value, it is intended only ever for us. Nietzsche writes:  
 
Qualities are insurmountable barriers for us; we cannot help feeling that 
mere quantitative differences are something fundamentally distinct from 
quantity, namely that they are qualities which can no longer be reduced to 
one another. But everything for which the word “knowledge” makes any 
sense refers to the domain of reckoning, weighing, measuring, to the 
domain of quantity; while, on the other hand, all our sensations of value 
(i.e., simply our sensations) adhere precisely to qualities, i.e., to our 
perspective “truths” which belong to us alone and can by no means be 
“known”! It is obvious that every creature different from us senses 
different qualities and consequently lives in a different world from that in 
which we live. Qualities are an idiosyncrasy peculiar to man; to demand 
that our human interpretations and values should be universal and perhaps 
constitutive values is one of the hereditary madnesses of human pride.21 
 
There are two points to be made here. First, Nietzsche is pointing out that the human 
can only conceive of the “true” nature of the world—quantities—as qualities. Second, 
quality can only ever re-present power—it cannot be power. The non-representational 
aspect of the will to power, once we erase the anthropomorphically attributed quality, 
however, is quite different. Nietzsche writes: “no things remain but only dynamic 
quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their 
relation to all other quanta, in their “effect” upon the same. The will to power is not a 
being, not a becoming, but a pathos—the most elemental fact from which a becoming 
and effecting first emerge.”22 Pathos, then, is the distance between those centres with 
different levels of quanta from others. Indeed, Nietzsche claims that the very idea of a 
“unity,” the belief that we are subjects, is necessary for the concept, Being. He writes: 
“If we did not hold ourselves to be unities, we would never have formed the concept 
‘thing.’”23 For Nietzsche, the necessary illusion of quality arises from “mere 
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22  Ibid., 339, emphasis in the original. 
23  Ibid., 338. 
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quantitative differences,” which are “something fundamentally distinct from 
quantity.”24 Yet a qualification by a perceived subject only arises from a comparative 
judgement where it is really only differences of power. And for Nietzsche, qualities 
are an insurmountable barrier for us. Clearly, the for us signals that we as humans 
cannot escape the all-too-human desire to imbue the reality of the will to power with 
quality. Qualities, according to Nietzsche, are the only way of comprehending 
quantities. Indeed, quantities cannot be totalised until they are conceived of as 
qualities. Therefore, for the subject, quantities can manifest only as signs, and yet, 
those signs necessarily misrepresent what quantity is in-itself. The question, however, 
is: For whom is the illusion effective if the subject is itself illusion? 
 
 Nietzsche claims that if there were no differences in force, or the difference of force-
centres, the world would be “dead, stiff, motionless.”25 The illusion of quality—
indeed, all illusions brought by language—is brought forth by force-will-centres that 
calculate “their” value based on differences in the accumulation of power. In light of 
generative anthropology, many questions now arise: How can we deduce the reality of 
the will to power in the end if it is, as Nietzsche suggests, impossible “for us” to 
adequately represent the reduction of the world to quantities of force? Is the will to 
power, whether reality or representation, merely human misrepresentation of the 
world? Even if the illusion of quality comes from a force-will-centre, is it not our 
representation in the end that misleads? In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche goes so 
far as to assert the “I” is not the doer of thinking. Rather, thinking, Nietzsche 
contends, is the cultivator of the illusion of “I.” Thinking is merely a multiplicity of 
wills, wills to power. Nietzsche writes: 
 
When I analyse the event expressed in the sentence ‘I think’, I acquire a 
series of rash assertions which are difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
prove—for example, that it is I who thinks, that it has to be something at 
all which thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of an 
entity thought of as a cause, that an ‘I’ exists, finally that what is 
designated by ‘thinking’ has already been determined—that I know what 
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thinking is. For if I had not already decided that matter within myself, by 
what standard could I determine that what is happening is not perhaps 
‘willing’ or ‘feeling’?26 
 
The idea that there is the illusion of a thinker, a subject that thinks, according to 
Nietzsche, presupposes that a present state of the self compares itself to previous 
states in order to know what it is. Thus, Nietzsche insists that there is no timeless, 
will-less subject that governs thinking. Instead, everything is produced by the will to 
power, from the minutest organelles competing amongst each other for power, up to 
the human–animal.27 To return to the will to power, the assertion that there is no “I,” 
leads us to think that Nietzsche had concealed and locked up his theory of the will to 
power as unthinkable (hence unchallengeable). Yet, in the end, it must be something 
thought with language by a subject; it must be something that is represented. There is 
a final question that must be asked before we move on to a generative anthropological 
response: How might Nietzsche’s idea of willing account for the consciousness of its 
own presence? Nietzsche never addresses this beyond claiming that consciousness 
arises from the oscillation of commanding and obeying force-centres. For Nietzsche, 
language is a false representation of will to power. Ultimately, however, Nietzsche 
still claims that quality is a human idiosyncrasy. How do we account for this?  
 
For generative anthropology, language is precisely what makes the human a human. 
In order to conceive of the will to power at all requires conceptual thinking, which in 
turn must have its origins in an originary scene. Thus, language would have had to 
emerge before the idea of the will to power. So far, I have discussed the will to power 
and its fundamental issues and its relation to representation. The next section of this 
chapter will deal specifically with this problem of representation in relation to Gans’s 
Signs of Paradox, by bringing the human back to the centre of the discussion, 
regardless of whether Nietzsche’s ontological claims hold. The problem of the 
representation of the unrepresentable, however, is not the only problem that arises 
when we take seriously Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power. The main point 
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Nietzsche raises about language is its worth, or its value to the “human.” What 
insights can generative anthropology give in relation to the value of language in light 
of Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power? Is language itself a kind of will to power? 
Or, is it something entirely different? something less? something more? Even if we 
assume Gans’s hypothesis is correct, the question of the very value of language in 
relation to the human needs to be addressed. I will attempt to address these issues by 
examining the concepts of “verticality” and “horizontality,” which Gans claims are 
equivalent to Nietzsche’s discussion on “quality” and “quantity.” 
 
 
Mimetic Paradox: Horizontal as Quantity, Vertical as Quality 
 
The crux of the origin of language is the emergence of the vertical sign-
relation from the horizontal one of animal interaction.—Eric Gans28 
 
This section aims to discuss “mimetic paradox,” and the difference between the 
“horizontal” and the “vertical”—which Gans discusses at length in Signs of Paradox: 
Irony, Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures—in relation to Nietzsche’s 
conception of the will to power as quantity and the illusion of quality. Gans argues 
that the emergence of the vertical from the horizontal is the creation of the formal 
closure of the sign in the originary scene, which is the advent of the human proper. 
On the other hand, the horizontal, for Gans, is the experiential pole of the non-human 
animal. Gans writes: “the unique event in which the verticality of human language 
emerges from the horizontal world of appetite is a moment of liberation reenacted in 
every subsequent act of representation.”29 Examining mimetic paradox and the 
distinction between the horizontal and the vertical throws new light on the problems 
explored in Nietzsche’s account of his theory of the will to power and his distinction, 
in this respect, between quality and quantity. Indeed, Gans claims that the 
horizontal/vertical distinction is the equivalent of quantity/quality. He writes: “The 
originary hypothesis addresses the mystery of the generation of the vertical from the 
horizontal, form from content, or, in the old dialectical vocabulary, ‘quality’ from 
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‘quantity.’”30 It is my contention that we can learn something about Nietzsche’s 
quality/quantity problem by directly engaging with the difference between non-human 
animal interaction and the emergence of the human vertical sign as quality, according 
to generative anthropology.  
 
In order to understand the difference between the horizontal and the vertical—or, 
quantity and quality—we must first briefly examine what Gans refers to as mimetic 
paradox. Mimetic paradox is the representational correlative of mimetic crisis seen in 
terms of symbolisation, and therefore, the world in which it engenders. It is the 
generation of the vertical from the horizontal. Gans writes: “Because mimetic paradox 
presides at the creation of the ‘vertical’ human sign from the ‘horizontal’ continuum 
of worldly experience, it stands at the centre of a constellation of categories—irony, 
comedy, tragedy, evil, and so on—that are conceivable only in a universe of speakers 
of (human) language.”31 It is important to briefly consider the way Gans looks to 
paradox when deciphering the birth of language and consciousness. Gans ultimately 
considers paradox to be the necessary precondition for the foundation and function of 
human language; language cannot meaningfully function without its structural 
foundations based upon paradox. For instance, Gans tells us: “Paradox is a structure 
of language; it cannot be conceived without the sign. But neither can the sign be 
conceived without paradox … The sign that is in the world represents the world it is 
in; the sign that stands above the world remains within the world of the sign.”32 For 
Gans, paradox precedes language precisely because paradox is in a perpetually 
deferred form: 
 
Paradox itself is paradoxical; that is what makes it paradox. It cannot be 
reduced to lowest terms, only deferred. But neither is it ever present 
before our eyes; it is always in a state of deferral.33  
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If language is the vehicle that spins on endlessly as deferral, then paradox is the 
engine that allows it to do so. For Gans, paradox is “older than language itself.”34 
Without paradox, Gans argues, the “openness” of language would not be possible. 
Instead of an enclosed system of finite symbols, paradox allows language to stem out 
into an infinite combination and recombination of symbols of perpetual deferral: “The 
paradoxical foundation of our systems of representation is a sign not of failure but of 
openness.”35 The linguistic efficacy of mimetic paradox is its ability to perpetually 
defer, and in the process, recreate the original sign, albeit in a slightly different way 
each time—what Derrida would call iteration.36 For Gans, paradox is the machinery 
that has churned out every facet of human thought since the creation of language.  
What does mimetic paradox have to do with Nietzsche’s will to power and the 
conception of the illusion of quality? If we return to the formal closure of the vertical 
sign, as well as horizontal worldly appetite, we can establish a link between the 
worldly appetite of the not-yet-human and Nietzsche’s conception of quantity (of 
power): the horizontal may well be a world of “quantity.” We have two very distinct 
ways of looking at the human. For Nietzsche, the human is really just part of the one 
will to power in an eternal flux of quanta. The other way of looking at the human, 
then, defines the human as the only animal that can re-present an object. If human 
language—or, the qualification of quantities—is not to be trusted as a way of 
representing reality, as Nietzsche suggests, can the theory of the will to power itself 
be trusted to represent the world? In other words, if language has no ability to deliver 
the truth about the world, what are we to contrast it with? I argue that there is nothing 
to contrast with representation other than non-representation, the idea of which is 
itself a form of representation—as far as we know, the human is the only 
representative of representation. 
 
 If we were able to speak to Nietzsche today, we would respond to his theory of the 
will to power by claiming that the verticality of the sign is, indeed, the qualitative 
separation from worldly appetite, or quantity. Our separation from pure “quanta” is of 
course the formal closure of the sign, which brings a qualitative distinction, the 
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vertical separation from the “competing” quanta of will to power. Gans claims that 
language coincides with human reality precisely because language is that which 
generates this “reality,” the human reality of qualification and linguistic exchange. 
Gans writes: “At the origin, language coincides with the human reality to which it 
refers because it undecidedly generates this reality and is generated by it.”37 In other 
words, language is the fundamental arbiter of human reality, and it is perhaps the only 
reality we will ever know. Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power as pure, 
undifferentiated, unqualified “force” or “quantity,” where quality is only the 
accumulation of “centres of force,” is ultimately untenable precisely because it is 
qualified, conceptualised and can only reach us as a force of representation.  
 
Perhaps the non-human, horizontal world of appetite is, as Nietzsche would like us to 
think, pure quantity. Yet, a pure “quantity,” as Nietzsche would have it, is so far 
beyond the reach of the human that it is a futile endeavour to even fathom what “it” 
is. Nevertheless, it is not the case for the generative anthropological idea of the 
verticality of human reciprocation, of the formal closure of the sign. Rather, for Gans, 
a sign is a quasi object in and of itself, a referent to the object, and a referent to other 
signs. The fundamental distinction to be drawn between the horizontal and the vertical 
is that which is essential for the “human” to be able to designate the world as such. 
Gans writes: “The crux of the origin of language is the emergence of the vertical sign-
relation from the horizontal one of animal interaction.”38 Perhaps the will to power 
reins in the non-human world, perhaps it does govern their reality; if so, we have no 
way of ever knowing. But Nietzsche’s attempt to conflate quality and quantity, or, in 
generative anthropological terms, the horizontal with the vertical, is a fatal mistake as 
it ultimately takes the declarative as a given—even in the most minimal sense. And, 
here, he reveals that he is a metaphysician, and it also shows the shape of his 
metaphysics. Yet, beyond dealing with Nietzsche’s problematic concerning quality 
and quantity in relation to the horizontal and vertical, it would be useful to consider 
Gans’s understanding of what the function of language is. Here, the central contention 
is that language performs what Gans refers to as an aborted gesture of appropriation, 
which, in turn, both negates and designates the proliferation of power as a quality.  
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The abrupt movement from the horizontal worldly appetite of the animal to the 
vertical closure of the sign is the result of the abortion of a gesture of appropriation. 
Consider the originary scene, where two or more protohumans are mimetically 
attracted to the same central object of desire. One protohuman points to an object, and 
in the process defers violence by producing a sign that is nigh immediately 
communally reciprocated. Gans writes:  
 
The gesture of appropriation is an act that directly intends a worldly 
result; its temporality is that of the practical world. In contrast, the sign 
does not intend its referent directly, but through mimesis of its formal 
closure. The sign is an object, a product, a whole imitating another whole. 
The sign points to its referent, but in order to do so, it must be cut off from 
the possibility of attaining it, must mimic the object’s closure in its own. 
What is new about the human sign as opposed to the most complex animal 
signals is that it is the product of a formal consciousness. The sign is a 
form in that it turns back on itself in order not to appear to be pursued as a 
gesture of appropriation.39  
 
The fundamental ethic of generative anthropology is deferral, and in that sense 
language is coeval with the ethical. However, through the guise of the will to power, 
Nietzsche urges us to strip ourselves of all anthropomorphisms in order to realise that 
everything is force, quantity, and without meaning (unless meaning itself is the will to 
power). For Nietzsche, the ethical is but a mere illusion that stems from the 
“gregarious” and “false” nature of language/consciousness, which indeed, according 
to Nietzsche, is will to power. Herein lies the intelligibility of a proposed reversal of 
the will to power through a generative anthropological perspective. Nietzsche 
concedes that his description is all-too-human, replete with unreliable 
anthropomorphisms, of resentful wills to power. As Nietzsche would have it, it is 
impossible to give a descriptive account of the will to power because everything is the 
will to power, including the reactive language of the slave who remembers. 
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Nevertheless, it is precisely language that allows Nietzsche to conceive of the will to 
power—for it to “exist.” On the other hand, generative anthropology brings the 
human back to the centre of discussion, instead of attempting to eliminate it. 
Nietzsche understands that the use of language, as a diseased condition, as a reaction 
to affects, is the key difference to be identified between the human and non-human—
the only distinction. Nietzsche takes for granted the very idea of the exchange of signs 
in a human community, as discussed in previous chapters. For Nietzsche, all things in 
the world—which is really just the will to power—are erroneously perceived 
precisely because they are perceived by us. For Gans, on the other hand, all things 
human are a re-presentation of the originary scene of human origins, where 
resentment constitutes all cultural endeavours.  
 
What Gans has illuminated is what Nietzsche has struggled with—the paradox of 
human language. For Gans, language has a double essence as “real and ideal, dualist 
and monist, ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal.’”40 There is a fundamental statement made by 
Gans in Signs of Paradox that establishes his position on what constitutes the human. 
He writes: “This analysis, as my title makes clear, is primarily concerned with 
paradox … the becoming-form of the human as an emergent dynamic structure that 
continually absorbs the nonformal into itself. The human is paradoxical because at 
every point it is both tempted and obliged to represent itself anew. The ‘vertical’ 
word-thing distinction that is at its core is constantly deconstructed and constantly 
reconstructs itself.”41 Again, it is the vertical that allows for the very notions of 
quantity and quality. Nietzsche does not grasp the double nature of language as 
vertical and horizontal, or quality and quantity—there is an inherent refusal of 
paradox with Nietzsche, as he attempts to create absolute distinctions between quality 
and quantity, even if that aim is ultimately to absorb one into the other. Gans, on the 
other hand, allows the paradox to stand. Of course, his total denunciation of language, 
which he considers to be an all-too-human phenomenon bearing no relation to the 
“apparent” world, is well known. The world is only apparent to Nietzsche because he 
declares that language has no capacity to circumscribe the “total reality” of the world, 
or what he deems to be the will to power. As we have seen in The Gay Science, 
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Nietzsche reduces self-consciousness to an insignificant, internal use of language for 
social cohesion that is also a tributary of will to power. He writes: 
 
The poor things were reduced to relying on thinking, inference, 
calculation, and the connecting of cause with effect, that is, to relying on 
their “consciousness”, that most impoverished and error-prone organ! … 
The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two 
layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, 
breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge 
of man’s instincts was obstructed.42 
 
To claim that Nietzsche is merely the philosopher who is suspicious of language, 
however, is both unproductive and intellectually hollow. Yet, when we witness 
Nietzsche’s ideas through the lens of generative anthropology, a new way of thinking 
that brings the human and human language back to the centre, many elements of 
Nietzsche’s thinking are revealed in a number of novel ways. In The Will to Power, 
Nietzsche writes that the only purpose language serves is to “form an image of the 
world, no more!” and that anthropomorphisms are nothing but “perspectival centers 
of willing and force.”43 Yet, if the will to power is a reality, it must be an impossible 
one. If the world is mere quantification of the sum of its parts, there must be a 
qualification that can be communally reciprocated in order to assert the existence of 
the will to power. In other words, a quantum of power does not “appear” in the human 
world until it is qualified with a semiotic, until it is designated as such by a subject. 
Yet, time and again, Nietzsche claims that qualities, established through language, are 
“illusions,” and “retroactive.” Surely, to qualify a quantity must emanate from 
language. Again, Nietzsche is assuming that the declarative is the sole linguistic form.  
 
From a generative anthropological standpoint, the inconsistencies found in the theory 
of the will to power are to be seen precisely where they are posited: in language. 
Nietzsche claims that there is no agency involved in the will to power other than 
competing “wills,” which leads to those wills or “forces” that either obey or command 
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depending on how much “centre of force” a given centre has. The fatal flaw in 
Nietzsche’s “theory” of the will to power lies in his asking us to conceive of the world 
as ultimately composed of quantities, where representation has no real meaning. 
Nevertheless, human interpretation and subjectivity are absolutely essential for 
endowing the qualities of terms such as “inhuman,” and “quanta.” The fundamental 
element missing from Nietzsche’s will to power is the very same thing that frames the 
theory, the human—or, more precisely, human language. Nietzsche claims that the 
subject, the human, is a mere depository of competing interpretations swayed by 
competing wills to power. Yet, there must exist something that represents the theory, 
even if it is something transitory, as Nietzsche would have it. Even though Nietzsche 
concedes that language inadequately describes that which encompasses all 
existence—that is, all of existence—the will to power is still impossible without the 
subject to qualify it as such. In order to conceive of the will to power requires the 
originary representation of an object, which is then mutually recognised as such 
through communal reciprocation. The will to power, in generative anthropological 
terms, is Nietzsche’s scenic vision of the world; it is his interpretation of the world 
made only possible through interlocution, whether it is the theory or the reality of the 
will to power that constitutes the theory’s explanation.  
 
Once again, we have Nietzsche denigrating language for its falsity, for its 
unreliability, as something that cannot “be” the truth of the world, which, to him, is 
will to power. Nietzsche, however, ultimately cannot reconcile what he wants to 
replace it with, the theory of the will to power as reality, and his representation of the 
will to power. Yet, perhaps this is why Nietzsche champions the cosmological theory 
of the eternal recurrence of the same as a way of bypassing the justification of 
meaning altogether. Nietzsche attempts to obliterate meaning once and for all through 
the eternal recurrence. The next section of this chapter will explore eternal recurrence 
in relation to Eric Gans’s hypothesis and Adam Katz’s exploration of what he calls 
the originary method.  
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The Eternal Recurrence of the Same 
 
I want to teach the idea that gives many the right to erase themselves—the 
great cultivating idea.—Friedrich Nietzsche44 
 
The sign is a form in that it turns back on itself in order not to appear to 
be pursued as a gesture of appropriation.—Eric Gans45 
 
This final section—divided into three parts after this preamble—will examine 
Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal recurrence of the same in relation to generative 
anthropology. What can we learn from Nietzsche’s—both cosmological and 
anthropological—theory of eternal recurrence in light of the originary hypothesis? 
The eternal recurrence of the same, indeed, I argue, shares a peculiar compatibility 
with what generative anthropology calls the representation of the originary scene. I 
will be discussing this compatibility at some length in this section. First, I will 
consider what is essential to Nietzsche’s conception of the theory of the eternal 
recurrence of the same—that is, both as a cosmological and as an anthropological 
idea. Second, I will examine the concept of the eternal recurrence in relation to Adam 
Katz’s “The Question of the Originary Method,” where Katz argues that Nietzsche’s 
theory is really a thought experiment that asks what it would really “mean” to mean 
“what one says and does, or what it would mean to ‘affirm’ one’s existence.”46 
Because of the very nature of the structure of language, Katz claims, there is no 
forthcoming “proof” of the theory of eternal recurrence. Third, I will draw a 
conceptual link between the ethical imperative demanded by the eternal recurrence 
and generative anthropology with the figure of the Ouroboros. The figure of the 
Ouroboros, I argue, aptly symbolises both Nietzsche’s theory of eternal recurrence as 
well as Gans’s theory of the formal closure of the sign. In this section I will also take 
into consideration Nietzsche’s theory of the origin of language in relation to eternal 
recurrence, which posits that there is either no origin at all, or every single moment is 
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the origin. How can we reconcile these differences between his earlier account of 
language and eternal recurrence? Or, is Nietzsche forced to ultimately abandon his 
earlier position on the origin of language? 
 
 
What Is the Eternal Recurrence of the Same?  
 
The pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus understood the order of nature to be in a state 
of perpetual becoming, or “all flowing” (Gk.: όλες οι ροές). He proposed that the 
ceaseless war of opposites striving for unity is the only measure in a reality where 
there is no permanent existence.47 For Heraclitus, everything is force against force. In 
other words, the only fixed “law” in nature, for Heraclitus, is that of perpetual change. 
In light of Heraclitus, one can easily understand how Nietzsche conceptualised both 
the will to power and the eternal recurrence of the same. In a similar fashion, 
Nietzsche’s prophetic teachings in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and the Nachlass, argue 
to embrace and affirm this necessary and inevitable impermanence of being in a world 
of flux. As Löwith states, Nietzsche, following Heraclitus, is rearticulating “a most 
ancient view of the world.”48 Indeed, Nietzsche considers the eternal recurrence to be 
the anti-Christian repetition of antiquity. In his brilliant and bizarre autobiography, 
Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes the eternal recurrence as “the highest formula of a 
life affirmation that can ever be attained.”49 Appearing first in The Gay Science, and 
elaborated upon in Zarathustra, Nietzsche claims that his “greatest teaching” is the 
idea of the eternal recurrence of the same. For Nietzsche, this world is an eternally 
recurring will to power. Nietzsche writes: “That ‘force’ and ‘rest,’ ‘remaining the 
same,’ contradict one another. The measure of force (as magnitude) as fixed, but its 
essence in flux.”50 To embrace this concept is to affirm all that appears and disappears 
in the world. Nietzsche confirms this in Ecce Homo by encouraging “the yea-saying 
to the impermanence and annihilation of things, which is the decisive feature of a 
Dionysian philosophy; the postulation of becoming, together with the radical rejection 
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even of the concept being.”51 Karl Löwith tells us that Nietzsche’s conception of the 
eternal recurrence, Dionysus and Zarathustra, are manifestations of one and the same 
thing.  
 
Nietzsche poses a question: Are we to take this knowledge as a horrifying burden? Or 
are we to integrate it as a precondition to transform ourselves? The eternal recurrence 
represents, for Nietzsche, the inverse of the Hindu and Buddhist religious conceptions 
of eternal recurrence. Instead of seeking liberation from the endless wheel of life and 
death, Nietzsche calls for us, as Löwith argues, to embrace this inescapable universal 
law. Löwith corroborates this by stating that “Nietzsche-Zarathustra becomes the 
teacher of the eternal recurrence, he, too, is reborn, because of a reversal, to be sure. 
But he is born not to a new and different life in Christ, but to the always same life of 
the world, which as an eternal cycle comes back to itself in its becoming.”52 In Ecce 
Homo, Nietzsche claims that his conception of Zarathustra and the eternal recurrence 
is able to incorporate all of what we know about experience and reality. According to 
Nietzsche, once one reaches beyond the illusion of being, through the eternal 
recurrence, one moves toward an affirmation of becoming. In Nietzsche’s Philosophy 
of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, Löwith claims that “with the idea of the 
eternal recurrence, Nietzsche is in fact beyond man and time, ecstatically removed 
from himself.”53 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s opus magnum and self-
proclaimed masterpiece, whose primary message is the eternal recurrence, explicates 
a shamanic journey, overcoming the ailments caused by stagnant myths (or, as 
Nietzsche conceived it, religious nihilism), through the “affirmation” of the eternal 
recurrence and Dionysian ecstasy.54  
 
The “tragic artist of the Dionysian type” and the eternal recurrence act as one in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy as the breaking open of the entire clockwork of “nihilism.”55 
The artist of the Dionysian type revels in the conception of the eternal recurrence of 
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53  Ibid., 62. 
54  The idea of the relationship between Nietzsche and the shamanic was explored in my honours thesis.  
55  Nietzsche’s understanding of “nihilism” turns out to be any dogmatic mode of life that adheres to the 
denunciation of certain aspects of life. For Nietzsche, Christianity is the most monstrous manifestation of life-
negation and, therefore, the most sinister form of nihilism in world history. 
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the same; the thought becomes intoxicating. Nietzsche conceives of this as the 
ultimate Dionysian ecstasy. And, as Löwith points out, it brings the “redemption from 
perfect nihilism.”56 Nietzsche’s Zarathustra must fight against all odds in the deepest 
solitude, for only in solitude, on the edge of madness, can one “awake,” beyond the 
human, as the Ubermensch. And Zarathustra tells us: “and once you are awake, you 
shall remain awake eternally.”57 Once Zarathustra completes his metamorphosis, 
through the affirmation of the eternal recurrence of the same, he finally reveals that all 
things that are held dear by man, are of man’s own creation—illusions that must be 
overcome. Zarathustra is now the creator of values, a free spirit who has cured 
himself of the illusions of humanity, and is now ready to cure “humanity” by 
overcoming it. Nietzsche-Zarathustra now has the inner direction to love his own 
destiny—to love his own fate (L.: amor fati). Emerging from the absolute depths of 
solitude and desperation, Zarathustra affirms all that comes into, and goes out of, 
existence. With an emphatic “Yes,” he pronounces:  
 
Did you ever say Yes to one joy? O my friends, then you said Yes to all 
woe as well. All things are interlinked and entwined together, all things 
are in love; if ever you wanted one time twice, if ever you said: “You 
please me, happiness, flashing instant, moment” you wanted everything 
back! Everything anew, everything eternal, everything interlinked, 
entwined, in love, O thus did you love the world.58  
 
This Nietzschean-Heraclitean joy in eternal becoming, through the eternal recurrence 
of the same, would become, as Nietzsche saw it, his ultimate contribution to 
humanity. He tells us in his Dionysian rapture that he becomes “beyond pity and 
terror, to realize in oneself the eternal joy of becoming” as if to propose that the only 
way to celebrate existence is to realise oneself as, not human, but a becoming.59  
 
                                                             
56  Ibid., 63. 
57  Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(London: Penguin Classics, 2003), 102. 
58  Ibid., 10. 
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Despite the inherent contradictions in Nietzsche’s work—pointed out by Löwith—
concerning the paradox of the will to power in an eternally recurring flux, Nietzsche 
nevertheless takes the idea very seriously. In fact, in correspondence with his friend, 
Paul Rée, Nietzsche proposes that the eternal recurrence is the “most scientific fact.”60 
Nevertheless, he first proposes the eternal recurrence as a thought experiment before 
he pursues it as a scientific “fact.” In The Gay Science, under the aphorism, “The 
greatest weight,” Nietzsche writes: 
 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your 
loneliest loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have 
lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and 
there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy, and every 
thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life 
will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence?—
even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this 
moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside 
down again and again, and you with it, a speck of dust!” Would you not 
throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who 
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when 
you would have answered him: “You are a god and never have I heard 
anything more divine.” If this thought gained possession of you, it would 
change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and 
every thing, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?” 
would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed 
would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more 
fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?61  
 
The first appearance of the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same is of course in 
the form of a question—a demand even. In your darkest hour, Nietzsche claims, a 
deity arrives and reveals the absolute reality of the world—every aspect of your life, 
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all the horrors and joys, will be lived out innumerable times. You are forced to choose 
between affirming what the demon has told you, or an unimaginable horror, infinitely 
repeated. Yet, what does it mean to “affirm” one’s existence? I will engage with this 
question shortly. Despite the plausibility or implausibility, however, of the science 
behind eternal recurrence, Nietzsche is imploring us to ask ourselves whether we have 
the capacity to accept an eternally recurring sameness. Of course, there is a certain 
elitism involved in the eternal recurrence; not every “human” can withstand such a 
heavy burden, according to Nietzsche. Disregarding the contradictory proclamations 
found in his theory of the will to power about there not being an individual, Nietzsche 
asks us whether or not one has the strength to embrace our lives in the same manner 
ad infinitum. Yet, one might ask: what is the point of embracing an eternally recurring 
life of sameness if it is already inevitable? And also, how can we reconcile 
Nietzsche’s earlier ideas on the origin of language if the eternal recurrence is indeed 
his final and self-proclaimed greatest teaching? To answer these questions, we can 
look to Katz’s “The Question of the Originary Method,” where the eternal recurrence 
is conceived of as a thought experiment. The eternal recurrence can be read in two 
basic ways: (1) the ethical imperative of eternal recurrence that one must affirm every 
moment one experiences, and (2) the cosmological “fact” of eternal recurrence, where 
Nietzsche claims that the universe is in fact a finite structure that eternally recurs in 
the same way. As has been discussed in chapter 1, Löwith claims that the two ways of 
viewing eternal recurrence are irreconcilable. My aim is not to discuss the 
incompatibility of the cosmological with the anthropological. Rather, my concern is 
the idea of eternal recurrence in light of generative anthropology. Indeed, there is 
much academic commentary to be found on the inherent problems faced with an 
eternal recurrence.62 And so, for now, I will leave aside the cosmological reading of 
the eternal recurrence until I discuss the Ouroboros in relation to generative 
anthropology.  
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The Generative Thought Experiment 
 
Minimality is a sign of inexhaustibility, not reductionism.—Adam Katz63 
 
Without delving into the notion of the apparent meaninglessness of the total reality of 
the world as eternal recurrence, we must take a step back and consider eternal 
recurrence as an attempt to think one’s way out of representation, which is also 
precisely one of Nietzsche’s “goals” concerning the affirmation of eternal recurrence. 
Adam Katz explores the idea of the thought experiment in great detail. Figuring 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence as a thought experiment, instead of an all-
encompassing cosmology—or, even a proof—which Katz also considers to be a 
thought experiment, allows us to situate his idea on/within the scene of representation. 
In The Originary Hypothesis: A Minimal Proposal for Humanistic Inquiry, Katz’s 
chapter “The Question of Originary Method,” examines the implications of the 
originary hypothesis as a minimal subject of conversation.  
 
What is most important in that chapter for this thesis, however, is Katz’s discussion 
about Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence in relation to the generative anthropological idea 
of self-reflexivity, and thought experiments. For Katz, a thought experiment “enacts 
the paradox of self-reflexivity, that self-knowledge (and, especially, the more acute 
the self-knowledge) cancels itself insofar as the self known is no longer the self that 
knows.”64 In other words, Katz highlights the self-reflexivity of the doubt that 
anything can be proven in any given thought experiment. Katz claims Nietzsche’s 
thought experiment of the eternal recurrence is a perfect example of an idea for which 
no “proof” can ever be given. Yet, Katz considers thought experiments with what he 
refers to as a generative thought experiment. What is a generative thought experiment, 
however? Katz writes: “If we view the thought experiment in scenic terms, we can 
simply describe it as the process of founding and entering; constituting and reifying; 
exiting and indexing spaces of thinking.”65 Of course, any thought experiment is an 
iteration of the originary scene upon which all humanity has been founded. In this 
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light, the very foundation of the eternal recurrence (and the will to power) relies 
exclusively on the scenic, where every sign Nietzsche—or anyone, for that matter—
iterates must preclude and anticipate the next.  
 
Katz claims that Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence can be accounted for through what he 
calls the originary method, which situates eternal recurrence on the scene of 
representation. He writes: “[O]riginary method is interested in the conditions of 
articulation of the saving sign, and seeks to situate itself in that infinitesimal instant 
when the exponentially increasing range and intensity of desires and resentments 
generated by the latest version of the sign (or, more precisely, by the field of mimetic 
activity constituted by that version) can and must be given new articulation.”66 Of 
course, because of the very structure of the scene of representation, there can never be 
any closure of a thought experiment. The thought experiment must always ‘invent’ 
new signs to attempt to give meaning to the preceding sign. In this light, Nietzsche 
attempts to convey, I argue, an “infinitesimal instant,” but he is seeking an ultimate 
“seal” or closure, where the eternal recurrence becomes the only sign. He asks us to 
seek for no meaning but the meaning of the will of eternity. Yet, as Katz asks us, what 
does it really mean to mean when we affirm such an idea? There are several ways to 
examine this question. 
 
First, we must understand what “meaning” could actually be in terms of the originary 
hypothesis. Katz suggests that “meaning” is merely the meaning of something as it is 
in the instant of the transmission of the sign. There is a certain “unthinkability” for a 
sign to mean anything other than what it is at the instant, because each iteration seeks 
to qualify the preceding one. Katz writes:  
 
Meaning is nothing more than the unthinkability of anything being any 
different than it is right now and it is the experience of the sign as 
confirmation of such that we are, unwittingly or not, requesting when, 
with whatever level of sophistication, we try to “make sense” of 
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something. And the proof that one has understood is that they emerge as 
the sign guaranteeing that sign and instigating its iteration.67 
 
For Katz, Nietzsche has no choice but to move from one sign to the next, forever 
deferring his thought experiment of the “greatest weight,” forever deferring the sense 
of what it would really mean to “affirm” one’s existence. The only way a sign, 
including the sign/vision of the eternal recurrence of the same, can be understood—or 
given meaning—is through the iteration of another sign that attempts to designate a 
meaning to the precluding sign. Looking at the eternal recurrence as a thought 
experiment in relation to the originary method in this way eliminates any possibility 
of ever knowing what it would mean to affirm what Nietzsche would refer to as the 
last sign. 
 
The ethical imperative of the affirmation of the eternal recurrence, then, is impossible 
in light of generative anthropology. The reason for this is that one cannot ever be in 
an “instant,” in the centre of the scene of representation, or what Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra refers to as “noon,” where he claims all meaning—except the meaning of 
eternity—is obliterated. His eternal recurrence is an attempt at the final closure of the 
scene of representation. Yet, generative anthropology includes Nietzsche’s eternal 
recurrence as a thought experiment on the scene of human representation, where the 
scene is never fully closed because of the very nature of deferral and the human 
periphery always denied access to the centre. Indeed, as a function of the sign as the 
deferral of violence, an aborted gesture of appropriation, the perpetuation of returning 
to the scene for a new iteration, representation is inherently ethical. Katz writes:  
 
deferral is by definition tentative and provisional, the originary scene is 
never definitively closed. If signs only mean to the extent that they are 
iterable, and iterability needs actual iteration to be demonstrated, what 
will have happened to all signs, signification as such, once we get to the 
sign that “doesn’t work,” and there is no more iteration? This opening of 
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the scene renders uncertain all meanings, making inquiry impossible by 
rendering existence problematic.68 
 
Of course the thought experiment of the eternal recurrence “works” as a thought 
experiment, but it works only to the extent that it must remain open as a thought 
experiment that requires the iteration of further signs. And so, Nietzsche’s convictions 
about his great vision of the world are surely misguided if he believes that the eternal 
recurrence is the final sign. Yet, whether or not the eternal recurrence captures the 
nature of existence, there will never be proof of this, and so one can or must question 
the tenability of living one’s life based on this thought experiment, or any thought 
experiment generated on the scene of representation.  
 
The continual return to the representation of the scene denies us the chance to know 
what an eternal recurrence of the same would mean, let alone live by. Because of the 
very nature of deferral as deferral, we cannot ascertain the absolute meaning of any 
sign until we move to the next sign. Katz writes: 
 
the thought experiment tries to gauge the “reach” of the sign in question: 
at what point does its meaning dissolve into meaninglessness, become a 
cliché, a sheer prompt to plug in a particular habit? The only way to carry 
out such a test is to place yourself inside the sign—completely, 
inescapably inside—and insist that you find a way out. And the only way 
out is into some other sign, whose very existence is both precluded and 
anticipated by the present prevailing one.69  
 
We might imagine Nietzsche burying himself “inescapably inside” the single idea, the 
single sign of the eternal recurrence, but of course it is arguable he ever found a way 
out. Nietzsche ultimately asks us to contemplate the single sign of eternal recurrence. 
He insists that we embrace it as the only reality, the only referent and sign. But this 
begs the same question: What would it really mean to affirm one’s existence 
eternally? Katz writes: “Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ thought experiment (the focus of 
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which is not the ‘hypothesis’ of the ‘eternal return’ but on what your answer would be 
to the demon) is interested in nothing more than representing what it would really 
‘mean’ what one says and does (what it would mean to ‘affirm’ one’s existence)—
again, something for which no visible proof is forthcoming.”70 While Nietzsche 
attempts to exhaust the possibility of an all-too-human meaning, generative 
anthropology convincingly asserts the inexhaustible nature of the reiteration of 
meaning. This is markedly different from much contemporary postmodern thinking. 
Katz writes: “Insofar as modernity is an attempt to forget our reliance upon the 
ostensive, and the postmodern further extends this forgetting by iterating and 
intensifying the terror of the sacred centre, the generative thought experiment restores 
the ostensive as the opening to thought by representing that ‘x’ as ‘just’ an array of 
signs, but an array that can never exhaust what it refers to even while that array’s 
distinctiveness is not only in the signifiers’ attempts to do so but to solicit the 
participation of others, as signs of one’s signs, in the process. I can know the other’s 
pain, indeed, I can represent the other’s humanity, insofar as I contribute to their 
‘array.’”71 In the same way, Nietzsche’s thought experiment of the eternal recurrence 
of the same as an “ethical imperative” is doomed to failure precisely because, through 
the very nature of the generation of signs described by Gans and Katz, it—and all 
thought experiments, for that matter—will inevitably generate more thought 
experiments, and more signs. 
 
 
The Ouroboros: A Provisional Synthesis of Gans and Nietzsche 
 
Events are openings, not closures. The only acceptable intellectual utopia 
is one whose story has a beginning but no end.—Eric Gans72 
 
Thus far, the primary focus in this thesis has been language. In this final section I 
wish to briefly reflect on a non-linguistic sign, the Ouroboros, in light of Nietzsche’s 
eternal recurrence and Gans’s originary hypothesis. Here, then, is a non-linguistic 
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sign that is able to capture, in visual terms, some of the key formal properties of both 
the eternal recurrence and the originary scene. While we have every reason to believe 
that there is intellectual profit to be had in both of these theoretical orientations, it is 
through generative anthropology that we will be best able to comprehend the eternal 
recurrence of the same. Through an examination of some of the key ideas of 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, Robert Yelle’s The Rebirth of Myth? Nietzsche’s 
Eternal Recurrence and Its Romantic Antecedents, Eric Neumann’s The Origins and 
History of Consciousness, Silviano Santiago’s “Ouroboros,” and, most importantly, 
Gans’s Signs of Paradox, I will attempt to uncover some potential conceptual 
synergies that exist between Nietzsche’s and Gans’s employment of the symbol of the 
Ouroboros. 
 
 
Figure 1. The alchemical Ouroboros, with the Greek inscription “One is All.” 
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Thought to originate in ancient Egypt, the Ouroboros depicts the symbol of a 
serpentine—or snake/serpent/dragon—creature eating its own tail.73 Yet, the symbol 
of the Ouroboros has many interpretations, from the ancient Greek founder of the 
Hermetic tradition, Hermes Trimegistus, who considered the Ouroboros to be the 
symbol that unites all religions, to the analytic psychology of Carl Jung, who 
considers the symbol to be the primal archetype of the collective unconscious. The 
Ouroboros may also represent a hermaphroditic, primordial, universal unity 
underlying the inherent duality of the sexes, of both man and woman, and the 
alchemical simultaneity of the acts of murder and impregnation. Simply put, the 
Ouroboros is the cosmogonic, archetypal, paradoxical symbol of the alpha and 
omega, or the “All One.” As an entirely self-contained entity that feeds off itself, the 
Ouroboros both creates and destroys: there is nothing beyond it, or behind it, or above 
its perfect model of autogeneration. Neumann’s The Origins and History of 
Consciousness is engaged with the notion of an origin of the human that is coeval 
with the rise of consciousness. Despite the analytic psychological explanations of the 
birth of consciousness given, Neumann depicts the Ouroboros as both the prime 
symbolic representative of eternity and the most credible model for the emergence 
and function of human consciousness. He describes the symbolism of the Ouroboros 
as containing an indeterminate multiplicity of meanings. Neumann considers the 
Ouroboros to be a symbol that at once “blends, as does the dream, it spins and weaves 
together, combining each with each. The symbol is therefore an analogy, more of 
equivalence than an equation, and therein lies its wealth of meanings, but also its 
elusiveness.”74 Neumann’s analogical reading of the Ouroboros opens up an 
interesting approach even if we have reason to doubt the substantive content that 
Neumann attaches to it.  
 
The Ouroboros might also be understood as a non-linguistic figure of paradox 
representing the universal, primordial image of the human. At the very least, for 
modern eyes, the Ouroboros represents the rejection of linearity in favour of a circular 
continuity. Although we may only fathom the Ouroboric symbol as a paradox, we 
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must situate, if we can, what kind of paradox it is. Neumann asserts: “The symbolic 
thinking portrayed in these images of the round endeavors to grasp contents which 
even our present-day consciousness can only understand as paradoxes, precisely 
because it cannot grasp them.”75 In other words, the generation of the paradox, then, 
represents ability to generate an image whose contents can never be exhaustively, 
fully determined.  
 
“Ouroboros,” by Silviano Santiago, examines the Ouroboros as symbolic of 
linguistics. Santiago writes: “This image of the serpent freely moving through the 
field only to turn back upon itself in such a way that the end recuperates the beginning 
(or vice versa) could well speak of us of the privileged yet precarious position of 
linguistics as it embraces and encompasses the whole cycle of western thought so as 
to postulate itself as that discipline which can best account for the clôture du savoir 
within our historic-metaphysical age: linguistics has become in recent years, to use 
one of Greimas’s expressions, the ‘pilot’ for all other sciences.”76 He depicts the 
Ouroboros as “the rejection of a linear in favour of a circular continuity: the adventure 
into space becomes the space of adventure.”77 Essentially, the Ouroboros 
symbolically represents both the beginning and end of an event—a closure and an 
opening.  
 
Yelle in The Rebirth of Myth? Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence and Its Romantic 
Antecedents describes the Ouroboros as “a circle uniting the two opposed paths of 
past and present.”78 In a similar conceptualisation, Yelle considers the symbol of the 
Ouroboros to be more consistent with Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence than with any 
other mythic depiction of an eternal recurrence. For instance, we have “The Seven 
Seals” from Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra:  
 
If I be a prophet and full of that prophetic spirit that wanders on high 
ridges between two seas, wanders between past and future like a heavy 
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cloud, enemy to sultry lowlands and to all that is weary and can neither 
die nor live: ready for lighting in its dark bosom and for redeeming beams 
of light, pregnant with beams of lighting which affirm Yes! Laugh Yes! 
Ready for prophetic lighting-flashes: but blessed is he who is thus 
pregnant! And, in truth, he who wants to kindle the light of the future 
must hang long over the mountains like a heavy storm! Oh how should I 
not lust for eternity and for the wedding ring of rings—the ring of 
Recurrence! Never yet did I find the woman by whom I wanted children, 
unless it be this woman, whom I love: for I love you, O Eternity! For I 
love you, O Eternity!79 
 
In fact, the Ouroboros is quite fitting as a model for Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. 
His eternal recurrence is one without “increase or income; without beginning or 
end.”80 Not only can we draw analogies between the Ouroboros and Nietzsche’s 
eternal recurrence of the same as the “ring of rings,” but we can also equate it to the 
signal thesis in Gans’s The Origin of Language: A Formal Theory of Representation, 
the first ever work in generative anthropology, which interestingly depicts the symbol 
of the Ouroboros on its cover. The difference in thinking about the Ouroboros 
between Nietzsche and Gans is that Nietzsche’s Ouroboros of eternal return is a return 
to “sameness.” Gans’s Ouroboros, by contrast, is the simultaneous openness of 
language and the formal closure of the sign. Most importantly, the “Ouroboros is 
appropriate as a symbol of origination.”81 Generative anthropology, I argue, invokes 
the symbol of the Ouroboros for precisely this reason: it is indeed a “symbol of 
origination,” and a symbol of the formal closure of the paradoxical sign. The symbol 
depicts the formal structure of the originary scene, where a group of hominids have 
gathered around an appetitive, mimetically attractive object—the sacred centre. Once 
the object is consumed, only the formally closed sign remains, forever denying entry, 
because the sign demands re-presentation. Much like Nietzsche’s vision of the eternal 
recurrence of the same, the Ouroboros symbolises the cyclical nature of the perpetual 
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return to sameness. Yet, the generative anthropological positioning of the Ouroboros 
is that it is a perpetual return to deferral.  
 
For Gans, there is no concern regarding the “external” world, nor any concern 
regarding whether or not eternal recurrence is a cosmological “fact,” as Nietzsche 
would have it—for if it were, it would not annul the originary hypothesis. If the world 
did indeed recur infinitely, there would still be an infinity of scenes of origin. Rather, 
for generative anthropology, each new return to the scene (or, each time we speak) of 
origin is a new iteration of itself. It is ultimately the human that cannot escape 
language (which defines the human as human) once it has been initiated, for if it were 
to do so, we might have something like the single sign of eternal recurrence. Yet, 
however much Nietzsche wants to “erase” the human, he cannot escape the paradox 
of language, or the paradox of the Ouroboros as depicted by generative anthropology. 
Indeed, every single sign uttered achieves a formal closure, only to revert back to 
individual originary resentment of the centre. Nietzsche’s fluctuating perspectives of 
the eternal recurrence, from absolute horror to joyous frivolity, only concretises the 
idea that it is still the perpetual play of signs that is utterly inescapable, unless one is 
to revert to animality, or, say, a certain species of madness. It is Nietzsche’s own 
iterations of a sceneless scene that constitutes his eternal recurrence: a sacred centre 
with no meaning is a centre that does not point to “God.” Rather, Nietzsche’s centre is 
the circle itself. Nietzsche’s sacred is the eternally self-creating and destroying, self-
regenerating Ouroboros. Clearly, we have a contradiction in terms, a reductio ad 
absurdum. It is Nietzsche’s insane attempt to be the Ouroboros, the sign itself, that 
constitutes his generative thought experiment. Yet, his final teaching is still no doubt 
unwittingly a re-presentation of the originary scene. 
 
If one were to take into consideration the notion that the Ouroboros best represents 
the paradox of the simultaneity of openness and closure through the depiction of a 
serpent biting its own tail, we could understand why Gans (or his publisher) would 
utilise this ancient symbol on the cover of his first work, situating the origin of the 
human in The Origin of Language.  
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Let us now reconsider how Gans describes the emission of the first aborted gesture of 
appropriation in Signs of Paradox. He writes:  
 
The gesture of appropriation is an act that directly intends a worldly 
result; its temporality is that of the practical world. In contrast, the sign 
does not intend its referent directly, but through mimesis of its formal 
closure … the sign is a form in that it turns back on itself in order not to 
appear to be pursued as a gesture of appropriation.82 
 
Indeed, the first sign must imitate this very same closure on its own: the sign itself is 
the invention/discovery of the very illustration of closure. Through the emergence of a 
sacred centre—avoiding a near mimetic cataclysm—to an aborted gesture of 
appropriation, the Ouroboros resonates most distinctively as the prime symbolic 
depiction of the closure of the first sign itself. Identical to the Ouroboros, the sign is 
self-contained and formally closed; it is the beginning of consciousness as it at once 
destroys the external object as the immediate desirable element, while, at the same 
time, it creates the openness of a self-referential world that forever mediates the 
external world through its very verticality.  
 
Every sign produced is a harking back to the re-presentation of the original scene, 
where humans stand on the periphery; they create a new “name-of-god”—or, a new 
symbol to conceive the Ouroboros—each time a sign is produced to stand in for the 
now objectless, sacred centre. As discussed in chapter 3, originary resentment is the 
outcome of an individual not being able to consume the desired object in the centre—
because of the aborted gesture of appropriation.  
 
For Nietzsche, only out of the death of “God” and the man who has overcome 
himself—the illusions manifest in an ethics of resentment gradually formed by 
reactive language—can will (can be the becoming of) the eternal recurrence. 
Nietzsche claims that his teaching is at once “the most extreme form of nihilism” and, 
at the same time, the “self overcoming” of nihilism because the teaching intends to 
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recognise the meaninglessness of all existence as the only goal. Ultimately, however, 
Nietzsche’s rejection of the truth value of language invalidates his goal to describe the 
total reality of the world as a will to power in an inexorably recurring universe. 
Following Löwith, I claim Nietzsche’s final attempt to eliminate an ethics of 
resentment through the affirmation of the eternal recurrence is an attempt to falsely 
situate himself as God. Of course, for generative anthropology, the sign itself is the 
“name-of-God,” not the resentful individual on the periphery. 
 
As has been discussed, Nietzsche’s last attempt to eradicate any iteration of meaning 
was by affirming the “one,” the only “fixed law” of eternal recurrence. Yet, from a 
generative anthropological perspective, Nietzsche’s idea of an eternally recurring 
cosmos is what Gans considers a “closed” way of thinking that aims at a “final 
solution.” In Signs of Paradox, Gans writes: “Closed forms of thought are built 
around apocalyptic events that provide ‘final solutions’ to all the problems within 
their universe. If we would rid ourselves of this sort of thinking, we must exchange 
the apocalyptic model of the event for an originary model. Events are openings, not 
closures. The only acceptable intellectual utopia is one whose story has a beginning 
but no end.”83 What Gans means by eliminating a final analysis is that we, as humans, 
who represent the scene of origin in perpetuity, are deferring a “final” meaning or 
“solution” to the world, and thus deferring cataclysmic violence, something to which 
Nietzsche ultimately falls prey. 
 
The originary version of eternal recurrence, then, is not one of perpetual sameness. 
Rather, this version of an eternal recurrence allows for inexhaustible novelty, ever-
new signs, ever-new ways to imagine the scene. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s 
eternal recurrence limits itself to the single sign of an infinite sameness that cannot 
allow any meaning beyond the “meaning” of the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche’s 
eternal recurrence, then, is a finite, self-enclosed eternity that strikes fear in all but the 
deranged and mad of the world. Surely, then, an eternal recurrence that allows for a 
deep understanding of what it “means” to be human, that allows for inexhaustibility, 
an eternal return to the aesthetic contemplation of the originary sign, represented in 
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ever-new fashions, is not only comprehendible, but allows us to reach for more 
“meaning,” something that Nietzsche vehemently rejects. One might ask Nietzsche 
whether or not his ultimate “goal” of “affirming” eternal sameness was ever going to 
be worth his while. Evidently, affirming the single sign of the Ouroboros, of 
Dionysus, of Zarathustra, of the eternal recurrence, was not worth Nietzsche’s while. 
We might echo both Klossowski and Löwith, who claim it was Nietzsche’s obsession 
with the single idea of eternal recurrence that led to his madness.  
 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, for Gans, is merely a conceptually aligned set of 
declaratives, made only possible by the sign. Gans claims that if we are to follow 
Nietzsche, we must assume that language has been “always already.” Whether or not 
language, as Nietzsche proposes, is an error, is something deemed irrelevant to Gans. 
Even if the protohuman “alpha” had “unintentionally” designated the first ostensive, 
triggering an error in the development of the species, all that matters is that the scene 
had occurred and is re-presented, forever deferring violence and a “final” meaning.  
 
The late Nietzsche would finally reject the Apollonian force that he claimed gives 
form, structure, and language to the force of nature, Dionysus. For Nietzsche, there is 
only the single world of the Dionysian ebb and flow of forces. Yet, conceiving of 
Nietzsche’s oeuvre through the lens of generative anthropology ultimately shows us 
generative anthropology’s capacity to incorporate Nietzsche’s thought into its ambit, 
and not the inverse. Simply put, representation cannot be eliminated by 
representation, no matter what is being represented. Indeed, generative anthropology 
allows us to remain open to the ongoing—or perhaps eternal—re-articulation of the 
paradox of human representation.  
 
Ultimately, Nietzsche does not allow for a generative anthropological space, but 
generative anthropology allows for Nietzsche. Perhaps it is only by reading Nietzsche 
through generative anthropology that we can be faithful to him. This theorist of a 
multiplicity of the endless play of signs who ends up insisting on only one can be 
saved only by his incorporation into something like a generative anthropological 
standpoint. As Katz states, the minimal scheme of generative anthropology is not 
equivalent to a reductionism, but to an inexhaustibility. And so it seems we can only 
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be faithful to Nietzsche by also taking leave of him. Nietzsche himself asserts that 
those who are to be true to him, to be the true inheritors and disciples of his 
philosophy, should learn to forget him. We need not discuss the consequences of 
implementing a singular vision, a single sign to live by—one need think only of the 
twentieth century and the horrors witnessed therein.  
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